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Letter to CD Chairman on Chemical Weapons Elimination

*OW2102130892 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service
in Chinese 0710 GMT 21 Feb 92*

[Text] Geneva, 20 February (XINHUA)—Hou Zhitong, head of the Chinese delegation to the Geneva Conference on Disarmament [CD], emphasized here recently: Future chemical weapons conventions must impartially solve the problem of chemical weapons that have been left behind and unequivocally stipulate that those weapons must be destroyed by whoever left them behind.

Hou Zhitong expressed this position in his letter to (Jikak), chairman of the Geneva disarmament talks, and in two working documents submitted to the meeting by him, concerning chemical weapons left in China by foreign countries.

Hou Zhitong emphatically pointed out: The convention on total ban and complete destruction of chemical weapons under discussion at the meeting must impartially solve the problem of chemical weapons that have been left behind, and unequivocally stipulate that they must be destroyed by whoever leaves them behind. On this premise, we should not rule out that the countries concerned find a proper and concrete solution through consultations.

The Chinese delegation told reporters today that the two documents submitted are "some information on chemical weapons left behind in China by foreign countries" and "China's principled stand and suggestions on the question of chemical weapons that have been left behind. They describe in detail the number, variety, and distribution of chemical weapons left behind in China by foreign countries.

The disposal of chemical weapons that have been left behind is one of the major topics of the talks on a convention on chemical weapons.

NATO, CIS, East Europe Adopt CFE Implementation Plan

*OW2202040992 Beijing XINHUA in English
0301 GMT 22 Feb 92*

[Text] Brussels, February 21 (XINHUA)—Delegates from NATO nations, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and East European countries today adopted a program for the implementation of the treaty on cutting back Europe's conventional weapons [CFE].

The program was adopted at a high-level working group meeting held in NATO's headquarters in Brussels today.

The arms reduction treaty signed in 1990 by the 16 NATO members and former Warsaw Pact member states called for massive cuts on tanks and other conventional weapons, but the disintegration of the Soviet Union has made it necessary to amend it.

Under the program adopted today, all independent former Soviet republics must finish their technical amending of the treaty by the end of May. And the treaty will come into effect on the 10th day after all sides have formally completed the ratification process.

CIS Chief of Staff Arrives To Resume Border Troop Cuts Talks

*HK2602100592 Hong Kong AFP in English
0928 GMT 26 Feb 92*

[Text] Beijing, Feb 26 (AFP)—A top military leader of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) arrived here Wednesday to resume high-level talks with China on demilitarizing their common border, officials said.

The talks were derailed last year by the collapse of the Soviet Union.

General Viktor Samsonov, chief of staff of the CIS joint armed forces, said on arrival that he aimed to develop military cooperation between China and the former Soviet republics, the Russian Embassy said.

Samsonov said he would discuss with Chinese officials joint steps to further demilitarize the border area. China and the Soviet Union clashed over disputed areas of the 7,000 kilometer (4,340 mile) long border in the 1960s.

Beijing said in October that border troop reduction talks were postponed because of the chaos in the Soviet Union. Scheduled bilateral talks involving military experts and diplomats resumed in November in Moscow.

Separately, the Chinese parliament ratified Tuesday a treaty signed with the former Soviet Union fixing the eastern part of the border. The Russian parliament ratified the treaty on February 13.

The CIS military leader was scheduled to meet Defense Minister Qin Jiwei and Jiang Zemin, head of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Military Commission, which makes policy on military affairs.

He was also to address the People's Liberation Army's Military Sciences Academy and visit a number of military units.

Samsonov is scheduled to leave for North Korea on March 2.

NORTH KOREA

Delegate on 2d N-S Nuclear Control Contact

*SK2702105492 Pyongyang KCNA in English
1016 GMT 27 Feb 92*

[Text] Panmunjom February 27 (KCNA)—A contact between delegates of both sides for discussing the question of forming and operating the North-South Nuclear Control Joint Committee took place at the Tongil House in the northern portion of Panmunjom today.

Present at the contact were two delegates to the inter-Korean high-level talks and suite from each side.

The contact was held behind closed doors.

Choe U-chin, a delegate of the North side, gave a news briefing at the end of the contact.

According to him, at the contact the North side drew attention to the shortcomings and debatable points of the draft "agreement on the formation and operation of the South-North Nuclear Control Joint Committee" brought forward by the South side at the preceding contact.

To begin with, the South side's draft agreement was failing to include the question of nuclear weapons and nuclear bases to which primary attention should be paid in realizing the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

The failure to mention even a word about this question when we do not know whether there are still U.S. nuclear weapons and nuclear bases in South Korea, or all of them have been pulled out or dismantled means turning away from the fundamental problem in the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, Choe U-chin said.

Pointing out that the South side's draft agreement laid stress on the inspection question alone, while dealing unsatisfactorily with the question of discussing and taking measures to implement the overall points set out in the "Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula," he said if the joint declaration on denuclearization is to be carried out in good faith, the North-South Nuclear Control Joint Committee should be allowed to discuss and solve not only the nuclear inspection problem but the overall questions for the implementation of the joint declaration.

He also pointed out that the question of providing against a possible nuclear threat from without, one of the noteworthy problems in the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, is not mentioned at all in the South side's draft agreement.

The North and the South should not permit any outside attempts to threaten the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula but strive jointly to check them, he said, adding that in order to consolidate the non-nuclear status of the Korean peninsula a step should be envisaged to make nuclear weapon states give assurances of it.

Besides, the South side's draft agreement contained many unreasonable points such as the question of forming a working committee, the question of regular and extraordinary sessions, the question of "optional inspection" and the question of bringing the agreement into effect, he said, and stressed:

At the contact, our side tabled the draft "agreement on the formation and operation of the North-South Nuclear Control Joint Committee," a most fair, realistic and reasonable one for implementing the "Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" most rapidly and thoroughly.

Our draft agreement is characterized by the fact that it fully supplemented the points which the South side failed to anticipate, nor did it take into consideration. In the matter of forming the Nuclear Control Joint Committee, too, our side suggested that it be composed of five members including one chairman and one vice-chairman from each side, among them, two members being a general and an officer on the active list.

Noting that the points which should be discussed and promoted by the nuclear control committee, too, are fully and clearly indicated in the draft agreement, he said that it includes the point of adopting an agreement to implement the "Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" and the point of taking measures to jointly frustrate a nuclear threat to the Korean peninsula from the outside and bring about an appropriate international guarantee on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

According to the news briefing, the question of operation of the nuclear control committee, too, is clearly described in the draft agreement in detail, and the question of starting an inspection within 20 days after the adoption of an agreement on the implementation of the "Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" and rules on the choice of objects of inspection and the procedures and methods of inspection, and the question of bringing the agreement of the nuclear control committee into effect from the day when the premiers of both sides signed it, etc., are included in the draft agreement in explicit terms.

Then, the sides entered into a discussion of their draft agreements.

The South side, however, contrary to the North-South agreement, insisted on discussing first the "optional inspection" alone, avoiding the question of implementing the "Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula," and went the length of letting out such impudent remarks distorting the fact to the effect that the nuclear problem was raised on the Korean peninsula because of the North side.

The North side, in this regard, made it clear that the origin of the nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula should be traced to the U.S. shipment of nuclear weapons in South Korea, adding it is not a Korean who denies or distorts this hard historical fact.

The North side urged the South side not to dance to the American tune.

As far as our stand is concerned, Choe said, we have clarified that an overall inspection of the U.S. nuclear

bases, not an "optional inspection" of one or two objects, should be made.

Our side stressed that the contact was aimed at fully implementing the joint declaration on denuclearization, not at making an inspection alone, he said, and added:

Our side urged the South side to deeply study our draft agreement and show an affirmative response.

It was agreed to have the next contact on March 3.

POLAND**Defense Spokesman: Kaliningrad Deployment Watched**

*LD0303003992 Warsaw PAP in English 1723 GMT
2 Mar 92*

[Text] Warsaw, March 2—Combat units of the former Soviet Armed forces withdrawn from Germany and Poland are deployed in the Kaliningrad district of Russia, and from a military viewpoint such a concentration of forces near the Polish northern border can pose a potential threat to our country, a senior officer from the chancellery of the defense minister said on Monday.

"The Defense Ministry is aware of the situation and keeps a watchful eye on it," the ministry's press spokesman Col. Ryszard Jakubczak declared. Jerzy

Milewski, the minister of state at the presidential chancellery responsible for national security said that "formally, we cannot regard such a deployment as a hostile act. Russia, which is now responsible for the former Soviet Army stationed in Germany and Poland, can withdraw the units only to its own territory, and not to Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan or former Baltic republics. The only option it has is to deploy the units inside Russia or in the Kaliningrad enclave."

"We are aware of this difficulty," Milewski told PAP. "We know that Russia has a shortage of housing and jobs for the soldiers and their families." He added, however, that "any concentration of foreign troops close to our borders is unjustified. Russia says it has no hostile intentions." "Poland can treat such a deployment only as a temporary solution. We expect that in future the Kaliningrad enclave will be disarmed, possibly totally," Jerzy Milewski stressed.

RESPONSE TO BUSH, YELTSIN INITIATIVES

Yeltsin Explains Initiatives to Journalists

924P0065A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 5 Feb 92 p 1

[Report by Vitaliy Tretyakov: "We Were Greeted Well and Given Money"]

[Excerpts] With these words Boris Yeltsin began his meeting yesterday with leaders of Russia's mass media, gently refuting in this way the banner headline of yesterday's issue of NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA.

During this meeting, which lasted from 1000 to midday in the Great Kremlin Palace, the president of Russia was clearly in good form. He looked fine and demonstrated an excellent knowledge of disarmament problems (specialists might, perhaps, have been able to have taken issue in some respect with his explanations, which were wordy, but there were none among the chief editors). [passage omitted]

Having described in detail the negotiations with George Bush, Boris Yeltsin observed that he had told the U.S. President plainly: The Union leadership deceived the Americans, particularly on the issue of chemical and bacteriological weapons and the alleged reduction of 700,000 men of the Soviet Armed Forces. Noting that he did not wish to have anything in common with such a policy, Yeltsin offered to really cut the strength of the Army by 700,000 men from the actual level, not the authorized manning level (there is a difference between them of half a million).

Concerning the press criticism of his proposals pertaining to the conversion of SDI into a joint system of global monitoring of the nuclear threat, Yeltsin pointed to the specific addresses of such a threat today (not the West) and observed that he was talking only about the joint tracking and warning of such a threat up to the moment the command is given, no more. According to the president of Russia, he managed to persuade the Americans to terminate the construction of the Ohio-class new nuclear submarines. [passage omitted]

Yeltsin's Response to U.S. Arms Cuts 'Positive'

PM0702152592 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 5 Feb 92 p 3

[Report by A. Matveyev: "Bush's Initiatives Discussed in Congress"]

[Text] If the U.S. President was hoping to improve his image in the eyes of Americans by putting forward proposals in the disarmament sphere, then, as public opinion polls have shown, this has not happened. Moreover, the disarmament agenda, which is linked to the country's economic problems, is becoming an election campaign theme.

Evidence of this was provided by an incident that took place at the White House. "The President's photo call with members of the National Association of Governors," CBS reports, "unexpectedly turned into an open political confrontation between the head of the Republican administration and Democrats in the White House."

According to journalists, when the President good-humoredly appealed for support for his draft federal budget, Colorado State Governor R. Romer suddenly demanded an answer from Bush as to why he does not want to use the "peace dividends." According to the governor, if the administration were to reduce military expenditure by \$100 billion over five years (the White House is planning a \$50 billion cut), it could direct funds into the social and economic sphere.

The President, clearly irritated, immediately entered the fray. He demanded that the governor couch his demand in more specific terms and say precisely which military bases he would propose shutting down, which arms programs he would discontinue, how many people he would put out of a job, and where jobs for them should be found in the future. It is clear that the White House does not tolerate dilettantism in the sphere of disarmament.

A discussion of these same problems took place far more calmly in the Senate Budget Committee. This was addressed by U.S. Defense Secretary R. Cheney and General C. Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In their statements they justified both the possibility of the proposed cuts and their size.

Events in East Europe, the disappearance of the Soviet Union, and the emergence of independent states in its place, the Pentagon chief noted, have not only lifted "the threat of an extensive attack on the West, but have also opened the way for a new era of cooperation in East Europe and Eurasia." At the present time, in Cheney's opinion, the United States is confronting "neither a global threat nor a hostile undemocratic power that dominates in a region with key significance for our interests. Therefore we have the potential to confront danger at lower levels and with fewer losses."

Cheney stressed that Russian President B. Yeltsin has given a positive response to U.S. initiatives in the disarmament sphere. Let us note, however, that in several interviews the defense secretary himself has been extremely skeptical regarding the acceptability to Washington of Moscow's counterproposals. In Cheney's opinion, if U.S.-Soviet talks are successful, it will be possible to cut by around one-half the number of warheads on strategic arms systems from the level approved by the START Treaty.

The tone of Gen. Powell's statement was somewhat different. He reiterated Bush's familiar pronouncement that the United States has won the "cold war" and can now cut back its Armed Forces without jeopardizing its security. One of the most marked features of the new

world, he stressed, is that America is the only superpower. In particular, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff singled out the idea that, while it is introducing changes to the structure of the Armed Forces and reducing military expenditure, the United States in no way intends to give up its active role in world affairs.

Results of Yeltsin Initiatives Still Unclear

924P0067A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 7 Feb 92 First Edition p 3

[Article by observer Sergiy Demidov: "Moscow-Washington: The Hostility Is Over, Forget It. But the Guesswork in the 'Missile Thicket' Continues"]

[Text] It has long been shown repeatedly that diplomats' ink is easily erased if dusted with powder. To prevent this from happening on a world scale the president of Russia participated at the end of last week in the first top-level UN Security Council meeting in history and met with a number of Western leaders.

The official results of this, many foreign mass media believe possibly the most important, overseas tour in Boris Yeltsin's career, are well known. And they are rightly being described with positive epithets. After all, the Russian disarmament proposals, which provide, specifically, for a sharp lowering by both Moscow and Washington of the "plank" of nuclear deterrence to a level of 2,000- 2,500 nuclear warheads and the creation of a global system of protection from space against missile attacks, confirm that the declarations concerning the setting of the tense "cold war" era, which have been so frequent in recent days, are not an empty sound. They testify also that Russia is truly changing from the enemy which the ex-USSR was into an ally and partner of the West.

Understandably, such a metamorphosis automatically entails a change of political and diplomatic priorities and the "conditions" of the strategic missions confronting Russia as a state. But it by no means signifies that the former problems will be resolved of their own accord. For example, the Russian president announced that American cities would no longer be within Russia's nuclear sights. But in what direction will its missiles be retargeted? This question remained open even after a more than three-hour "unofficial exchange of opinions" between the Russian and American leaders at Camp David. Yet "weapons" problems as a whole and this one in particular were not the least important things during their discussions. Washington's response, however, was very evasive. What is clear from it is merely the fact that there is nothing of the kind in the Pentagon's plans. So both the political scientists and journalists will have to continue the guesswork in this "missile thicket."

True, responding to all this, U.S. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney gave the assurance in an interview with NBC that "there has been a fundamental change in American strategy" also. According to him, "there has been a shift from a readiness to counter the old threat—a

global war with the Soviet Union almost without prior warning—to a new strategy, in which the emphasis is put on regional conflicts of the kind which we recently encountered in the Persian Gulf."

Nonetheless, the two presidents could hardly have harmonized the proposals for a mutual reduction in missile arsenals which they put forward last week "right off the bat" without upsetting the nuclear parity. And as a result, therefore, the leaders of Russia and the United States agreed to return to a discussion on control at the negotiations scheduled for March. The head of the American military department declared here that no one doubted the need for further reductions in nuclear arms.

He expressed highly diplomatically also the hope that Washington and Moscow would, possibly, find ways to cooperate in the creation of a general antimissile "shield" based on the SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative] "Star Wars" program, which the United States has been implementing for nine years now. But, as the newspaper CHICAGO TRIBUNE observed, Boris Yeltsin's idea of subscribing to this work contradicts his statement that Russia is a supporter of observance of the 1972 Soviet-American ABM Treaty.

It should be mentioned here that, according to information of THE WASHINGTON POST, the George Bush administration recently left this agreement off a list of arms control treaties which it is calling on the former Soviet republics to observe. "Many technical, economic, and political questions remain," this influential newspaper observes, "in respect to this project."

Questions remain, for that matter, in other spheres also. Thus French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, and other Western politicians also, are not entirely convinced of the dependability of the control of the nuclear potential of the ex-Union.

Particularly unpleasant sensations and negative emotions in the West are being evoked by the disagreements on this problem between republics of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States]

Nuclear problems are also at the epicenter of the visit, currently under way, of the Russian president to France, which, as Francois Mitterrand emphasized, has received with interest the nuclear disarmament proposals advanced by Russia. An aide of his observed that the most important element of the negotiations was the concurrence of views on the question of defensive sufficiency or minimum deterrence. True, although, according to REUTERS, Boris Yeltsin did not appeal to the French side for it to cut its nuclear force, Paris hastened to give notice that it was not ready to make reductions.

Nonetheless, it is believed that there is agreement everywhere—Moscow and Paris, Kiev and Alma-Ata, Washington and Ottawa—on one thing: The history of tomorrow is being written by the ink of the diplomats

conducting today's disarmament negotiations. So that no one ever takes it into his head to dust the world with "nuclear powder."

Yeltsin Plans 'In Need of Major Corrections'

*PM1402151792 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
10 Feb 92 Morning Edition p 5*

[Feature prepared by A. Sychev based on interview with Georgiy Arbatov, member of the Consultative Council under the Russian president and director of the U.S. and Canada Institute: place and date not given: "The Author of the Russian Initiatives Is Still Unknown, but the Disarmament Proposals Themselves Are in Need of Major Corrections"]

[Text] The rapid exchange of initiatives in the nuclear disarmament sphere between the United States and Russia, and particularly the scale of these initiatives, has come as something of a shock to the world public. Having given an initially positive response, Western politicians and experts have taken "time out" for a more detailed assessment of the proposals and the consequences of their implementation. This is justified, Academician Georgiy Arbatov, member of the Consultative Council under the Russian president and director of the U.S. and Canada Institute, believes.

The Initiatives Have Major Significance

Academician Georgiy Arbatov gave a positive assessment of the overall result of the initiatives and the meetings held in New York. Basically, the West was awaiting confirmation of the continuity of our policy, primarily with regard to disarmament issues. Revolutionary changes have taken place in the former Soviet Union, the "cold war" is over, and both we and the Americans have basically lost an adversary but are left with a pile of weapons, onerous military spending, and colossal armies. Yeltsin has confirmed that he is prepared to go even further along the disarmament path, and with even more determination than M. Gorbachev. This is important, because despite all the achievements of the last few years, the arms reduction talks have remained much as they were at the height of the "cold war"—an instrument for controlling the arms race, not a means of doing away with it altogether. They have been dragging on for years and have yielded minimal results. It now seems that things are on the move.

The Idea of Retargeting Missiles Is Unclear

Every idea has its prehistory. The Americans first put forward a proposal to remove cities from the list of strategic missile targets back in the days of McNamara. Even then the idea was regarded as dangerous.

Two doctrines exist—the countervailing doctrine (whereby cities are selected as targets) and the counterforce doctrine (whereby military installations are selected). Of course, it is immoral to select peaceful inhabitants as living targets, but it was precisely the

countervailing doctrine that guaranteed stability and the preservation of peace. If just one capital is threatened by nuclear bombing, this is already an excessive price to pay for aggression and is therefore a weighty deterrent factor. But what if 10 or 100 cities are targeted? Therefore the countervailing doctrine, under the existing rules of the game, would not be a preventive strike but a warning or, to be more exact, a threat of retribution if the other side decides to use aggression.

In the case of the counterforce doctrine another logical chain is brought into play. Thus, it is a strike against military installations. But who needs to hit silos that are left empty once the missiles have been launched or communication and command centers that have already relayed all the essential commands? Targeting military installations makes sense when there are plans to inflict a preemptive or first strike rather than a retaliatory strike.

Moreover, when military installations are destroyed, it is necessary to be certain that the inflicted strikes have been effective. This means that more than one missile will be used on one target, i.e. a minimum of two or maybe more missiles will be used. In this case no arsenals will suffice, even those currently at the disposal of the United States and Russia.

In a word, the proposal was not thought through far enough. It seems that this has been realized, because twice already Yeltsin has spoken about removing U.S. military installations from the list of targets. Indeed, this is unambiguously a goodwill gesture. But for the time being nobody has answered the question of what to do with the nuclear might thus released; who will it be targeted on? Yeltsin has not given an answer to this question, which has caused concern throughout the world and even among CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] members, whom he has not consulted. Moreover, does it take much time to retarget the missiles on their old targets, and, moreover, in such a way that nobody will know about it?

A Global System of ABM Defense—a Way of Putting the Brakes on Conversion

A global system of ABM defense makes no sense, just like its predecessor SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative]. The United States is citing new challenges as the justification for needing to work on its SDI program. Iraq, Libya, and some other states, in the Americans' opinion, are on the verge of developing [sozdaniye] their own nuclear weapons. But this is no argument. They may possess nuclear weapons, but in order for the threat of nuclear blackmail to become an urgent one that merits the SDI program, intercontinental ballistic missiles are still necessary. Without a developed industrial base, scientific potential, and tests, none of which can be kept secret, it is impossible to supply oneself with missiles.

It is more likely that the threat might come from terrorists who might either bring in a bomb in suitcases, throw one out of an aircraft, place one on a ship in a major port,

or use this kind of thing as a means of blackmail. ABM defense is powerless against this sort of threat, but on the other hand it would undoubtedly lead to an increase in expenditure on the defensive arms race, which can only be in the interests of the U.S. and Russian military-industrial complexes.

For our military-industrial complex a space shield is also a pretext for putting the brakes on conversion. Arbatov does not rule out the possibility that our own defense complex may not have been uninvolved in the emergence of the idea of joining SDI. It is clear that the argument for trading weapons as a way out of the crisis in which the military industry finds itself arose in the same quarter.

With the end of the "cold war", the arms market is contracting sharply. We are not being given the chance to find ourselves a cozy position in this market, and most of our old clients never repaid their debts and are unable to do so. Moreover, trading in really expensive systems calls for the dispatch of technical specialists to service them. Events could subsequently develop in line with an already familiar scenario—military advisers will follow, which is a short step away from direct or indirect involvement in a conflict. The moral aspect is also important. A good name in politics is a great asset.

The Americans Will Not Share SDI Technology With Us

Hopes of jointly formulating a "space shield," Academician Arbatov is convinced, are groundless. The banning of U.S. companies from participation in the laying of a fiber-optic telephone cable in Siberia is a rather revealing example. This stance should not be viewed as mistrust of Yeltsin or the Russian Government. The United States is afraid of our instability and fears that our scientists with their knowledge in the sphere of producing weapons of mass destruction will be tempted by good salaries in countries with dubious regimes. It would be unwise to supply them with state-of-the-art technologies suitable for ABM defense into the bargain.

The 1972 ABM Treaty Should Be Kept

The ABM Treaty, besides limiting the militarization of space, bans the placement of nuclear weapons in near-earth orbit and sets a lower limit to which both the United States and Russia can calmly reduce their nuclear capabilities. Under the treaty, each side is entitled to deploy up to 100 antimissile missiles. This means that in future we could reduce our arsenals of ballistic missiles on both sides to 100—or a few hundred at the outside—instead of the thousands we have at present. At any rate, for the time being we have not mutually abandoned the deterrence doctrine or proceeded to full nuclear disarmament.

If we review the treaty and raise the level of ABM defense, then there will be a corresponding rise in the lower arms threshold. To abandon a constraint like the

ABM Treaty would be dangerous. The reduction of offensive nuclear weapons and ABM development are incompatible.

The Absence of a National Security Blueprint Is Not an Obstacle to Disarmament

As before, neither the United States nor Russia has a new national security blueprint. Radical changes have taken place. The old guidelines have gone, and an appraisal of what has happened is now under way. It is no surprise that inertial thinking is still creeping in on both sides of the Atlantic. Arbatov reminded me of the recent all-Army Assembly at which the following opinion was frequently voiced: The threat from outside remains. "How is this threat to be defined?" Arbatov asked. "Who wants to conquer us? Who would want to saddle themselves with our problems? Natural resources? But it is cheaper to buy them than to seize them by force. Nowadays war for the purpose of seizing something is absurd. Sources of raw materials and sales markets are won in another way—economically. The collapse of a number of sectors in the U.S. economy that cannot withstand Japanese competition is a vivid example of this."

Russia and the CIS have a sufficient margin of military-strategic strength to enable them to halve their arsenals and even repeat this operation several times and still be left with too much. There is work enough to last about 10 years, and during this time it is to be hoped that Russia and the CIS countries will formulate a new blueprint.

At the same time the threat to security still exists. Only now it is more a threat from within. The establishment of the CIS is a first step on the road to strengthening our security. Careless words, a lack of attentiveness and respect for each other, and economic collapse are increasing the mistrust that divides us.

All the same, some parameters of the new blueprint are obvious: Nobody wants to attack, it is impossible to inflict a first strike, and the use of nuclear weapons even in a retaliatory strike is also suicidal. Open debate is needed to formulate a national security blueprint. The blueprint should be reviewed without any attempt to indulge the United States, which, Arbatov suspects, could happen in the event of a global ABM defense initiative.

Experts Find Out About the Initiatives From a Television Report

The West's suspicion that Russia's response to the U.S. proposals was a hastily formulated emergency measure is seemingly being confirmed. Although a member of the Consultative Committee under the Russian president, Georgiy Arbatov heard nothing about the foreign policy action that was being prepared. Neither he nor any of the experts he knows were enlisted to take part in discussing the proposals.

Moreover, nobody knows who the author of the proposals is. Information has filtered through from sources in foreign diplomatic missions in Moscow that the author is the young Russian Foreign Ministry diplomat Kozin. "If this is true, can questions like these really be resolved by bringing in one man, even if he is extremely intelligent?" Georgiy Arbatov said.

This system of making decisions must be changed immediately. In Academician Arbatov's opinion, this was a timely signal that all is not well in the system of administering affairs of state.

"If this is how decisions are made in the sphere of safeguarding security, then clearly things are similar in other spheres as well," he said. "In view of what is happening in the country as a result of Gaydar's reform, I am seriously beginning to believe that this is possible. Anonymity is unacceptable—it abolishes responsibility. Broad discussion of ideas among specialists, in parliament, and with an outlet to broad sections of the population, must become the rule. This is the why a number of aspects of the initiatives that have been put forward are annoyingly ill-conceived. If we make amendments, people will understand us. Everyone understands that we are going through a stage of establishing statehood."

IZVESTIYA got in touch with Russian Federation Foreign Ministry expert Vladimir Kozin. He denied being behind the formulation of the Russian initiatives put forward by B. Yeltsin. At the end of last year he prepared a background report on similar questions for Vice President Rutskoy. It is possible that this document was taken into account when the initiatives were formulated, but Kozin knows nothing about it.

So Kozin is not the author of the proposals that have caused so much fuss.

Comments on Yeltsin Announcement on ICBM Targeting

Shaposhnikov Interview

MK1202080192 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 12 Feb 92 p 2

[Interview with Marshal Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of CIS, Commonwealth of Independent States, Joint Armed Forces, by Sergey Parkhomenko under the "Army" rubric; place and date not given: "Marshal Shaposhnikov: 'Russian President's Statements Are Political Statements...' Commander in Chief of CIS Combined Armed Forces Answers NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA Correspondent's Questions"]

[Text] [Parkhomenko] Yevgeniy Ivanovich, I think that you have had to answer this same question countless times of late: Where are the Commonwealth strategic forces' ballistic missiles that the Russian president mentioned in his recent statements pointing now?

[Shaposhnikov] The missiles mentioned in the text of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms Reduction have simply been taken off combat alert and are no longer pointing anywhere.

The other missiles that have not as yet, so to speak, been affected by the reduction mechanism are still on combat alert. I must point out here that Boris Nikolayevich's well-known statements are political statements. Some time elapses between a political statement and its concrete—practical and technical—implementation. Therefore at the moment I can only say that the level of combat alert readiness has been reduced. There has been no retargeting as such.

In response to all the questions about the overall situation with regard to the former Union's strategic and tactical nuclear weapons I can only say this: Despite certain disagreements over the future of and principles governing the use of the general-purpose armed forces, the leaders of the sovereign states have nonetheless manifested sufficient responsibility and restraint to take a very serious attitude to the nuclear forces.

The situation with regard to strategic weapons is totally clear today: They are under unified control, under unified command. There is also an agreement on tactical nuclear weapons (at present apart from Russia they are only to be found in Ukraine, and a small quantity in Belarus). These weapons are currently all being taken back to Russian territory. By mid-summer this year this withdrawal will have been completed.

The future of these weapons is another matter. As you know, we intend to reutilize [utilizirovat] or dismantle [razdelyvat] these weapons—in line with existing accords. Weapons-grade plutonium and uranium are to be turned into nuclear fuel to be used for peaceful purposes. Some Western states are offering us a very long list of services here: transportation, storage, protection [sberezeniye], and, last, reutilization. But we have quite enough experience in these matters. We have, after all, already removed nuclear weapons from Europe, from the Transcaucasus, and from the Baltic....

We find most interesting the offers of technologies to "reorient" nuclear weapons, uranium, and plutonium to peaceful purposes. We will see how appealing they are. If they look more advantageous and reliable than our own, we will not ignore the services offered by our Western partners.

Another serious question that our colleagues in the West are constantly asking concerns the position of our nuclear physicists. Boris Nikolayevich tried to find a solution to the problem when he met with a large group of scientists before his trip to the United States. The first thing that they agreed upon there was to develop a mechanism of social security for specialists, increase their wages, and so on. The second is that nuclear specialists will be provided with work linked with reutilizing nuclear weapons and using military technologies and materials for peaceful purposes.

[Parkhomenko] How much of a surprise were President Yeltsin's initiatives on setting up a unified system of nuclear security and ABM defense to the CIS military leadership?

[Shaposhnikov] They were coordinated in full with the military command.

[Parkhomenko] But who had the idea first: Did the military suggest it to the president or did the president "order" the military to make these developments?

[Shaposhnikov] Let us put it like this: This was the military-political leadership's idea. Of course, it could not come into being right away. Developments accumulated gradually, in different structures.

The thing is that we have nonetheless reached the point where, in my view, roughly a dozen more countries could shortly join the nuclear club. We will have less and less reliable insurance against breaches in the rules of storage and protection and unsanctioned use [primeneniye] of nuclear weapons in various regions. All this convinces us that it is time to think about a global defense system.

[Parkhomenko] How do you think this can be organized? How long will it take?

[Shaposhnikov] A long time...years...at least five years. Or even 10. We do after all still mistrust one another: They hide things and we hide things...

In terms of our technical ideas we are already abreast of world progress and even ahead of it in some areas. Our problem is that our technologies lag behind. It can take decades in our country between having an idea and putting into practice, whereas in more industrially developed countries this period is sometimes measured in terms of just weeks and months. Therefore their advantages and ours may be amalgamated very usefully, with very interesting results.

A joint working group will most likely be set up to work in turn in our country and abroad. Somewhere in the second half of February we expect a visit from Secretary of State Baker, and I think that we will just touch on this problem and start practical discussion of it during the talks with him. Provided of course that we see that the West is really showing serious interest in this.

[Parkhomenko] I expect that this will require a fairly difficult mental effort for CIS military specialists due to the change in the entire accepted system of keeping secrets, the whole hierarchy of secrecy...

[Shaposhnikov] I do not think that there will be any particular problems with that.

There is no need to worry especially. On the one hand, we will not tell them, and they will not tell us, state secrets.

On the other hand, we must not forget that there are not just dozens, but many hundreds of people in both our

countries involved in the serious problems of organizing defense and strategic weapons. If we achieve something and hide it, we must not think that they will not develop the same thing sooner or later. Or vice versa.

Kravchuk Denies Missiles No Longer Aimed at U.S.

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[Excerpts] Since the Commonwealth of Independent States was formed the media have always given prominence to statements by the Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk. His actions and decisions have been playing an ever greater role in maintaining the political structure of the Commonwealth, and in the long-term in solving the problem of its very existence. [passage omitted]

President Leonid Kravchuk has made a sensational disclosure at another briefing for domestic and foreign newsmen in Kiev. He actually denied a statement by the press by [as heard] the Russian President Boris Yeltsin that the strategic nuclear missiles are no longer targeted on installations in the United States and have been taken off the alert status and that tactical nuclear weapons have been taken away from the Ukrainian territory. Here is a recording from that briefing made by our correspondent in the Ukrainian capital Kiev, Vladimir Sokolov. President Leonid Kravchuk:

[Begin Kravchuk recording in Ukrainian fading into English translation] I've learnt all that only from the papers. No one consulted us on such decisions earlier. The strategic missiles on the territory of Ukraine are so far on combat alert and it's unknown where they are targeted, and only one half or so of the tactical nuclear weapons have been removed from the Ukrainian territory. [end recording]

President Kravchuk added: We must be responsible for the common cause only together. No one can tell the world anything on our common behalf without first consulting the others.

Those were statements by the president of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, made shortly before the Commonwealth summit in Minsk on Friday.

Specialist Explains Problems

924P0078A Moscow MEGAPOLIS EXPRESS in Russian No 6, 6 Feb 92 p 14

[Interview with Doctor of Military Sciences Ivan Anureyev, consultant to the General Staff and specialist in missile systems, by Vladimir Shcherban; place and date not given: "Where They Fly Is a Big Secret"]

[Text] In the past 20 years the control system for Soviet missiles has been substantially changed twice. The first time was in 1972 when the deputy general designer of the control systems, Shevtsov, defected to the American side when he was in Paris and gave them his secrets. The

second time was in 1974 because of the treachery of Colonel Penkovskiy of the General Staff.

Now we face the need to totally retarget the missiles. What does this operation mean on the technical plane? A MEGAPOLIS EXPRESS observer met with Doctor of Military Sciences Ivan Anureyev, consultant to the General Staff and specialist in missile systems.

[Anureyev] I should note that the missile retargeting process takes place regularly, both here and across the ocean. For example, the Americans have a nuclear planning group subordinate to the NATO Military Council, and it discusses the matter twice each year. For us, nothing under the sun is forever, especially strategic targets. This process has been taking place here constantly, but it has never been on so massive a scale as is promised now. Briefly, what is needed for retargeting is the calculations of a new trajectory program, feeding the data on the new target to the onboard computer, and doing the retargeting at the launch site. Technically none of these is a complicated process.

[Shcherban] So how much time is needed to retarget our 2,496 strategic delivery vehicles carrying about 10,000 nuclear warheads?

[Anureyev] I think that it will take close to six months. Inputting the program data to the onboard systems is today done from command posts by radio.

[Shcherban] It follows from what you say that data banks exist for some of the targets in America most important to us. Is it enough merely to "transfer" accurate target coordinates from these data banks into the missile?...

[Anureyev] In general terms, that is all there is to it. Feeding the calculated trajectory into the onboard computer ensures that the missile hits the target with a maximum spread of 100 meters over a range of 11,000 kilometers.

[Shcherban] What are the criteria used to define primary targets for missile strikes?

[Anureyev] First the targets earmarked for destruction are listed taking into account their dimensions, durability, and coordinates, and the calculated mission and flight mission. The Americans have prepared eight trajectories for the warheads of the Minuteman-2 missiles. This means that today the missiles can be aimed at one target, and at another tomorrow, based on the military-political situation. The primary targets for destruction are the systems of state and military control of a country, which are usually located in major cities. Targets also include the enemy's nuclear assets, the military-economic potential...

[Shcherban] Who signs the "passport" for a target for feeding the data on it into the onboard computer?

[Anureyev] These are exclusively military experts from the Main Intelligence Directorate and the General Staff

Directorate, at the top level. Thus, even the commander of a missile regiment does not know where his missiles will go.

[Shcherban] Is it possible to check the missile retargeting process?

[Anureyev] In principle this is impossible. Here it is purely a question of the word of a gentleman. In politics, you will agree, this is not a very weighty argument. Thus, of all possible methods of disarmament, this will be the least effective.

Commentaries on Kozyrev Speech to Geneva Conference

Alert Status of Missiles

924P0083A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 13 Feb 92 p 2

[RIA report by Vladimir Markov specially for NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA: "Russia Is Disarming, Having Armed Itself with Human Rights: New Aspects of Russia's Policy Were Presented in Geneva by the Russian Foreign Minister"]

[Excerpt] Geneva—A solution to the problem of retargeting strategic missiles, most eye-catching politically and most intricate from the technical viewpoint, was proposed—unexpectedly for the majority of observers—on 12 February by Andrey Kozyrev, addressing the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

First, the total lifting of alert status from the strategic forces of Russia, the United States, and the other nuclear powers targeted on one another's territory and facilities. Nuclear weapons' "zero combat readiness" would thereby be achieved.

Second, the separate storage of the nuclear delivery systems and the warheads. That is, the intercontinental ballistic missiles would be on the launchers without warheads, the nuclear missiles on submarines would be unloaded from them, the submarines themselves would be at their home ports, and the nuclear arms of heavy bombers, in centralized storage. As the experts accompanying A. Kozyrev to Geneva explained to me, such a step would remove the majority of doubts regarding the fact that the retargeting of the missiles cannot, allegedly, be monitored. As distinct from a change in the missiles' electronic control and guidance program, separate storage of the delivery systems and the warheads could be monitored from space. In addition, other control measures could be agreed also.

The third and fourth ideas expressed by the Russian minister in this connection concern a "cardinal reassessment of the entire military-strategic situation," including nuclear doctrines and a return to the proposal concerning control of nuclear weapons on the part of an international organization, the United Nations, say.

Essentially, as the Russian experts observed, the latter idea revives the American Baruch Plan.

Aside from this, A. Kozyrev set forth in addition a whole number of initiatives, which Moscow had not previously expressed in such a form. These included an exchange of information of all the nuclear powers on the quantity and types of available nuclear warheads and materials and the facilities for the production, storage, and elimination of nuclear weapons. Also included was Russia's consent to subscribe to the conditions of the control of missile technology adopted by a number of leading Western countries and a readiness to abide by—Western once again—"the guiding principles of arms trading" approved last year in London. Incidentally this fact, experts believe, is of significance with respect also to the policy of the other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States in this sphere, particularly from the viewpoint of the prevention of unlawful and destabilizing supplies of weapons to crisis regions.

The Russian minister also provided a more specific interpretation of the idea of the creation of a "joint global system of protection in place of the American SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative]": It presupposes joint research, which "would help solve the problem of preventing a 'brain drain' from the defense complex of the nuclear and space states." The results of this work could be used "for peaceful purposes in the interests of the entire international community."

The Russian side considers the priority task the conclusion this year even of an international convention completely banning and eliminating chemical weapons. Russia itself alone has been forced to appeal for Western, primarily American, assistance to destroy 40,000 tonnes of war gases.

A. Kozyrev made quite a sensational statement after his speech at the Conference on Disarmament, in a paper he delivered that same day in the Geneva Institute for International Research on the subject "Russia's New Look in the International Arena." The point being that he was perhaps the first Russian official to call in question the "holy of holies"—the concept of strategic parity. "A renewed Russia does not see the need to constantly maintain parity and does not aspire to have as many arms as the United States or any other power," the minister said, thereby giving a new boost to the debate in our country, which will not culminate in national consensus any time soon. [passage omitted]

'Clarifies' Yeltsin Initiative

*PM1302190092 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
14 Feb 92 Morning Edition p 7*

[Report by Maksim Yusin: "Russia Offers To Separate Nuclear Warheads From Missiles"]

[Text] Geneva and Moscow—The high point of Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev's lightning visit to Geneva 12 February was two speeches—one at the

Disarmament Conference, and one a few hours later at the UN Commission on Human Rights.

Kozyrev Explains and Clarifies Yeltsin's Disarmament Initiatives

Kozyrev's speech at the Disarmament Conference provided for the West something of an explanation and clarification of Boris Yeltsin's recent initiatives, which shook the world but left many questions unanswered. After the Russian minister's speech there were fewer unclear points.

For instance, he admitted, in effect, that CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] strategic missiles are still targeted on the United States, and although the political decision has been made, its implementation is a matter for a fairly lengthy period. (Hitherto experts were mystified as to how thousands of missiles could be retargeted overnight.)

Through Kozyrev, Moscow put forward new ideas in the disarmament sphere. According to members of the Russian delegation, it is not yet a question of specific proposals that must be implemented within a given time scale. "We launched a kind of trial balloon, indicating the main avenues along which the disarmament process could proceed. We do not expect an immediate response to our proposals," one Foreign Ministry expert said.

Moscow Calls for "Zero Combat Readiness" To Be Achieved

Russia's initiatives attracted much attention among the foreign mass media and experts. Two points in particular are singled out. First, it is proposed to remove entirely from alert status the missiles belonging to Russia, the United States, and other nuclear powers that are targeted on one another. In other words, that "zero combat readiness" be achieved. Though Russian diplomats admit that it is extremely difficult to verify [prokontrolirovat] missile guidance computer programs.

The second proposal is for missiles and nuclear warheads to be stored separately. As the delegation experts explained, the crux of the initiative is to ensure that weapons and delivery vehicles are far enough away from each other and that any movement could be picked up by satellites. In Kozyrev's opinion this would provide guarantees against "unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons."

The Russian minister echoed the point expressed by Yeltsin in London and Paris, that Moscow does not insist that the other nuclear states—France, Britain, and China—should immediately join the rapid Russian-American disarmament process. "This question will become relevant when the nuclear arsenals are comparable," Kozyrev noted.

He stressed that Russia's disarmament initiatives were agreed beforehand with the CIS partners.

Moscow reaffirmed its readiness to get rid of chemical weapons, but not everything is going smoothly on this matter. Disagreements have arisen between Russia and the United States, which Kozyrev referred to, although he did not mention the Americans specifically. Washington is demanding the destruction of chemical weapons production plants on Russia's territory. Moscow objects, arguing in justification that these plants have already begun to produce peaceful output and that their closure is impermissible in the crisis conditions afflicting the country.

Instead of demolishing the unfortunate plants, Kozyrev proposed that authoritative international inspection teams be sent to Russia, who could dispel Washington's suspicions if any arise. In the opinion of Russian diplomats, certain nuances in the Americans' behavior at recent consultations allow us to assume that they will ultimately agree to that option.

Russia Will Deal in Weapons "On a Commercial Footing"

In his speech Kozyrev touched on the sensitive topic of the weapons trade, which diplomats (and not only ours) usually try to avoid. As he put it, Russia will not abandon arms sales, but henceforth this will take place "on a commercial footing." The minister stated that Moscow will avoid arms deliveries to unstable regions, unlike in past years, when Soviet weapons were sent mainly to ideological allies and not infrequently to the planet's hot spots.

Kazakhstan's Position on Nuclear Weapons Is Not Boosting the Republic's International Prestige

Touching on one of the most sensitive topics—the fate of the nuclear missiles sited in Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine—Kozyrev repeated Russia's well-known position: "We proceed on the basis that those three republics will accede to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons." Ukraine and Belarus have already made such a promise, as is well known, but Kazakhstan's position is still unclear.

Talking with journalists on board the plane, Kozyrev said nonetheless that he remains optimistic about the Kazakh nuclear weapons. "Kazakhstan has no alternative but to accede to the Nonproliferation Treaty. Maybe some people are suggesting to Nazarbayev that by leaving this question hanging, the republic can score points in the international arena. If so, these are patently unskilled advisers. The longer the mystery continues, the more severely the country's prestige will suffer. Nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is too serious a question for the world to tolerate vagueness. Credits and foreign aid could be jeopardized. When the Americans became suspicious about the Pakistani nuclear program, they applied sanctions against their own close ally."

Kozyrev clarified his terminology. In his opinion the Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan cannot be called nuclear countries, since Russia is the sole successor to

the USSR in this respect. The other three republics have therefore acquired the status of "states on whose territory nuclear weapons are sited."

A few hours before leaving for Moscow Kozyrev spoke at the UN Commission for Human Rights. It was the first time in history the head of our diplomacy had taken part in such a session. In past years, for obvious reasons, Soviet representatives used to avoid this commission. Kozyrev set forth the view of the new Russia on human rights. Judging from the initial reaction, the UN experts were satisfied.

Remarks on Parity Highlighted

*PM1402115192 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 14 Feb 92 p 3*

[Article by Aleksandr Golts: "Does Russia Need Parity? About Russian Foreign Minister A. Kozyrev's Sensational Remarks"]

[Text] Let us pay due tribute to Russian foreign policy, which only recently was being accused of not being vigorous enough. Now everything is different. Even after the end of B. Yeltsin's foreign trip Moscow diplomacy has been managing to remain in the center of the whole world's attention. Russian Foreign Minister A. Kozyrev's stay in Geneva, where he took part in the work of the Disarmament Conference, brought another sensation. Admittedly, the main sensation was his speech at the Geneva institute for international studies. In his report there Kozyrev declared: "The renewed Russia sees no need to constantly maintain parity and is not seeking to ensure that it has just as many armaments as the United States or any other power."

I would note that this statement was a surprise only because of its clarity and lack of equivocation. Essentially that could have been the only possible conclusion from B. Yeltsin's recent disarmament initiatives. Indeed, what is the point of parity (in our economic situation) if the United States is no longer regarded as a potential military rival? Admittedly, the question arises of what other criteria besides parity will be taken into account in ensuring national security. And against the might of which states does Russia now intend to measure its defense programs?

However, as A. Kozyrev's other, this time "official" speech at the plenary session of the Disarmament Conference indicates, Russia is proposing for the moment that world security be ensured precisely on the basis of parity by all the nuclear powers.

This speech made yet another attempt to clarify the complex of large-scale proposals in the disarmament sphere that Russia has put forward recently. Thus a new interpretation of the rather confused question of the retargeting of missiles was proposed. A. Kozyrev has now proposed examining the possibility of removing from combat alert status [boyevoye dezhurstvo] the strategic forces of Russia, the United States, and the

other nuclear powers targeted on each other's territory and facilities thereby achieving "zero combat readiness." The Russian minister also sees as useful a measure like separate storage of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and the warheads themselves. ICBM's would be in their launchers without nose cones. Sea-launched missiles would be unloaded from submarines at their bases. The nuclear arms of heavy bombers would be kept at central storage sites.

While paying tribute to Russia's consistent desire to create a genuine nuclear-free world, I nevertheless want to express doubt as to the possibility of implementing these proposals. It is unlikely that the initiatives will be greeted positively in Washington, which, along with Moscow, must make the main contribution to resolving these tasks (the other nuclear powers, in A. Kozyrev's opinion, could join in the process of nuclear disarmament later). But, so far as I understand, the Americans have no intention of abandoning nuclear deterrence either now or in the foreseeable future. And the separate storage of missiles and warheads, which presupposes that it would take quite a considerable time from the strategic viewpoint to bring missiles into a state of combat readiness, essentially undermines this concept.

There is a problem connected with the need to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. As A. Kozyrev declared, Russia is now taking measures to ensure that several nuclear powers do not arise in place of the USSR. Here it is proceeding from the premise that Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan will accede to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. This is a fair and considered approach. I would like to hope that it, like the Russian initiatives in the sphere of nuclear disarmament, has actually been coordinated with the other CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] states. A. Kozyrev's speech also touched on B. Yeltsin's proposed elaboration of a joint global system of defense in place of SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative]. In the minister's opinion it is a case of a program for performing joint research work which, inter alia, would help resolve one problem which so perturbs the West. That is the problem of the possible "brain drain" from our nuclear complex. In this connection I permit myself to mention that SDI was initially planned as a nonnuclear program. Later there was talk of the "nuclear excitation" of lasers intended to destroy enemy missiles. Yet to judge by press reports B. Yeltsin is suggesting creating exclusively a system for tracking and early warning. So that even now it is not entirely clear what the thousands of our nuclear specialists will do within the framework of this project.

I write this by no means to cast doubt on the scale of the measures Russia is proposing. It is perfectly obvious that they were generated by Moscow's radical reassessment of the strategic situation in the world and of its own nuclear doctrine. It is simply that such is the nature of security problems that in their radical solution special caution and balance are required.

Yeltsin Questioned on ICBM Cuts, Global Defense

*924P0085A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 14 Feb 92 p 4*

[Article by retired Lieutenant General Vladimir Belous, candidate of technical sciences, Russian-American University: "The Politics and Economics of Disarmament: How Much Does a Seat Under the Nuclear Umbrella Cost?"]

[Text] Boris Yeltsin's statement "On the Policy of Russia in the Field of Arms Limitations and Reductions" was met without particular enthusiasm by specialists. As NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA surmised, the initiatives of the president, alas, were not prepared in the proper way. Today retired Lieutenant General Vladimir Belous, candidate of technical sciences, sets forth his opinion. The editorial office, however, is not ending the polemics with this.

Expert Examination

As a rule, the conclusion of agreements or the advancement of initiatives in the area of arms reduction pursue three main groups of objectives—political, military, and economic. In examining the content of a statement from these positions, it should be immediately recognized that the greatest direct positive results should be expected specifically in the political sphere.

In his statement and speech to the United Nations Security Council, B.N. Yeltsin asserted that Russia is the legal successor of the USSR, that it rightfully occupies a seat at this international organization, and that it will adhere strictly to the fulfillment of the obligations it has assumed, particularly in the sphere of disarmament. He succeeded, at least for the present, in calming the populations of Western countries, which are troubled by the breakup of a nuclear superpower.

The clear and consistent position of Russia made a deep impression on world opinion. The international rating of the Russian president undoubtedly rose.

However, it remains an indisputable fact that a determination of the optimal speed of political and military settlements, which are closely related to each other, is a very important task for important state figures and their advisers. The political detente undertaken in the 1970's was not reinforced consistently enough by military detente, and this, in the final analysis, led to its attenuation.

Strategic stability denotes the kind of correlation of forces where neither of the sides can achieve victory under conditions that are most favorable to it. President Kennedy said about this: "We do not need a victory with radioactive dust in the mouth!" Inasmuch as the results of the exchange of the first nuclear strikes are a decisive factor, the level of strategic stability can be increased by improving strategic nuclear forces in two directions: by

lowering the counterforce capabilities of strategic offensive arms [SOA] (a reduction in the effectiveness of a preemptive strike on the enemy's SOA) and by increasing the survivability (invulnerability) of SOA systems for delivering a retaliatory strike of "unacceptable" damage.

A sharp reduction in the number of SOA's and the number of warheads on them (up to 2,000-2,500), with the primary removal from arms of multicharge ground-launched and sea-launched missiles, will significantly reduce the offensive and counterforce capabilities of both countries. This will undoubtedly have a positive effect on the level of strategic stability, and will reduce the incentives for delivering a surprise first nuclear strike.

As for the invulnerability of SOA systems, mobile ground-launched and sea-launched systems possess the greatest survivability in the event of war. This is convincingly demonstrated by the results of the Persian Gulf War. Despite the large number of U.S. air sorties (about 6,000), U.S. aircraft still did not succeed in destroying a significant part of Iraqi mobile SCUD missiles. The United States traditionally attaches great significance to missiles on nuclear-powered submarines, on which 50 percent of their strategic warheads are placed. In addition, about a half of the missile-carrying submarines are on permanent operational readiness in the depths of the world ocean.

In the Armed Forces of the former USSR, by virtue of geographic and economic conditions, about 30 percent of the strategic nuclear warheads fall to SLBM's. However, the superiority of the United States in invulnerable SOA systems is compensated by the mobile rail-launched (SS-24) and ground-launched (SS-25) missiles. This asymmetry is a constant source of difficulties in determining the correlation of forces by experts in negotiations. The fact that no kinds of obligations are being undertaken with respect to the "fixed emplacement" of mobile ICBM's, other than those previously approved with respect to SS-24 missiles, is very positive in the statement. At the same time there is some doubt regarding the advisability of the proposal concerning the halving (and even more) of ballistic missile nuclear submarines that are on combat patrol. While at bases, they lose all their advantages and are transformed into a nice target for the delivery of strikes against them. When you consider that ICBM silos are placed at such a distance from each other that during a nuclear delivery strike, a strike on one of them will not knock out an adjacent one, then in the event of "fixed emplacement" of submarines, one enemy warhead could destroy 16-20 SLBM's (160-200 warheads). This figure could be even higher if several submarines are deployed at a base at the same time.

There is one more aspect of the initiative with respect to the reduction of strategic warheads to a level of 2,000-2,500 units. The hope was expressed in the statement that other nuclear countries would join the disarmament

process. It turned out that this did not happen. The supreme leaders of Great Britain and France, while welcoming the disarmament initiatives of the United States and Russia, deem it inadvisable for themselves to examine the question of reducing their own nuclear weapons. They can join the disarmament process at the point when the nuclear arsenals of Russia and the United States are reduced to a level comparable to their own. Moreover, neither England nor France made an announcement on the cessation of their own nuclear rearmament programs. In addition, no one has any doubt that the strategic missiles of these countries are certainly not aimed at Washington and San Francisco. The same status will be established in the event that Russia and the United States have 5,000 warheads each. Then, the 1,000 warheads of England and France will create a preponderance of the West over Russia in strategic nuclear weapons in a ratio of 1.2:1.0. Given a reduction of the strategic arsenals of Russia and the United States to a level of 2,000 nuclear charges, the superiority of the West in SOA's will be 1.5:1.0.

Some observers have already turned their attention to the contradictions contained in the proposals of the president of Russia in regard to ABM defense. On the one hand there is a corroboration of compliance with the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems, which is an "important factor in the support of strategic stability in the world." On the other hand, there is a declaration of readiness for no less than an immediate "development and also subsequent creation of a jointly operated global system of defense in place of SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative]." The second proposal completely devalues the first, and, in the event of its adoption, the treaty will depart this life. It will give an OK to the expansion of the arms race to outer space—the only natural sphere free of weapons. We are expressing a readiness to take a fatal step—to cross the threshold of outer space with weapons. Having made the first spurt into outer space with weapons, humanity will in the foreseeable future hardly be able to use it exclusively for peaceful purposes. Who will guarantee that immediately after the crown of American military technology—"Brilliant Pebbles"—laser, particle beam, and nuclear weapons will not appear in outer space? It is not accidental that an extensive discussion unfolded on the pages of *ZA RUBEZHOM* around the proposal of N. Moyseyev concerning the creation of a global antimissile defense system on the basis of "Brilliant Pebbles" technology under the aegis of the United Nations. Almost all the Soviet participants in the discussion, including the author of these lines, have a completely negative attitude toward this idea. But considering that "there are no prophets in one's own land," we will turn to the opinion of respected foreign military-political analysts. We will cite the opinion of former U.S. Secretary of Defense R. McNamara, leading specialists in the field of military technology, professors H. Bethe, R. Garwin, H. York, and some others. They are all convinced that a global system of defense against a missile attack will be ineffective. The conclusion of these scientists is identical: "Despite the enthusiasm of some

persons in the military-industrial complex of the United States (and in the former USSR) with respect to the technology and deployment of an ABM system, we believe that this would do damage to our security." Thus, was it necessary to "leap before looking" with regard to our readiness, not to study, but immediately "to develop and create" such an ABM defense?

It is possible to agree with the proposal on the creation of a space-based global information reconnaissance system under the aegis of the United Nations. In a short time, the combined national technical monitoring systems of the USSR and the United States could become its technical base. Later on, observation systems of other countries could be "built into" it, and, in the end, it will be transformed into a general planetary system of collection and processing of information that will be accessible to all members of the world community. This kind of openness will serve as a serious stabilizing factor, and will restrain a potential aggressor from hostile actions.

We will dwell on certain economic aspects of the statement. At one time, after the announcement by the Pentagon of Reagan's SDI program, its critics both in the United States and the Soviet Union justifiably pointed to its fabulous cost. A global ABM system that must cover not only the territory of the United States (like SDI), but also more than half a hundred of the most developed states of the world, will require greater expenditures. Consequently, while closing down the arms race in some directions we are ready to invest billions on its development in other directions. Under conditions of a profound economic crisis, it is hardly worth talking about whether such proposals, moreover, very questionable in their consequences, look realistic.

The significant reduction in the periods for the destruction of weapons causes concern. It is no secret that hundreds of military ships are rusting in harbors, and that there are tens of thousands of tanks, armored combat vehicles, and artillery pieces, which we cannot utilize wisely, in Trans-Ural forests.

It is now proposed to cut the period for the destruction of SOA systems from seven to three years (more than in half). It is impossible not to recall here the barbaric method in which intermediate and shorter range missiles were destroyed. As a result of their destruction, thousands of tons of toxic products were hurled into the atmosphere from the explosion of solid missile propellants.

At the present time there are no generally accepted economical and ecologically clean methods that have undergone independent expert analysis for the destruction of solid fuel missiles, certain components of liquid fuel missiles (for example, heptyl), and the removal and burial of nuclear reactors and radioactive wastes from the hulls of submarines. Professor V. Mikhaylov, manager of the military nuclear program of the former USSR, admitted that the destruction of nuclear weapons removed from arms will require appropriations on a

scale of 1.5-2 million rubles (in 1991 prices), and that it will take no less than 10 years. Until now the scale of costs resulting from the destruction of intermediate and shorter range missiles has not been published.

The impression is created that the preparation of the Russian initiatives was conducted in a short period by representatives of some academic institutes that are free of responsibility for the condition of defense capabilities and the economy of the country, and for whom the main objective was the creation of a dumbfounding political effect.

Military Expert Assesses Yeltsin's Proposals

*AU1902115592 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG
in Hungarian 14 Feb 92 p 2*

[Interview with Andrey Kokoshin, deputy director of the Russian Academy of Sciences United States of America and Canada Institute, by Laszlo M. Lengyel in Moscow; date not given: "Yeltsin Wants a Radical Nuclear Disarmament"]

[Text] Professor Andrey Kokoshin is an expert equally in Soviet (Russian)-U.S. relations, the issues of armament and disarmament, and security policy. Our Moscow correspondent asked him to assess Yeltsin's latest disarmament proposals.

[Lengyel] What kind of scientific commendation would you make of Yeltsin's disarmament plan?

[Kokoshin] I know it from reliable sources that President Yeltsin has definite intentions to take radical steps in the reduction of nuclear arms. Both for military policy and economic considerations, he wants to greatly reduce the military expenses of Russia and the other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS].

[Lengyel] Is this how the other side sees this?

[Kokoshin] There have been certain differences in the views of Russia and the United States, but these can be bridged. There is a difference of opinion on the role of nuclear weapons. A considerable section of the leadership and political elite of the United States continues to attribute a greater importance to nuclear weapons. There is a strong view that the United States should remain the world's only superpower as regards nuclear power, too. There are strong intentions not to reduce the U.S. Forces to less than between 4,000 and 4,500 warheads under any circumstances. The aim is to maintain a considerable, ten to twelvefold, difference between the U.S. power and the second line of nuclear powers that also existed before the collapse of the Soviet Union. Structural differences are also important. Our nuclear strategic forces are mainly land based, while the Americans are sea based and airborne. Therefore, a compromise is possible up to the threshold of 4,500. This is when the new question will arise. As the English proverb says, "We will cross that bridge when we come to it."

[Lengyel] Nevertheless, the West must not have liked the—let me say, ill-considered—reasoning that they had to help Russia so as not to leave the 30,000 warheads to their own fate. The disarmament proposals may improve the bitter feelings left by this but they may indeed weaken Russia's bargaining position.

[Kokoshin] You mean that we can exert pressure on the West? The large number of nuclear weapons mainly causes problems for us, namely Russia and the other former Soviet republics. There are also some signs that, to some extent, the possession of nuclear weapons is starting to play a political role in some of the newly independent countries. This role is only marginal, but certain leaders are starting to use the existence of nuclear arms as a political trump card. Nevertheless, all in all, the population of these countries will sigh with relief when no more nuclear arms are on their territory.

[Lengyel] However, it cannot be denied that the bipolar world and its security system have disintegrated. How does this affect the future of disarmament?

[Kokoshin] The system of the world's power fields [eroter] and power centers has been radically changed. At the same time, few people have noticed that the role of nuclear arms has fundamentally changed. From the tools of largely political opposition of the two poles, to a certain extent, these weapons have become the tools of political force that influence the relations of friends and allies. This is taking place equally in the East and in the West. We can partly observe this in the CIS and, partially, within NATO.

French nuclear arms have always played a special political role because they compensated for France's economic weaknesses. Today, the role of French nuclear arms as deterrents of Eastern aggression have been further reduced. However, they are part of the French arsenal and their future is an important issue. The French leadership is launching research balloons to assess the chances of the new nuclear doctrine of the new Europe and, at the same time, to find out to what extent the French nuclear striking power can be an integrating factor for France in the new Europe and to what extent Europe can be tied to the French nuclear forces.

[Lengyel] From Russia's point of view, is the intention the same, namely to sell the former property for political gains while a good price can be received for it?

[Kokoshin] I would use the term property very conditionally. This is much more of a burden than richness. It is an economic and political-psychological burden—and an enormous responsibility on Yeltsin's shoulders. The president is bearing this responsibility with dignity. The nuclear system is an extremely complicated and gigantic mechanism that has to be dismantled gradually, but in large chunks. For foreign and domestic political reasons, the United States will not find it easy to maintain its role as the only superpower, either. I am considering the difficult economic situation and the fact that the United

States is behind Japan and the united Europe according to a number of economic indicators.

[Lengyel] Yeltsin's parcel of proposals is not homogeneous. Not aiming rockets at U.S. cities and eliminating equipment have a different importance in practice. What is at the core of the proposals?

[Kokoshin] Naturally, the changing of targets also has actual political and military content. It is true that he is not talking about "retargeting," but about redirecting. The program on flying tasks will be removed. Although this is very hard to supervise, our relations are at a level where it is not always necessary to do that. When we were opposed to each other, only the controllable measures made any sense. Today, this means a different degree of combat-readiness of the rocket. It would be a more radical solution if, as certain experts suggest, the rockets were taken out of their silos and launching pads both on land and in submarines, equally on both sides. It would be possible not to leave a single rocket in its place, but central storage of, let us say, 80 percent of them is more realistic. We have submitted the proposal but it still has to be discussed with the U.S. side. However, now the most solid proposal is the dismantling of certain parts of the rockets and the elimination of the explosive matter [robbanotoltet]. Previously, the agreements were made on carriers and the fuel was "put aside." The fact that the elimination of strategic nuclear equipment emerged is a great step forward and the Russian side is insisting on this.

Reports on Baker Talks in Moscow

Policy Issues Examined

PM1402155192 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
14 Feb 92 Morning Edition pp 1,7

[Article by Stanislav Kondrashov: "James Baker—Coordinator in CIS?"]

[Excerpts] Washington is taking on board in a professional way the new geopolitical reality called the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States]. And in its diplomacy it seems to be more effective and thorough than the Russian leadership, which was the main creator of this reality. That is the impression given by U.S. Secretary of State James Baker's current tour of CIS capitals. [passage omitted]

According to the itinerary, 25 hours and 20 minutes will be spent in Moscow 17 and 18 February. The primarily nuclear subject matter of the Moscow meetings was determined by Bush and Yeltsin at Camp David. The Moscow meetings will again be returning to the two presidents' initiatives on further sharp strategic arms cuts. One could say that the difference between the two positions is 2,000 warheads—should they be reduced to 2,500 in the years to come (as Yeltsin has proposed) or to the 4,500 proposed by Bush? And how can the imbalance affecting Russia—obvious from the nature of the cuts proposed by the Americans—be eradicated? That is, of

course, if Russia, in the wake of the defunct USSR, insists on even a semblance of parity.

Moscow is also expecting specific proposals from the Baker delegation about where the \$400 million allocated by Washington for the expedited elimination of tactical nuclear weapons on the territory of the former USSR may end up. And, finally, the question of the fate of our scientists and nuclear specialists is particularly acute and urgent. The pride of yesterday's superpower, they are now in the position of orphans or stepchildren. The fatherland has no money to look after them, yet it is frightened and fearful of letting them try "seasonal work."

"Urals! The stronghold of our power, its breadwinner and blacksmith," Aleksandr Tvardovskiy once wrote. Between his visits to Dushanbe and Tashkent Baker will visit the super secret Chelyabinsk-70, where the military atom has reigned for decades. Viktor Mikhaylov, Russian deputy minister of nuclear power generation and one of our main military nuclear specialists, said that the secretary will see a "beautiful city—albeit with empty shelves in the stores. Although that will hardly surprise him."

According to Mikhaylov, a total of 100,000 people are employed in the nuclear military-industrial complex. Some 10-15,000 are cleared for secret work and, of these, 2-3,000 have access to information of paramount importance in the sphere of sensitive technologies. It is their future that Western leaders are currently worried about. Citing Mikhaylov's figures, the diplomatic correspondent of THE NEW YORK TIMES quoted a Bush administration spokesman: "Washington's short-term aim is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear equipment and technology. But its long-term aim is to promote the conversion of military enterprises."

In conversation with me Viktor Mikhaylov did not object to these aims in principle, but firmly drew the following line: "If they want to destroy our nuclear complex, that's pie in the sky." Not all our interests coincide, and it is hardly surprising if not all of the suspicions which have built up over decades have been dispelled.

"Yes, salaries are modest. People do not earn very much, but there is no unemployment, and thousands of specialists are not being made redundant," Mikhaylov stated. And again he emphasized with pride: "We have never gone cap in hand, nor will we." But we are prepared to cooperate "on nonmilitary subjects." A delegation from Arzamas-16—another super secret city, where the military atom was once developed by Andrey Sakharov—is currently in the United States, visiting its "fellow" U.S. laboratories of Los Alamos and Livermore and discussing cooperation issues. Viktor Mikhaylov sees mutual interests in the speediest destruction of nuclear weapons and in the construction of special dumps to store the plutonium extracted from nuclear warheads.

A source at the Russian Foreign Ministry involved with the subject matter of the talks with Baker in Moscow reports that the question of setting up an international center to provide help to CIS nuclear scientists will be discussed. The idea came from Kohl and Mitterrand, who are worried about the dangers of a "brain drain." There was also the letter from our scientists to Yeltsin and Bush about collaboration in saving basic science. It is now being planned to "marry up" these two initiatives. It is planned that Andrey Kozyrev and James Baker will publicly support the idea of an international center in a special statement. German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher will later invite "G-7" representatives to flesh out the plan. [passage omitted]

Yeltsin to Visit U.S. in July

*LD1702181792 Moscow Russian Television
Network in Russian 1700 GMT 17 Feb 92*

[Correspondent Yu. Reshetnikov report; from the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] U.S. Secretary of State Baker was in Moscow today. On the agenda of his talks with Boris Yeltsin were two main issues: Initiatives in the disarmament field and the fate of the nuclear physicists in the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS]. Many of them are currently losing their jobs in their homeland and are being offered profitable contracts in countries striving to create their own nuclear weapons.

[Reshetnikov] Russian President Boris Yeltsin had three hours of talks with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker in the Kremlin today. The sides tried to bring their positions on nuclear disarmament closer together. The Russian side is insisting on a more radical reduction in nuclear weapons than is considered acceptable by the U.S. side.

[Begin Yeltsin recording] [video shows Yeltsin standing, speaking before press with Baker at his side next to another microphone] We consider that tomorrow's talks will bring these points of view closer together. We also bluntly and clearly say: Let us get closer together tomorrow, so that it then will be possible for President Bush and me to make a joint statement on the reduction and destruction of nuclear weapons. [end recording]

[Reshetnikov] Boris Yeltsin also told journalists about his intention to go to the United States in July to meet the U.S. President. The setting up of a scientific-technical center to support scientists and specialists of the former Soviet Union during the present critical period of transition to a market economy also was announced. [video shows both sides in discussion across table surrounded by pressmen; Yeltsin and Baker speaking to newsmen]

Meets Kozyrev, Arms Cuts Reviewed

*LD1802114892 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1107 GMT 18 Feb 92*

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondents Igor Peskov and Andrey Surzhanskiy]

[Text] Moscow, 18 Feb (TASS)— During the Russian-U.S. talks in Moscow prime attention was devoted to coordinating steps for implementing the accords that have been reached on cutting strategic offensive weapons. This was stated by Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, speaking at a joint news conference today on completion of the two days of talks.

At the present stage the political issues concerning reductions in nuclear weapons have been resolved, Andrey Kozyrev noted, and it remains to resolve purely technical problems. Moreover, he drew attention to the fact that the figures proposed by the parties for the armaments being reduced were "very close".

This afternoon, before his departure from Moscow, a meeting is planned between James Baker and Tengiz Sigua, the provisional head of the Government of Georgia.

'Decisive Progress' Expected

*LD1802134892 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya
Ostankino Television First Program Network
in Russian 1200 GMT 18 Feb 92*

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev took his leave of U.S. Secretary of State Baker today following the diplomatic marathon undertaken by the American around the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

[Unidentified correspondent] Andrey Kozyrev's meeting with James Baker today summed up the two days of Russian-American talks, assessed by the parties as exceptionally interesting. [video shows Kozyrev and Baker talking to journalists]

[Begin Kozyrev recording] It seems to me the main thing is that we have agreed to proceed in such a way as to avoid protracted talks lasting many years. Such protracted talks have often turned into a deferment of decisions, or even a revocation of decisions, and have only by the end of a period lasting 10 or 15 years led to agreements. We have agreed to move much more quickly, and to use our contacts, and moreover at a high level, at foreign minister level, so that the presidents may be able to reach decisive progress in this area by the summer. [end recording]

[Correspondent] The Russian minister drew attention to the closeness of the two sides' positions on quantitative parameters in cutting nuclear weapons. [video shows

Baker] Having agreed with this assessment, the U.S. secretary of state noted that American-Russian relations have entered a new era, which is distinguished by a departure from confrontation toward close cooperation. Touching on President Yeltsin's decision to retarget nuclear missiles, James Baker said he supports the spirit of this step, but sees certain technical problems in its implementation. Journalists were told Russian-U.S. talks will be continued in March.

Solton Views Moscow Talks

*LD1702231592 Moscow Radio Moscow World
Service in English 1210 GMT 17 Feb 92*

[Commentary by Yuriy Solton]

[Text] The American Secretary of State James Baker has arrived in Moscow for two days of talks with Russian leaders. Mr. Baker, who has already toured a number of former Soviet republics, meets President Boris Yeltsin and tomorrow will have talks with his Russian opposite number, Andrey Kozyrev. Now, what's the substance of negotiations in Moscow? Here's the view from Yuriy Solton. He writes the following:

The chief subject of negotiations is the implementation of the reciprocal nuclear disarmament initiatives advanced by the American and Russian presidents. Boris Yeltsin offered to George Bush in Camp David on 1 February to cut the number of nuclear warheads on strategic delivery vehicles by up to two-and-a-half thousand pieces. Mr. Bush was more anxious as he suggested another figure, four-and-a-half thousand. For their part, Americans have shown keen interest in the proposal that Mr. Yeltsin spelled out at the UN Security Council summit where he suggested the creation of a global space defense system as a safeguard against the unsanctioned or accidental nuclear missiles launch. Both sides have made progress in coordinating steps towards nuclear disarmament, the key field of security. Yet another example of enhanced bilateral trust has been the invitation extended to James Baker to visit Chelyabinsk, where a top secret factory produces warheads for nuclear missiles.

There is no question for Russia whether to head for scrapping the nuclear arsenal or not. The formal principle of parity based on the quantitative count of nuclear weapons gives way to the least defense sufficiency principle. Russia today spends more time on dismantling arms than on their manufacture. But on its own Russia will hardly cope with the costly and dangerous process, so the American Congress has set aside 400 million dollars for it as aid to safely store the dismantled nuclear weapons and convert them to peaceful use. A concrete plan for the utilization is expected to be agreed in Moscow.

There is yet another problem, a purely human one. What is meant is not to change the mentality of the military, who are scared and frightened that the nuclear shield protecting the USSR will become holey. The question is

how nuclear scientists could be helped to survive conversion. There are over 100,000 specialists in the former USSR who have access to nuclear technology. Of them nearly two, three thousand have been initiated into top classified data. The problem of their social security and their possible but undesirable emigration to eastern Muslim countries interested in such services to advance their nuclear programs were discussed at a conference with Boris Yeltsin last month. Certain measures were mapped out. But help is essential, too. German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and French President Francois Mitterrand have proposed raising an international fund to provide employment to nuclear physicists who may be jobless through conversion. Andrey Kozyrev and James Baker are expected to back up such an idea officially.

Let's hope that on all these and other matters negotiators in Moscow will achieve concrete results to start filling with substance the Russian-American declaration on fostering partnership and friendship between the two countries.

Tours Chelyabinsk-70 Nuclear Center

*PM1602221992 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
17 Feb 92 Morning Edition p 1*

[Report by Georgiy Shcherbina: "Baker Opens 'Closed Cities'"]

[Text] What the U.S. spy pilot Powers was not allowed to examine from the Urals skies more than three decades ago has now been quietly studied on the ground by U.S. Secretary of State James Baker.

The important transatlantic guest made use of this opportunity to visit closed Urals cities. Baker was first received by Snezhninsk. Although the city does not feature on any maps—since its inception it has hidden under the "pseudonym" Chelyabinsk-70—its reputation nowadays has ceased to be a secret for the world's public. It was here, at the height of the "cold war" in March 1955 that Soviet thermonuclear weapons were developed. It is here that work which cannot be publicized is still done. This work is handled by the all-Union Technical Physics Scientific Research Institute, a design bureau, and an experimental plant, where major intellectual resources are concentrated.

This scientific and production potential, which was an achievement of the collapsed USSR and its military-industrial complex, holds a colossal stockpile of unused technologies, know-how, and highly original developments.

It is another matter that, in order to implement the conversion programs, great amounts of investment—which Russia unfortunately does not have available—will be required.

There is no doubt that all these circumstances will be taken into account by both the government and the U.S. secretary of state, accompanied by his delegation, who

thoroughly familiarized themselves with the All-Union Technical Physics Scientific Research Institute complex.

GENERAL

Presidium Begins START, CFE Treaty Ratification Process

*PM1302105592 Moscow IZVESTIYA
in Russian 12 Feb 92 Morning Edition p 2*

[Sergey Chugayev report: "Reform in First Place. Constitution Later"]

[Excerpts] The central event of the latest Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Presidium session, which was held 10 February, was the decision to propose that parliament approve the date of the start of the work of the Sixth Congress of People's Deputies—20 April. [passage omitted]

The Presidium's decision to embark on the ratification in parliament of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms [START Treaty], signed in the United States 31 July 1991, and the Treaty on Conventional Arms in Europe [CFE Treaty], signed in Paris 19 November 1991 [as published], also appears no less important. The contents of both documents are known quite widely. In the opinion of Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev, who presented the documents, they both strengthen Russian security. However, certain problems are posed by the fact that the treaties were signed on behalf of the USSR, whereas they are to be ratified by another state, albeit one that has been recognized as the former state's legal heir.

The question of the ratification procedure arises in connection with the START Treaty. In principle, the Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan could ratify it on the same day as Russia. But such a procedure would run counter to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. For, officially, only Russia is a nuclear power. Therefore another option will most likely be proposed—Russia ratifies the treaty, while the three other republics express official approval for it and ensure its fulfillment. According to Andrey Kozyrev, the republics have no objections to such a procedure, and it is very probable that the treaty could be ratified at the end of April.

Things are more complex with the CFE Treaty. As Aleksandr Kotenko, deputy chairman of the parliamentary defense committee, declared at the session, the Ukraine and Belarus disagree with the arms quotas offered them. But if their demands are agreed to, then Russia, in fulfilling the treaty's provisions, will have to disarm almost completely. Thus, this treaty's ratification must be preceded by talks on the arms of the European members of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States].

'Full Public Control' Urged for Disarmament

*PM1702163792 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
17 Feb 92 pp 1,4*

[Report by Vladimir Gubarev: "If You Have Bought an Atomic Bomb, Destroy It!"]

[Text] The myths, rumors, scandal, and speculation surrounding nuclear weapons are increasing every day. Hardly had the "nuclear brain drain" sensation faded, even though not one of the creators of the weapon has left to work abroad, than fresh "top-secret" information hit the newspaper pages: The Japanese are ready to buy up all the weapons-grade plutonium and "quickly reprocess it for the needs of the nuclear power industry, thus freeing themselves from the need to import oil and fuel." For information's sake, at the moment there are no effective techniques available for reprocessing weapons-grade plutonium, there is only research work and nothing else to speak of.

The politicians are not being left behind here, either. The Russian President's sensational statement on retargeting missiles away from U.S. cities has generated a host of bewildered questions: So where will they be aimed? But even that is not the main issue—unfortunately the president's advisers are making B. Yeltsin say the kind of things that cannot be carried out. That is why in Geneva the Russian Foreign Minister had to explain that the president has only put forward an idea, "launched a trial balloon, whereas in fact everything is far more complex." The air above the planet is quite thick with "nuclear trial balloons." J. Attali, president of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, has proposed that the USSR's debts be written off in exchange for our destroying our nuclear warheads. A figure has even been mentioned: \$60 billion. A generous gift, is it not? But if you take a closer look at nuclear disarmament problems, you will see that statements of this kind are mere declarations.

To destroy the vast arsenal of nuclear weapons stockpiled in the world will cost money—lots of it! Perhaps only slightly less than it took to create the weapons. The \$400 million which the Pentagon is promising are surely only enough to build a single storage facility. So let us not be deceived by the politicians' various statements—we are still a very long way from real disarmament, the pace of nuclear weapons production remains high, and we still have not seen with our own eyes a single nuclear charge being dismantled and destroyed.

Furthermore, with the disintegration of the Soviet Union a danger has arisen not so much of the "leak of nuclear technologies" that people are talking about so much as of a slackening of control over the nuclear monster. The "voyages" of nuclear charges from Ukraine and Belarus to Russia, the absence of secure depots, and finally the complete unpreparedness for the dismantling and storage of warheads on such a scale all sharply reduce nuclear safety. Even though the military are trying to avoid publicity because they fear the public,

some information on the inauspicious situation is getting through. And we learn about this "from abroad." They are not letting us, their own country's journalists, have access, arguing that everything in this sphere is classified. Whereas for U.S. specialists the doors of the most closed installations are suddenly flung wide open. Recently some visitors from across the ocean visited a tactical nuclear weapons dump (they were invited to "one of the best"). The Americans were horrified at what they saw!

I am deeply convinced that nuclear disarmament must be under full public control. Moreover, with the public's most active participation, financing included. Let us not harbor any illusions: The Russian leadership, like the U.S. Administration, does not now have the means to implement its planned programs. And if the government's attitude toward nuclear physicists does not change in the very near future, there will simply be no one left to carry out nuclear disarmament. In the press and on television, both at home and abroad, there are reports that the threat of unemployment hangs over "Chelyabinsk-70," "Arzamas-16," and other nuclear centers in Russia and that physicists will be reduced to "beggary" and "starvation." They are even collecting humanitarian aid for them in the United States and Europe and some charitable foundations are prepared to "pay them extra in freely convertible currency." In my view, everything has been turned upside down in the present situation. In fact, there are no financial centers. Yes, specialists' pay is miserly by present-day standards. Yes, the solution of the fate of our atomic ministry has been delayed and there is a bureaucratic fuss being created over the appointment of a leader for the new department. All these things are true. And this is the nuclear physicists' calamity.

It is a great good fortune that specialists have an incredible degree of self-restraint—none of them has left and collectives have not disintegrated because people, unlike the government, understand very well how great the responsibility resting on them is—above all for the world's nuclear safety. Specialists such as those employed at "Arzamas-16," for example, will have no particular difficulty finding work. Any of our firms will pay them just as much as they will earn abroad. But if the designers and engineers from the nuclear centers leave there will be problems for the government and the peoples of Russia because they are the only ones capable of dismantling and neutralizing the nuclear charges. Pray God that this principle is not breached: Then we will not only have Chernobyl and Kyshtym on our land, there will also be Russian Hiroshimas and Nagasakis.

The public has held out a helping hand—we have decided to enlist private capital in disarmament. The "nuclear auction" project (see PRAVDA for 14 and 28 December 1991) envisages the destruction of actual nuclear charges and the financing is to be carried out by firms and concerns, private individuals and social organizations.

The first to approve the draft were specialists themselves, whom some mass media are calling "blind hawks." It is they who prepared the plan for dismantling the charges and bombs in such a way that the whole process could be displayed to the public at large and at the same time prevent a leak of information—the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons must be observed in full and in all respects! The International Federation of Peace and Accord, the M. Gorbachev Foundation, the concern headed by M. Bocharov, the "Doveriye" firm, 20 enterprises and organizations belonging to the "Neizvestnyy kosmodrom" joint-stock company, the small-scale enterprise "Vityaz," the "Nekos" RIA [expansion unknown], plants in the Urals, combines in Kazakhstan, and many of our readers are ready to take part most actively in implementing this project.

The Western firms about which we have already reported ("Lare" from Italy, the "Kuzin Grupp Interneyshnl" from Austria, and Khink [company names as transliterated] from the United States) are being joined by others. On the eve of the auction for the right to destroy the first nuclear charges (and we are sure: it must take place!) we will publish a complete list of participants. It seems to me that the general mood was captured by the president of an Indonesian goldminers' concern, whose letter we received yesterday.

"Recently we learned about your program for the destruction of nuclear weapons, known as 'I am buying a nuclear warhead.' The idea expressed recently by Austrian Chancellor Vranitzky on the acquisition of weapons in the CIS countries and their subsequent destruction caught our attention by its extraordinary nature and profound common sense.

"Having analyzed the firm's financial potential and counting on the earliest and fullest destruction of nuclear weapons not only in the countries of the former socialist camp but throughout the world, our Indonesian goldminers' concern has decided to acquire a few warheads from the most destructive Soviet missiles, the SS-17, SS-18, SS-19, and SS-22. In our view it would be sensible to begin with the destruction of the latest warheads, including mobile forward-based systems, intermediate-range, and ICBM's.

"The firm's board is ready to use up to 14.5 percent of net profit for the above mentioned purposes, amounting to several billion U.S. dollars.

"We hope that the successful implementation of this program will help to strengthen peace and rid mankind of the threat of its total destruction as quickly as possible."

Interesting, is it not? In far-off Indonesia, Australia, and South America, from where we also received evidence of a desire to take part in the "nuclear auction," people are attentively following events connected with disarmament in one-sixth of the world. Furthermore, they are ready to come to our aid. But so far the answer has been

silence because some people are still convinced that the best, correct ideas originate only within the Kremlin's walls.

CIS Commander Shaposhnikov Interviewed

PM2102221592 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 22 Feb 92 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Marshal of Aviation Ye.I. Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, by unidentified correspondent; place and date not given: "Serving the People. Marshal of Aviation Ye.I. Shaposhnikov, Commander in Chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, Replies to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent's Questions"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] The problems of defense building and the Armed Forces are not only of domestic importance, they have great foreign policy importance too. In particular, this applies to the fulfillment of accords in the disarmament and arms control sphere.

[Shaposhnikov] You are right—what is happening in the military sphere has a major international impact. The Commonwealth states have stated their resolve to unswervingly fulfill the former USSR's commitments in the disarmament sphere. But the reality is that, for instance, it is already 16 months since the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe was signed, but it has not yet been ratified by all the states—including Commonwealth states—whose territories are covered by the treaty. The situation is complicated by the fact that the levels of conventional arms defined for the entire former Union and differentiated region by region are to be redistributed among the Commonwealth states, taking account of the existence of the Joint Armed Forces, the creation by some states of their own armed forces, and, of course, the observance of the interests of all states located in the area covered by the treaty. Obviously, meaningful talks and agreement on this issue are essential. An agreement should be examined and signed by the Commonwealth heads of state at the forthcoming Kiev meeting.

As for the START Treaty, the best option would be for it to be ratified by Russia and for Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan to associate themselves [prisoyedinyatsya] with this act.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Items appear in the local and foreign press from time to time reflecting the public's concern at the state of control [kontrol] of nuclear weapons.

[Shaposhnikov] There are no grounds for such concern. Centralized command and control of nuclear weapons in the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] Joint Armed Forces is guaranteed to be reliable. The withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from Ukrainian and Belarussian territory to salvage and destruction bases at plants [predzavodskiye bazy utilizatsii i unichtozheniya]

on Russian territory is proceeding strictly according to plan. Currently around half of these munitions have been transferred. The work will be complete by 1 July this year.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Could you say just a few words about the Russian president's latest disarmament initiatives?

[Shaposhnikov] These are major political initiatives of historic importance. They stem from the context of our strategic line of reciprocal and total nuclear disarmament. Of course, they require very major military-technical elaboration and the creation of a mechanism for their implementation. But that is an essential practical task stemming from any political act in the sphere of defense and disarmament. For instance, the reciprocal refusal to target strategic arms against installations in the Russian Federation and the United States, the phased reciprocal transition to single warhead [monoblochnyy] ICBM's and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and the joint development, creation, and operation of a global ABM defense system could all become a real basis for genuinely reliable strategic stability and universal security and peace. [passage omitted]

Yeltsin Interviewed on Military, Strategic Issues

PM2402100192 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
24 Feb 92 Morning Edition pp 1, 3

[Interview with President Boris Yeltsin by IZVESTIYA Military Correspondent Nikolay Burbyga; place and date not given: "Boris Yeltsin: Russia Has No Special Secret Policy Regarding Nuclear Issues"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [Yeltsin] Now to the military theme. Of course, in my opinion, it should have been possible to do more. The development of the armed forces within the Commonwealth could have, I am convinced of this, followed a different scenario based on the preservation of the unified armed forces. As is known, Russia favors precisely this approach.

The times when a single viewpoint was foisted on everyone are gone. In the Commonwealth there are neither commanders nor subordinates. All the states are equal, and the position of each one is respected. This is one of the main principles of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States], a factor of its viability.

At the same time we have learned to negotiate agreements and elaborate compromises. Assessing the results of the latest Minsk meeting, I would like to note above all that the question of the Strategic Forces was resolved clearly and precisely. An agreement to this effect was concluded.

I would like to emphasize that in accordance with the Agreement, the Strategic Forces are an independent strategic combined unit of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Their leadership is carried out by the commander, who is answerable to the Council of the Heads of State.

Thus we have reached a consensus. The territory of the former Union will not be a source of nuclear instability within the world community. [passage omitted]

[Burbyga] Under what conditions will Russia be forced to set up its own armed forces?

[Yeltsin] Everyone probably understands that Russia has considerable advantages in this matter, and this is largely why we are in no hurry. I believe that the approach based on pooling states' efforts in questions of defense is preferable and more effective, and as long as this opinion is shared by the majority of the states of the Commonwealth, we will not change our stance.

[Burbyga] It is known from various sources that the Russian army is expected to have a numerical strength of 1 million, and its officer corps is to number 150,000-200,000. Today, as far we know, about 3 million men are serving in the army, of which around 1 million are officers. What is in store for those who will not be part of the Russian army?

[Yeltsin] The question of establishing a Russian army is not on the agenda, and therefore I do not want to comment on the figures which you have cited. Furthermore, these are not the only figures which have been mentioned. I believe it is more important to explain our general approach to problem which you have raised. [passage omitted]

[Burbyga] In one of your speeches you stated that Russia will engage in trade in arms and military equipment. Are we not thereby undermining our prestige? After all, it cannot be ruled out that the weapons will reach the most dangerous and strife-torn areas.

[Yeltsin] First I would note that weapons are a commodity traded by almost all the states which produce them. The Soviet Union was no exception.

The arms trade is also an enforced necessity for us today. It is a source of foreign currency, which is currently in extremely short supply. It is also a condition for supporting defense sectors. Readers will probably be aware that we have cut defense spending sharply, and spending on arms procurements in particular. The corresponding cuts in weapons production would be a severe blow to the plants producing them. This abrupt turnaround would inevitably lead to social problems and leave millions of people on the brink of unemployment. The arms trade would act like a shock absorber on this process.

We have discussed this issue with several Western leaders—including the United States—and our position has met with understanding.

At the same time, new aspects are appearing in our arms trade. We are departing from our ideological approach to this issue and from supporting those who declare their

adherence to certain doctrines. We are conducting this trade at state level and openly.

Russia shares the guiding arms trade principles approved in London in October 1991 by the leading conventional arms-exporting countries and will adhere to those principles. I must say that Soviet arms have a good reputation and are in demand, but I agree with you—weapons are weapons. We always remember that.

[Burbyga] It is well known that conversion of the military-industrial complex is currently bogged down. Why is this the case, in your view? Are you confident that it will be possible to arrange for its transition to civilian production?

[Yeltsin] Yes, conversion of defense production is one of Russia's most important problems. There are few countries where the defense industry has such a significant position. Of course, it will take gigantic efforts and expenditure to totally alter our distorted economic structure. All this will take time.

I agree with you that the first phase of conversion has been a failure [ne poluchilsya]. You get the impression that from the very outset emphasis had been placed on the traditional principle of changing while changing nothing, maintaining the military-industrial complex' positions at all costs, not allowing anything new into the defense sector of the economy, and blocking reforms in it. This has dealt a severe blow to enterprises and left them teetering on the brink of survival. Conversion has evolved on the basis of the worst option—it has been a natural disaster.

For several years people did not embark on any serious transformation of the defense sector. Now a great deal will have to be done "from scratch"—even from less than scratch. In 1992, part of the funds released from defense spending will be directly channeled into financing conversion. We have a number of major projects for converting modern military technologies, including in the nuclear industry. We advocate the comprehensive development of cooperation with foreign firms in this area. Cooperation is being organized with a number of countries—including Italy, Britain, Germany, and others—to use defense enterprises' production capacity to jointly produce civilian output and primarily consumer goods, which will be in line with the defense sector's scientific and technical potential.

Of course, defense sectors are currently in a difficult position, but I am sure that we have chances to hang on to everything valuable that has been accumulated in this sphere.

[Burbyga] You have announced that our missiles are no longer targeted on U.S. cities. So what are their targets now? There are a lot of conjectures and much vagueness

in this respect. In general, is Russia prepared to be the first to use nuclear weapons?

[Yeltsin] I will answer your second question first because it is of fundamental importance. Russia will not be the first to use nuclear weapons. This is our fundamental stance.

Now to the targets of our missiles. In this question we proceed from the fact that many years of confrontation between the West and the East, between our country and the United States have ended. The military doctrine which was based on the division of the world into two opposed systems has become part of history. Thus the need to target our missiles on those who are not our enemies and with whom we are not about to wage war has disappeared. I would like to stress that this is **not a unilateral measure on our part which serves to disarm us. We are implementing it on a reciprocal basis, primarily with the United States. The missiles will have a "zero flight plan [nulevoye poletnoye zadaniye]."**

At the same time, the world is not yet a safe place. There are regions which require heightened attention. Naturally, the new political reality does not require nuclear weapons on the scale to which they have been accumulated. This is precisely why we have put forward the proposal for deep cuts to be effected on a reciprocal basis with the United States.

Of late, conjectures have appeared in the mass media claiming that there is a danger of the use of the military factor in our relations with the former republics of the Union. These are not realistic. What is more, I regard such suggestions as blasphemous and insulting. Russia has no special secret policy on nuclear issues. A united policy in the sphere of Strategic Armed Forces is being implemented within the Commonwealth. It would be simply impossible to use nuclear weapons without the knowledge and consent [bez vedoma] of any one of the nuclear republics. [passage omitted]

[Burbyga] As far as we know, Boris Nikolayevich, Russia is not planning to totally eliminate nuclear weapons. Why? In general, do you regard nuclear weapons as a factor of a power's might, as a deterrent, or an offensive weapon? Do you believe that in time mankind will rid itself of the nuclear arsenal once and for all?

[Yeltsin] I have answered this question several times already, but if it is necessary, I am prepared to repeat.

Russia favors nuclear disarmament not a unilateral disarmament but one based on parity. The principle of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons must be strictly observed. Our strategic goal is a nuclear-free world, and we are in favor of achieving it as soon as possible although setting deadlines in advance would probably be naive.

Speaking in general terms, I believe that the emergence of nuclear weapons on earth was a great evil. It is true, of course, that they have acted as a deterrent, but that is nonetheless not the main point. The entire world policy underwent a revolution in the wake of the emergence of these weapons. Having created a weapon for its own annihilation, mankind was forced to spend vast amounts of energy on protecting itself from it and from new, previously unknown forms of blackmail, terrorism, accidents, and even human error.

In a nutshell, I am no advocate of nuclear weapons, and if their final destruction in the world takes place in my lifetime, I will be truly happy. It is a dream, of course. [passage omitted]

START TALKS

NNRRC Chief: START Implementation Under Way

LD0702202692 Moscow TASS in English
2011 GMT 7 Feb 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sergey Ostanin]

[Text] Moscow February 7 TASS—"The work on putting into action the decisions of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) began", chief of the national centre for reducing the nuclear danger [NNRRC], Lieutenant-General Vladimir Medvedev told TASS today.

The centre was formed in 1987 as a body to exchange information on putting into action the Soviet-American agreements on medium- and short-range missiles. At the same time it became an organization for monitoring the provisions of the agreement. Its officials are currently preparing to work on cutting down the strategical nuclear arsenals. It will require great efforts in exchange of information and carrying out the inspection checks, the lieutenant-general said.

"During the three years of the implementation of the START, there have been no complaints against the inspection work of the groups", Medvedev said. "We either solved all problems on a technical level or passed them on to diplomats for consideration by a special control committee", he said.

"This experience will be useful for us in the future after ratification of the START", Lieutenant-General Medvedev concluded.

Reports on Military Reaction to Large-Scale Strategic Forces Cuts

Visit to Missile Base

LD0702230792 Moscow Radio Rossii Network
in Russian 1900 GMT 7 Feb 92

[Text] It has long been known that it takes more than a day to turn political leaders' announcements into specific action. The length of the delay depends on the seriousness and scope of the decision made. Boris Yeltsin's plan for large-scale cuts in strategic forces is unequaled, and we do not yet know how the situation will develop. Our correspondent Eduard Gendeleya reports on reaction in the Army to this move by the Russian leadership.

[Gendeleya] The military formation is hidden deep inside the forests of Russia's black earth zone. The rules of secrecy are so strict that even officers risk dismissal if they leave the unit's territory. The formation is part of the Strategic Deterrence Forces.

I am not allowed to give any details on where this unit is stationed, what kind of weapons it has, or even the name of the unit's commanding officer. The men serving here are used to the strict rules on secrecy and their isolated way of life. Commanding officers from the formation visited the unit recently and asked what should be done next. Russian President Boris Yeltsin's announcement of major cuts in strategic weapons left too many questions unanswered. What does the commanding officer of the formation think about all this himself? Perhaps he would tell your Radio Rossii correspondent.

[Begin unidentified officer recording] You see, in theory we officers welcome all of our president's initiatives, especially in strategic nuclear disarmament. So many of these terrible weapons have piled up in the world that there is nowhere left to put them. But what worries me is the speed and deadlines that Boris Nikolayevich proposed in his announcement. I do not think he has worked it all out properly. They are not saying anything in the United States about timeframes or other short-term goals, and for good reason. They are in no hurry to say anything about it. That is my own personal opinion. I do not know; I could be wrong. [end recording]

[Gendeleya] Well, this is just another mutinous general, some of our listeners will say after hearing that interview. Believe me, that is not the case. Formations of this kind have always been loyal to the country's leadership; the leadership has always had the control button [nuclear button] in hand, literally, while that is not the case with other branches of the Armed Forces.

Officers in Strategic Deterrence Forces formations are not worried about career motives. As professionals they are worried about the fact that the country has no tried and tested technical means to destroy rocket fuel, for

example. There are no storage facilities where, metaphorically speaking, all this equipment could be collected, and there will not be any in the foreseeable future. There are simply no apartments for the 700,000 servicemen and family members who will be affected by the cuts. Will this most large-scale and rapidly performed arms cut be the most expensive?

'Concerned' Over New Policy

*PM1002105192 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya
Ostankino Television First Program Network
in Russian 1900 GMT 2 Feb 92*

[Report by Kiselev over video: From the "Itogi" newscast]

[Text] [Kiselev] This is what a strategic missile command post looked like some 10 years ago. Naturally, you have to bear in mind that even then we were not allowed to film the latest equipment. However, the situation in the underground silos has probably not changed fundamentally in recent years.

The officers on duty probably still keep their eyes glued to a screen on which a sequence of numbers may appear at any second. This is the code of the launcher in question with which no one in the silo is familiar until the launch. The same applies to the target to which the missile is to deliver its lethal payload. Generally speaking, going by a number of indirect indicators, the officers can make an assumption about the direction of the trajectory, but no more than that. The exact coordinates of the target are stored in the memory of the missile itself, and until the moment the start button is pushed, they remain heavily guarded.

Yeltsin's statement that missiles will no longer be targeted on U.S. cities has evoked a certain amount of puzzlement among the strategic forces' command. What new target coordinates should be fed into the command system? That's the first point; the second is that it is no secret that the missiles were targeted not only on the U.S. continent. Targets are also located elsewhere. By lifting the threat from the former enemy, who has become the No. 1 friend, but maintaining it in respect of other countries, are we not complicating the political situation in the world? It seems that high-ranking officers of the strategic forces are even more concerned about the political consequences of this step than the politicians themselves. On the whole they favor the reduction of strategic offensive arms, but they have reservations about the haste with which this decision was adopted. However, being disciplined military people, they have declined to comment for the time being. We were told at the Strategic Forces main staff: Let us wait for President Yeltsin's return from abroad. Perhaps we will receive an exhaustive explanation.

And so, the military have correctly refrained from making assessments, but that does not mean that there are any fewer questions. It is hard to shake off the impression that the proposal for superdisarmament was

prepared for Boris Yeltsin under pressure of time, after it had become known that President Bush intended to put forward a unilateral initiative.

For some reason we do not seem able to shake off that very Soviet desire to catch up and overtake America, and to win what has now become the disarmament race. It is unquestionable that this sort of action lowers the threat posed by nuclear missiles. It is also a great boon that it is done unilaterally, which means that there is no need for coordination and haggling, which can spell the death of any positive initiative. However, political declarations must be followed up with concrete actions. We will probably learn in a week's time what exactly these actions will be. We have been firmly promised an interview at the Strategic Forces Main Staff.

Data on Republics' Strategic Capability Issued

*LD1402151392 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya
Ostankino Television First Program Network
in Russian 1200 GMT 14 Feb 92*

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] Only four of the Commonwealth Republics currently possess strategic weapons. Russia's PRAVITEL-STVENNY VESTNIK published the following official data on the layout of forces. You can see it on your screens [video shows the following table of figures]:

	MBR	SB	YaP
	[ICBMs]	[strategic bombers]	[nuclear submarines]
Russia	1035	70	59
Ukraine	176	30	0
Kazakhstan	104	0	0
Belarus	720	0	0

Warheads' Relocation to Perm Questioned

*LD1902004392 Moscow POSTFACTUM in English
1526 GMT 18 Feb 92*

[From the "Politics" section]

[Text] Perm—Regional administration refuted rumors concerning re-dislocation of nuclear warheads to a missile base near Perm from the territories of Ukraine and Belarus. This fact was featured by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA on February 8 issue with reference to a senior officer of a missile Army unit near Bershet village, who wished to remain anonymous, and later, on February 11 and 12, by the PERM ZVEZDA newspaper. Perm journalist Oleg Andriyashkin, author of the information in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, told POSTFACTUM that despite refutations, he is certain in his informer's reliability who allegedly saw for himself tractors carrying warheads in the ammunition storage zone of the Army unit.

The Bershet garrison is situated 25 km southward of Perm. According to the Western military experts, multi-charge systems RS-22, possessing 10 warheads with 550 kilotons capacity each and capable of hitting the target at a 10,000 km distance, are located here.

On February 17, Major-General Yuriy Kirillov, Bershet garrison's head, told journalists that of late nuclear warheads had been neither brought into nor taken out of the base. Right upon publication regional administration heads were allowed into Bershet who, according to Kirillov, had a possibility to see everything for themselves. Vyacheslav Igumnov, first deputy regional administration head, warned journalists that in case of publishing unverified data to the point in the future, the administration is ready in keeping with the law on the press to demand identification of information sources from the authors. General Kirillov also added that the command of the base expects the arrival of the NATO inspectors. The inspection terms have not been determined so far. Journalists are not likely to unconditionally accept the refutations, noting that the military will always deny everything. Nevertheless, an officer of a special department of a Perm division, who asked not to name him, told POSTFACTUM that special departments in the Army units were not operating of late in guaranteeing security of transporting of any military cargoes, which is always the case while transporting nuclear weapons.

SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

U.S. Interest Topaz Nuclear Reactor Noted

PM1002141392 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya
Ostankino Television First Program Network
in Russian 1900 GMT 2 Feb 92

[Report by Sergey Slipchenko: From the "Itogi" newscast]

[Excerpt] [Kiselev] The next item throws new light on a report which has appeared recently in the U.S. press, according to which there is U.S. interest in purchasing certain achievements of our space missile technology, and specifically a compact nuclear reactor which can be used as a power supply for space satellites. To begin with here are details in a reportage by Sergey Slipchenko.

[Slipchenko] This is a "Topaz" satellite, and this is the nuclear reactor. Right here is the know-how which the Americans would so much like to get their hands on.

The Americans stopped working on these problems in 1978. Now, after they have been working on the SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative] program for many years, they need a strong power source, for example for a laser beam in orbit. At the "Krasnaya Zvezda" science and production association a concept already exists for a nuclear plant with a capacity of several hundred kilowatts and an operational life of five to seven years.

In THE WASHINGTON POST article dated 8 January, U.S. scientists report that negotiations with the Soviets as to the price and terms of purchase of the reactor are continuing, and that in all likelihood its cost will be less than \$10 million. Ten million dollars is clearly not enough—this is the Soviet scientists' opinion. [Slipchenko ends] [passage omitted]

U.S. Attitude Toward Space, ABM Cooperation Viewed

LD1002200992 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 1810 GMT 10 Feb 92

[Commentary by Vladislav Kozyakov]

[Text] In last week's speeches in Paris and Brussels Mr. Henry Cooper who is in charge of America's Strategic Defense Initiative hailed President Yeltsin's proposal for a worldwide antimissile system.

In his view the two countries stand to profit from bilateral cooperation in space research, given Russia's achievements in space-related technologies, such as directed energy systems, neutral particle beams, and power reactors for space application. For their part, U.S. experts say the Russians appear to be ahead in nuclear power systems that would orbit in space and components for electric propulsion units for rockets.

AVIATION WEEK AND TECHNOLOGY reckons joint space research by Russia and the United States could save the nation more than four billion dollars in Star Wars development costs and also help booster the troubled economy of the former Soviet Republics.

However, until recently Washington disapproved of any bilateral deals with Russia involving high technologies. A policy analyst for the Federation of American Scientists said recently that SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative] had been the leading advocate for purchasing Soviet technology more than a year now and that the administration's response overall had been absolute [word indistinct].

Other problems emerge: As work is now in progress to create a global missile defense shield, experts raise doubts both about its effectiveness and expediency. The main argument in favor of such a system is the protection of would-be signatories against a missile attack by terrorist or extremist regimes. Some counts put the number of countries likely to be in possession of ballistic missiles by the turn of the century at 24 at least, which in itself gives rise to a question of whether the establishment of the global shield may not lead to an increase in that number.

One other problem is the continuance of the 1972 ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile] Treaty. The Americans want to amend it to increase the number of antimissile systems above what is permitted under the treaty as well as to lift a ban on the testing and deployment of weapons in space.

In the meantime, both Moscow and Washington agree that the ABM Treaty is an important factor of international stability, while the United States Congress imposed a ban on the development of space weapons under an SDI program.

Away from all doubts it is most encouraging that Russia and the United States have begun discussions about a global security system as partners seeking to become allies.

Support for SDI To Prevent Attack From Third Countries Urged

MK1802103092 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 18 Feb 92 p 2

[Interview with A. Savelyev, vice president of Institute of National Security and Strategic Studies, by Natalya Gorodetskaya; place and date not given: "Opinion: Optimum Scenario for a Joint Defense System For Us Is SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative] Aleksandr Savelyev, Vice President of Institute of National Security and Strategic Studies, Thinks. But ABM Treaty Must First Be Repudiated"]

[Text] [Savelyev] SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative] is by no means directed against our country. The system is designed to intercept at most 200 missiles; we have more than 2,000, so this system would not intercept any attack, even a weakened retaliatory nuclear attack, from our country. The Americans have no intention of defending themselves against us—they see the main danger as coming from third countries, as shown by the Gulf war. There is a real danger of the proliferation of nuclear technology and missile technology. For many of our politicians and military people the very name SDI is like a red rag to a bull. The Americans have already invented another name for the program—Global Protection Against Limited Strikes.

[Gorodetskaya] But we have never taken seriously the danger from third countries.

[Savelyev] At present they have no strategic weapons. Where are the guarantees that they will not develop relatively long-range missiles tomorrow? Why should we rely on these countries' not having enough money or lacking sufficient technological development and expect them not to succeed in achieving that? We must not fail to take into consideration the possibility of an unauthorized missile launch. The situation in our country is that there are three nuclear powers in what was the USSR and seats of instability and tension around.

[Gorodetskaya] Do you think that a space-based defense system will save us?

[Savelyev] In the event of a nuclear war it will not save anyone. But this system will intercept a lone missile no matter where it comes from.

[Gorodetskaya] But the ABM Treaty bans the development [razrabotka], creation, and deployment of ABM defense systems.

[Savelyev] Following the statements by Yeltsin and Kozyrev I think that this treaty is on its last legs. It is far more important to persuade its defenders within the country. The campaign against ABM defense that began after Reagan put forward the Strategic Defense Initiative in 1983 has accomplished its task, and voices can now be heard charging opponents of ABM with fueling the arms race. It is claimed that this treaty supposedly bans nuclear weapons from being put into near-earth space. Nothing of the kind; that is regulated by the 1967 treaty on space. Incidentally, in our long hatred of SDI it was somehow forgotten that the 1972 ABM Treaty was concluded on the initiative of the United States; the Americans made great efforts to prove that the limited deployment of ABM defense could undermine strategic stability. In 1967 Kosygin issued a blunt statement saying that it was strictly up to the state to protect the population against a possible attack—including a missile attack.

[Gorodetskaya] You think that it is preferable for us to subscribe to SDI rather than developing a "joint global defense system" in its place. Why?

[Savelyev] The Americans have spent several tens of billions of dollars on their program. This means that all new "global programs" will be based in one way or another on developments already made. We simply cannot conduct studies on an equal footing and put billions into them. What is more, Russia does not even have a cosmodrome. It is far more beneficial for us to join an existing program. The Americans want to spend money on their own security. There is no need to stop them. We must join this system, thus deriving the maximum benefit for ourselves. The U.S. ABM defense system presupposes the deployment of 1,000 ground-based and 1,000 space-based intercepts. This system will be sufficiently limited for there to be no talk of an arms race. Let us ratify these ideas in a new treaty. Let us sign an agreement linked with predictability and confidence-building measures. Admittedly, it would be unrealistic to talk about dual control of the system—as we have been accustomed from our position as a superpower. We must not take part in this program on a full basis and demand that the sides are equal in commissioning and controlling the system. The system will exist—it presents no danger to us—and will be able to defend us.

[Gorodetskaya] Is that not too much of a consumerist approach to cooperation?

[Savelyev] The Americans consider this system extremely essential for their defense. They have the money. Unlike us they also have tremendous experience of getting a return from military developments in the nonmilitary sphere. And relations between allies are somewhat different. A struggle is under way in NATO as to who will pay less. That is fine. On the other hand we

will show in practice that we do not regard the United States as a potential adversary. We only have to formulate rapidly and clearly new Russian-U.S. agreements on space and ABM defense—limited defense, naturally—and we will be able to sleep soundly.

[Gorodetskaya] Apart from being able to sleep soundly, what will we gain from joining the U.S. ABM defense system?

[Savelyev] Russia has no defense system at all now, most of the radars were left in the republics, and there are only 100 nuclear-tipped missile intercepts around Moscow. The possibility of a nuclear explosion over the city to repulse a nuclear attack is still in question. So we will get at least something right away. Then, I think, we will be able to develop our own ABM defense system.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Withdrawal From Germany Continues Gradually

Six Divisions To Leave This Year

LD1202112692 Moscow TASS in English
2138 GMT 11 Feb 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Mikhayl Voronenkov]

[Text] Berlin February 12 TASS— The withdrawal of the Western Group of Forces from the five new German lands will gradually continue in 1992.

This year another six divisions with a total strength of 100,000 men, 65,000 family members and employees, as well as 33,000 arms units and mechanisms and 780,000 tonnes of various materials and ammunition will be withdrawn, representatives of the German Army told correspondents on Tuesday [11 February] evening in Strausberg upon the completion of a regular meeting of the German-Soviet group on the withdrawal of the Western Group of Forces.

Before the end of 1992 the formations of the former Soviet Army will be withdrawn from another 59 towns of the West German lands, including Dresden, the capital of Saxony.

All in all, 249 military facilities were transferred to the German side in 1991.

Equipment For Sale

LD1102172992 Berlin ADN in German
1504 GMT 11 Feb 92

[Text] Potsdam (ADN)—The Western Group of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] Armed Forces has offered equipment and decommissioned military hardware for sale to the Brandenburg Economics Ministry and to companies in the federal land. High-ranking military officials offered the Economics Ministry items such as remnant aluminium-titanium alloy sections of MiG-29 fighters scrapped at airbases belonging to the

Western Group in Germany. Medical equipment and the turbine engines of modern tanks, which according to the Russians could be used to power ventilation and cooling equipment, are also to be given over to civilian use.

In conjunction with the chambers of commerce and industry, the Economics Ministry is currently looking for companies interested in such items for conversion, a spokesman for the ministry told ADN on Tuesday [11 February]. The military intend using the proceeds of the deals for the construction of more accommodation and for other welfare projects for soldiers and officers returning home from Germany.

Commentary Sees Pullout 'Under Threat'

MK1502120092 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 15 Feb 92 pp 1,2

[Report by Pavel Felgengauer: "Army: Germany Recognizes Russia as USSR's Rightful Successor, But Not in Everything. Financial Dispute Over Troop Withdrawal from Germany Could Develop Into Conflict"]

[Text] After the former USSR "ceased to exist" (was disbanded), troops on territory outside the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] (Germany, Poland, and the Baltic) were transferred to Russian jurisdiction. President Yeltsin announced this publicly 17 January at the all-Army Officers Conference. However, Decree No. 4 "On Measures to Regulate Economic Issues Linked With the Withdrawal of the Western Group of Forces [WGF] from the FRG and Its Deployment on Russian Territory" was signed 4 January 1992, and a Russian Government resolution of 20 January ratified the personnel of the main interdepartmental commission on the WGF troop withdrawal (chaired by General Pavel Grachev), the commission to manage the special transition fund in German marks for the maintenance and withdrawal of the WGF, as well as the new Russian members of the joint (previously Soviet-German) commissions and groups in charge of various aspects of the WGF withdrawal. A state withdrawal commission was also set up under the Russian president.

Having thus settled fundamental issues, the Russian leadership made a serious attempt to move on to settling more individual practical tasks linked with the maintenance of troops in Germany, housing construction, the sale of property, and professional retraining for men discharged into the reserve. A delegation led by General Grachev, comprising "the chairmen and representatives of the new Russian organs" paid an official visit to Germany 1 through 7 February, but the talks with the Germans bore no fruit—Germany did not accept as lawful the decisions adopted by the Russian president and government.

One delegation member told NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA's correspondent that "the Germans immediately cast doubt on our authority." Russia considers itself the USSR's rightful successor on all Soviet-German accords regulating the troop withdrawal, in the belief

"that Russia has been approved as the rightful successor by the joint decision of the Council of CIS Heads of State whereby Russia continues membership of the Security Council and other international organizations." But the Germans have totally different views on this: They refused to hold serious talks in the absence of plenipotentiary representatives from Ukraine and Belarus. Especially since this period saw a brief visit to Germany by President Kravchuk, who assured the Germans that Ukraine had not entrusted Russia with holding any talks on the withdrawal of the WGF. Thus, the juridical status of the WGF troops on German territory has suddenly become dangerously vague.

However, as is usually the case, there is a quite matter-of-fact reason for the legal and diplomatic shilly-shallying—money. Germany has gotten sick of paying for unification, and the delighted smiles of 1990 have given way to petty (and not so petty) carping objections in 1992. Germany wants the troops to leave somewhat sooner and for this to cost as little as possible. And it is far easier to hold talks with a joint delegation: Russians, Belarussians, and Ukrainians will fight among themselves, claims on Germany (legitimate claims too) will remain ignored, and the troops will be withdrawn just the same.

During the talks monetary problems prevailed over problems of rightful succession: The German side in principle agreed to buy up all WGF real estate by paying a fixed amount. However, the sum cited by Russia (DM8-10 billion) [deutsche marks] was unacceptable. The German side is presenting counterclaims for compensation for environmental damage. However, whereas the Russian request is based on some element of calculation, the "environmental damage" has not yet been determined in any way, and presumably this sum could ultimately correspond exactly to the cost of the military camps and bases.

Thus, the "ignorant" (according to one delegation member) agreements concluded by the former Soviet Foreign Ministry and Defense Ministry leadership in the hope of "friendship with the Germans" have put the WGF and the Russian Government in a difficult position.

Moreover, this is an old Soviet tradition. After the war the U.S. occupying authorities bought up all land in Germany on which they sited their troops, while the Soviet Government did the opposite: In 1959-1960 it gave the GDR Government land belonging to it (land confiscated by decision of the Nuremberg Tribunal from Nazi criminals and criminal organizations). So it is virtually impossible to sell WGF property at auction now. The Germans are demanding that all the money go into a closed account to pay off mutual claims. Moreover, according to Aleksandr Timerko, chairman of the committee for social security for servicemen, the money received from auctioning property without land has totaled a few percent of the real cost. However, Russia can take some retaliatory action: A number of foreign firms (U.S., Japanese, and Austrian among them) have expressed a desire to lease WGF property and set up joint enterprises for the remaining

period until the withdrawal is completed and then enter into litigation [suditsya] with the German authorities. While a number of law firms in Germany itself are trying to prove in court that some of the land confiscated after the war still belongs to Russia. It is hard to predict how these proceedings will turn out, but they will undoubtedly go on a long time and cause the German Government plenty of difficulties.

What is more, the Germans have refused altogether to hold talks (without referring in this case to the absence of Ukrainian and Belarus representatives) on increasing pay (in marks) for WGF troops in line with inflation (the cost of transport, electricity, domestic expenditure, and so on has risen).

However, the troops are still being paid, although some delegation members got the impression that in the event of complications the German side may stop payment. Funds allocated for housing construction for the troops being withdrawn have already been frozen (at the end of December, after Gorbachev's resignation). Correspondingly, the incipient construction of military camps, including two in Belarus and four in Ukraine, has been suspended. According to Aleksandr Timerko, chairman of the committee for social security for servicemen, DM200 million allocated for retraining discharged servicemen has been blocked. The troops' organized withdrawal is under threat, and this could have sorry consequences for Central Europe as a whole. However, delegation head Grachev said "that the troop withdrawal will continue; we will not abandon our people."

Latvians Continue Demands for CIS Troop Withdrawal

Foreign Ministry Repeats Protest

*OW1202150492 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1414 GMT 12 Feb 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Latvian Foreign Ministry has sent the fourth note to the Russian Foreign Ministry protesting against the presence in Latvia of the troops which are under the jurisdiction of Russia. The document says that the strength of the units located in Latvia is increasing not decreasing. The garrisons in Adazi, Ventspils, Daugavpils, Valmieru and Sigulda have been replenished with 500 servicemen who arrived from Germany, says the note of protest.

Demonstration in Riga

*LD2202184392 Moscow Radio Rossii Network
in Russian 1600 GMT 22 Feb 92*

[Text] A demonstration took place in the Latvian capital today against the presence of CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] troops on the territory of the republic. ITAR-TASS reports that several thousand people gathered on the square in front of the Domus

Cathedral and demanded the immediate withdrawal of what they described as the occupation troops. They also called for the closure of the Russian-Latvian border. The protestors then headed toward the headquarters of the Northwestern Group of Forces, where the demonstration continued.

Reports, Comments on Talks With Baltics on Troop Withdrawal

Russian Parliamentarian Interviewed

*OW1402021492 Moscow INTERFAX in English
2049 GMT 13 Feb 92*

[Interview with Aleksandr Kotenkov, deputy chairman of the Russian parliamentary Committee on Defense and Security and member of the Russian delegation that "recently" visited the Baltic states, by Andrey Borodin; place and date not given; from the "Nation and Society" feature—transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Aleksandr Kotenkov [A.K.]: To begin with, the Russian Government delegation has done a good job. Despite serious differences in the negotiating parties' positions and the load of problems which we have inherited from the last, we moved the talks from standstill in just three days.

On the eve of the visit we had agreed that the units and military facilities located in the Baltic states would be put under Russia's jurisdiction. The fact that the Baltic states acquired a definite partner in the talks on the disputable issue largely ensured our success.

The leaders of the Baltic delegations acknowledged that the jurisdiction of Russia applied not only to personnel, but also to the property of the garrisons.

Generally speaking, it will take us a long time to settle the property issue, because in 1940 the Red Army confiscated the movable and immovable army property of the Baltic states. There are other circumstances as well, among them the fact that before the revolution some of the ship-repair yards and ports were built by Russians.

Russia has recognized the Baltic states' right to the property which once belonged to them, and the sides agreed that disagreements could be settled during the talks. It was recognized that these states could claim on a part of the former Union army's property, because they were building armed [words indistinct] and equipment. The terms of their transfer will also be negotiated and may include free transfer, sale, barter exchange and compensation. Corr. [Correspondent]: How would the schedule of withdrawal be defined? A.K.: An agreement on the withdrawal has been reached already, which is a move of good will on the part of Russia: Russia has no room to accommodate the arriving forces, so accelerated withdrawal is an extremely painful process. We all remember social tensions in the Armed Forces in Russia as a whole after the Union leadership took the hasty decision to withdraw the Soviet

troops from Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland. The political ambitions of our leaders rendered servicemen homeless. The withdrawal of the troops from the Baltic republics will begin only when we have room for accommodating them. We'll begin from removing relatively small units from Lithuania and Latvia in February and March - units which will be accommodated in small buildings and territories.

During the visit we cleared away differences over the date of final withdrawal. The Russian delegation managed to convince its partners, although it was not easy to do, not to fix the exact date to avoid repeating the Eastern European variant with unpredictable circumstances. Such a variant would not benefit anyone. The servicemen of the units to be withdrawn will have to spend the winter in tents, all of which may cause serious tensions in Russia. Moreover, news about their plight may reach the units still remaining in the Baltic republics, which will also tell negatively on the situation in the Baltic states.

An army newspaper recently published an article entitled "We have what to defend and with what to defend". A simple phrase, which sounds quite ominous in such a tense situation. Corr.: Now what does the withdrawal of the troops from the Baltic state depend on? A.K.: The negotiating parties have discussed a number of factors which can accelerate or slow down this process. Lithuania, Latvia and Russia have documented these factors in their joint communiques. Two of them are of paramount importance. What I mean is the provision of normal living conditions for the troops to be withdrawn, plus the defence capability and security of Russia and the Commonwealth states. The social aspects seem even more important to me. The leading military experts believe that given the current situation, the purely military issues may be moved to the background because none of the Western states can be viewed today as this army group's potential enemy.

Therefore, the chief factor determining the schedule of withdrawal is the availability of garrisons for accommodating the removed units, and adequate living conditions for servicemen. Aware of this, the three Baltic republics volunteered to participate in tackling this problem. The negotiating parties discussed the possibility of using Western loans, above all loans extended by the Scandinavian countries, as well as hard currency compensations to be granted to servicemen by the Baltic governments.

'Slow March East Has Begun'

*PM2002143692 Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET
in Swedish 17 Feb 92 p 6*

[Report by Sune Olofson: "The Russian Withdrawal Has Begun"]

[Text] Riga—The slow march east has begun. The Russian Army in the Baltic region is packing up its weapons. The occupiers must be gone from here within a year, the Balts say. It will take at least six years, the Russians say. Sensitive negotiations began recently.

"We do not intend to repeat the depressing experiences we had as a result of the withdrawal from central Europe

when thousands of officers found themselves homeless and jobless and our soldiers had to sleep in tents," said Colonel General Valeriy Mironov, commander of the Russian forces in the Baltic region and the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad.

"We do not think that the Russians really want to go. We have an angry dog sitting on our haystack," said Georgs Stiprais, head of the Latvian Foreign Ministry's planning department.

In a speech to the People and Defense national conference in Lycksele last week Prime Minister Carl Bildt said:

"The negotiations between the Baltic countries and Russia are characterized by great slowness. The Russian presence, which is not regulated in any agreements, is naturally a cause for concern. The independent states have not even been informed in full of what combat forces there are within their frontiers."

In Riga SVENSKA DAGBLADET met with Russian and Latvian military representatives. A picture emerges of suspicion and uncertainty.

The two sides have met on two occasions, on 2 February and last Friday, 14 February. So far the negotiations have led to an assurance that the withdrawal from Lithuania will begin at the end of February and from Latvia at the end of March.

"It will be a painful process which will take five to seven years," said Colonel Igor Golin, who works at the Russian military press department in Riga.

Colonel General Mironov has been under strong pressure from his soldiers and officers who want a clear indication of when they will be forced to move from Latvia. Unofficially, and only to the officers, he has said that withdrawal will take eight to ten years, a Russian captain told SVENSKA DAGBLADET.

The withdrawal affects not only the approximately 150,000 soldiers and officers stationed in the Baltic region. It is unclear what Russia intends to do with the forces in the Kaliningrad region.

The former Soviet Union built hundreds of military installations in the Baltic region. The Russians have military staffs, dwellings, and depots in every town.

Along the whole coastline, from Kaliningrad almost to the Gulf of Finland, there are around 110 radar and anti-aircraft installations to protect against low-level flights.

In Skrunda, northeast of Riga, there is a large, satellite-controlled radar stations whose mission is to monitor the Western border for attacking missiles.

The Baltic Fleet in the Baltic region is built up around three large naval bases—Paldiski in Estonia, Liepaja in Latvia, and the large submarine base at Baltiysk near

Kaliningrad. The fleet has over 200 ships at its disposal, including 30 conventional submarines.

The land forces form the largest part of the Russian military resources in the Baltic region, around 100,000 men. There are airborne divisions, motorized rifle units, armored divisions, and coastal defense units in places like Dobeles, Vilnius, Kaunas, Gusev, and Klaipeda.

The number of aircraft is estimated at 350-500. The major air bases are at Tukums in Latvia, Chernyakovsk near Kaliningrad, and Vasalemma in Estonia. There are also bombers and pursuit, attack, and surveillance aircraft in Tartu, Jessau [name as published], Daugavpils, and Lielvarde. Military runways have been constructed throughout the territory of the Baltic states.

"Our strategy is that the weapons must go first, and after that the premises of military staffs and bases," Georgs Stiprais said.

The Balts are already irritated. They point to the "logical contradiction" in the fact that Russia wants to take over Russian property, at the same time as it rejects the status of occupying power. Stiprais spoke of a Russian company in Liepaja which has begun to sell Russian military property.

"People have already begun demolition and have taken away materiel and in doing so have unilaterally breached the first agreement reached in the negotiations. We believe that Russia wants to keep the Baltic region in the Russian sphere of interest for security reasons," Stiprais said.

One agreement has been reached. All the military buildings constructed before 1940 will pass into the ownership of the Baltic states. Everything else will be negotiated.

The big problem is homes and jobs for the Russians.

"The officers must have their social security guaranteed. If they do not, there will be dissatisfaction which could lead to revolt and conflicts," said Viktor Shekurov, chief editor of the Russian military publication, "The Good of the Fatherland."

"Some of the money which Russia used to defend itself against the West should now be used to build houses for its own officers," Georgs Stiprais said.

In the Baltic countries people point to Denmark as an example. Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen has earmarked part of Denmark's aid for Latvia.

"Denmark is giving money, and we will provide the workers. And together we will build homes in Pskov and Ostrov near the Russian-Latvian border for the families of Russian officers. Sweden should follow this example," said Auseklis Plavins, information chief at the Defense Ministry in Riga.

A question that is difficult to assess in the "Russian pollution."

"The military has destroyed our rivers, destroyed the land by driving on it, demolished churches and ancient monuments, and collectivized agriculture. A Professor Smulders has estimated that the Russians are responsible for destruction totaling 66 billion rubles," said Plavins, who spoke openly about the Russian strategy: Create confusion and obstacles in order to be able to show the world that the independent Baltic states cannot manage without mother Russia.

Shaposhnikov Comments

*OW1802211392 Moscow BALTFAX in English
2017 GMT 18 Feb 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Commander-in-Chief of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] Armed Forces, Marshal Shaposhnikov told a news conference in Moscow February 18 that "both Russia and the Baltics will pay for the withdrawal of troops from the Baltics". He said the withdrawal should not be carried out hastily, since there are still no social guarantees for soldiers and officers stationed in the Baltics.

Marshal Shaposhnikov also commented on a statement by head of the Lithuanian government Vytautas Landsbergis who a few days ago spoke in favor of the withdrawal from the Kaliningrad region of Russia as well. Landsbergis made this statement in Vilnius February 16 at the solemn meeting dedicated to the 74th anniversary of Lithuania's independence. Shaposhnikov pointed out that the withdrawal of troops from the Kaliningrad region is a matter of Russia and "nobody can dictate terms to us".

CIS Regional Commander: 5 Years Needed

*LD2102220592 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 1900 GMT 21 Feb 92*

[Text] It will take the Northwest Groups of Troops at least five years to move out of the Baltics. This was declared in an interview in newspaper RED STAR by General Valeriy Mironov, authorized by the Russian Federation to supervise the temporary presence of ground and naval forces in the Baltics, and their withdrawal from there. Gen. Mironov stressed that this concerned only ground troops, excluding the naval and anti-aircraft elements. He also spoke in favor of opening in the Baltics of a Russian Embassy or a general consulate to determine a legal basis for a military presence in the region.

CIS Troops To Leave Lithuania Even Without Bilateral Accord

Report on Withdrawal Talks

*LD1102152492 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network
in Lithuanian 1000 GMT 11 Feb 92*

[Excerpts] Viktor Isakov, deputy head of a directorate at the Russian Federation Foreign Affairs Ministry, is

heading the delegation of experts from that country which has arrived in Vilnius to prepare the agreement of the Russian Federation and Lithuania on the systematic withdrawal of troops of the former Soviet Union from the territory of Lithuania. [passage omitted]

The meeting of the Russian and Lithuanian groups of experts to discuss this issue started an hour ago at the Lithuanian Foreign Affairs Ministry.

To Begin Exiting in Feb

*OW1502185492 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1732 GMT 15 Feb 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Russian and Lithuanian experts on withdrawal of Soviet troops from Lithuania completed their meeting in Vilnius Friday [14 February]. They agreed to start the withdrawal no matter whether an official bilateral agreement is signed or not. Russian experts confirmed that troops will begin leaving Lithuania in February.

Heads of the experts groups A. Abisala (Lithuania) and V. Isakov (Russia) will present the official delegations of the two countries with the protocol of their meeting. The delegations are to decide whether to start official bilateral talks or to hold another meeting of experts. As Abisala put it, both options "are possible and acceptable".

In an interview with BF [BALTFAX] shortly after the meeting, Minister Without Portfolio and leader of the Lithuanian expert group Abisala said that Lithuania's position will remain unchanged: it insists that troops should abandon Lithuania within 4-5 months. In the words of Abisala, Russia "has not yet revealed its position".

Lithuanian Home Defense Minister Audrius Butkevicius noted that the meeting of experts showed that there are no technical obstacles to the withdrawal. However, he refused to indicate the exact terms of the withdrawal.

Lithuanian MP [member of parliament] Romualdas Ozolas told BF that experts had been working in three groups. The first one discussed general principles and protocol, the other examined technical aspects of the withdrawal and the third focused on indemnification for losses inflicted to Lithuania by Soviet troops between 1940 and 1992, as well as social guarantees for the military.

Defense Minister Satisfied

*LD1802144292 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network
in Lithuanian 2200 GMT 14 Feb 92*

[Text] Defense Minister Audrius Butkevicius has expressed his satisfaction over the consultation meeting between Lithuanian and Russian experts concerning questions of the withdrawal of the former Soviet Army from Lithuania. The meeting ended today.

The round of consultations by experts that had commenced on 11 February was described by the minister as difficult, however, Butkevicius said, it constitutes a serious beginning.

One thing is clear, namely that the former Soviet Army now under the jurisdiction of Russia is to be withdrawn from Lithuania; serious preparations are being made for this task noted Audrius Butkevicius. Vilnius and Moscow experts discussed in Vilnius the order of individual stages in the Army's withdrawal and also the factors exerting an influence on the speed of the withdrawal.

The minister refused to comment on the possible dates for the Army's withdrawal pointing to the fact that these questions have not yet been coordinated. According to the Government Press Bureau agreement has been reached that the Army's withdrawal will commence and will be carried out independently of the time when the official interstate agreements will be signed.

The Russian representatives have affirmed that the Army's withdrawal will be initiated this month. It is not being announced for the time being as to how the Lithuanian and Russian representatives will continue the work. It is possible that an official negotiation round between state delegations may soon be organized even though the possibility is not being rejected that an expert group will meet once more prior to that.

Landsbergis on Army Withdrawal

LD1602151992 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 1400 GMT 14 Feb 92

[“Traditional” interview with Vytautas Landsbergis by journalist Balys Urbonas; date and place not given—recorded]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Urbonas] Was a very important issue to both Lithuania and Germany—the withdrawal of the Soviet Army—discussed? Maybe the Germans will encourage European countries and Germany itself will render assistance in building those apartments for the officers?

[Landsbergis] There was talk about it. Maybe one should not think about this on its own. We are included in such a chain of demands; for instance, when apartments are available for the officers, only then will the Army be able to move. This is the problem of Russia itself, or the problem of the Commonwealth of Independent States. We have said repeatedly that we could help to solve it, but this solution cannot be imposed on us.

Germany has experienced the fact that, although it has signed a treaty and is building the apartments or houses, they are not always allocated to those officers who are withdrawn from Germany. This provokes concern, and the Germans are observing this with greater interest. Germany, of course, will continue to fulfil its promise but it understands our situation well, to the effect that

this alone does not comprise the problems of the withdrawal of the Army. It is very well understood that the stay of the Army is a much greater problem to stability in the Baltic and to stability in Europe.

We also discussed the withdrawal of the Army from Germany and from Lithuania, and also the withdrawal of the Army from Germany via Lithuania. One such practical aspect is the state of our railways. The former Soviet Union, the present Russia, pays nothing for carrying dangerous military loads and the Army from Germany on our worn-out railways, where accidents are possible. This issue must be solved with Russia but we may expect and, I think, we will receive technical help from Germany in the reconstruction of our railways so that they operate well, and that the withdrawal of the Army from Germany is not disturbed. Payment for the use of the railways is another question, but Germany is ready to help in railway technology and improvement of the rails. Mr. Kohl himself asked me to write several letters, memoranda, on various issues explaining the problem. They will consider [words indistinct].

Landsbergis Interviewed

LD2002044492 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1910 GMT 19 Feb 92

[Italicized passages recorded in Lithuanian with superimposed translation into English]

[Excerpts] [Announcer] The head of the Lithuanian parliament, 50 year old Professor of Fine Arts Vytautas Landsbergis, sees the future of his country in mutually advantageous cooperation and political accord with all countries of the world. Mr. Landsbergis has just returned from Germany, therefore the first question of our correspondent Aleksandr Peltu was about the results of the visit. [passage omitted]

And what is Mr. Landsbergis's opinion of the future of the Kaliningrad region?

[Landsbergis] *The Kaliningrad region must be demilitarized. In the new situation, a (?sense) of Army units may be viewed as a survival of the former policy and ideology of the Soviet empire, which was always prepared to expand its influence and possessions. The European states have rejected such policy and expressed a desire to cooperate on an equal footing. This iron fist in the center of Europe may give rise to misunderstanding.*

[Announcer] The troops of the former Soviet Union will shortly start to withdraw from Lithuania, but this is a complicated and a [word indistinct] process. Besides, it effects the future of the military. (?Will) accords have been reached with the Russian President Boris Yeltsin to this end?

[Landsbergis] *We have agreed that Russia will begin to withdraw troops in February, but the deadline for the troops withdrawal has not been set up yet since this is a*

complicated issue. We have just exchanged opinions. The Russian leaders believe this process will take several years. The military (?then) wish to link the troops withdrawal from Lithuania with that from Germany. We do not think these two processes should be linked. Troops are deployed in smaller quantities in Lithuania and their status is different. Troops from Lithuania can and must be withdrawn earlier, maybe in several months or half a year. I am convinced the process must be completed this year.

[Announcer] You have invited the Russian President Boris Yeltsin to visit Lithuania. Have you specified the terms of the visit?

[Landsbergis] *President Yeltsin has expressed consent and a wish to visit Lithuania shortly but no concrete date has been agreed upon. We suggested for one the 11th of March, the day of Lithuania's independence. We will be glad to see him on the occasion in the country but the president's schedule is very tight no doubt.*

CFE Talks Discuss Verification of Personnel Limits

LD2102050292 Moscow TASS in English
1729 GMT 20 Feb 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladimir Smelov]

[Text] Vienna February 20 TASS—Verification of a future agreement on troops limitation in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals was discussed on Thursday [20 February] at a plenary meeting of the Vienna Talks on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

The participants in the forum say that verification problem must be based on practicability, that verification should not be burdened by too large administrative and financial expenditures. At the same time, there must be confidence that set levels of restrictions are observed by all countries.

The use of inspections envisaged under the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe would suit these criteria, it was said at the meeting. Without enlarging teams of inspectors and prolonging the inspections' duration, local inspections of armed forces could also evaluate troops' numerical strength.

A number of delegations stated their views about the ways of perfecting inspections verifying the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

Vladimir Shustov, head of the Russian delegation, told ITAR-TASS that it is better to seek a simpler agreement that would be easier to implement.

"Our purpose is to conclude an agreement on additional measures aimed at further ensurance of stability and security in Europe, including measures for troops reduction. The main thing is to supplement restrictions on conventional arms and equipment stipulated by the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe with corresponding restrictions on numerical strength of

troops. The military potential of a state is judged now not so much by the total number of armed troops, as by the numerical strength of the personnel connected with the main systems of armaments", Shustov said.

NUCLEAR TESTING

Deputy Minister Comments on 115 Civilian Nuclear Explosions

PM1402145692 Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER
in Swedish 13 Feb 92 p A11

[Anna-Maria Hagerfors report, incorporating undated Moscow interview with Russian Deputy Minister for Atomic Power and Industry Viktor Mikhaylov: "115 Civilian Nuclear Charges Detonated"]

[Text] Alma-Ata—Moscow—The Soviet Union detonated 115 nuclear charges for civilian purposes throughout its territory in the years leading up to 1988. The Russians claim that the United States also carried out around 40 nuclear detonations for "general purposes." In the Soviet Union the purpose of the explosions was to extract oil, create artificial lakes, prospect for minerals, and bury nuclear waste.

The site of the explosion closest to Sweden is Apatit on the Kola Peninsula. It is around 400 km from the Swedish border and around 150 km from the Finnish border. Now CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] generals are planning new nuclear explosions to bury the Soviet Union's chemical weapons and nuclear arms.

In Kazakhstan alone over 30 nuclear charges were detonated "for national economic purposes," in addition to the regular military nuclear tests which have been going on for 40 years around the city of Semipalatinsk.

In the seventies child mortality began to rise steeply in Kazakhstan, even in places far from the military testing area.

Researchers discovered that people had been poisoned by thallium, which had been used in the underground nuclear tests. The Otrar region in southern Kazakhstan is so polluted by radioactivity that the parliament is now planning emergency aid to those affected.

Russia has set aside 5 billion rubles this year to combat radioactive pollution.

"We have exploded charges to put out oil field fires or to increase oil pressure in boreholes, to create artificial lakes, search for rare minerals, and to create a final place to store nuclear and toxic waste," General Fedor Safonov told DAGENS NYHETER in Alma-Ata.

"For example, we exploded charges in Donetsk north of the Crimea in the Ukraine because methane gas had

begun to build up in mine shafts. We exploded charges in the Pechora river in Arkhangelsk to unite it with another river."

The distance from Pechora to Stockholm is the same as the distance from Kiruna to Stockholm.

Scientist Nikolay Prichodko in Moscow is an expert on underground hydrodynamics. He said that nuclear explosions have been carried out to create huge artificial salt caves where compressed gas is stored.

"We have also used nuclear charges to plug the gas fountains which sometimes occur when we extract natural gas," Prichodko said.

Viktor Mikhaylov, Russia's deputy minister for atomic energy and industry and himself a nuclear scientist, said that he is currently compiling a map of the 115 civilian nuclear explosions.

"The map has red dots from the Kola Peninsula to the River Lena in eastern Siberia. It is in my office."

[Hagerfors] May we see it?

[Mikhaylov] No. It is gruesome, and we do not even know whether we dare publish it in the Soviet Union. Here the situation is so tense that the map would just be more fuel for the fire. There are people who could make use of it to make trouble.

You have to understand that I only took up this post in 1989, after the explosions had taken place.

Now I am here and have to dig up the whole garbage heap.

[Hagerfors] If we may not see the map, can you give us guarantees that you did not carry out explosions in the region of the Baltic Sea? It is only 300 km from Sweden.

[Mikhaylov] Yes. The site closest to your country is Apatit on the Kola Peninsula. We exploded charges there to extract the mineral, apatite.

We developed sophisticated methods of using nuclear charges in situations where nothing else worked, at oil well fires, for example. So there were occasions when our efforts were effective.

[Hagerfors] Does this mean that many other explosions were completely unnecessary?

[Mikhaylov] Of course.

But there is no danger of radiation either in Scandinavia or on our territory.

[Hagerfors] But you did carry out the military nuclear tests in a way that was slipshod, to say the least. When geologists recently looked at the Semipalatinsk region

they found that the ground is unstable. One earthquake has already occurred in the region. An underground coal stratum has been burning for the last five years. When that coal has turned to ash the earth's crust could collapse on top of 40 years of accumulated radioactivity. And you say that there is no danger of radiation?

[Mikhaylov] We have checked the geological conditions very carefully, and the coal field is outside.

[Hagerfors] But the coal was ignited by the nuclear tests, and one earthquake can be followed by more.

[Mikhaylov] We lag the boreholes.

[Hagerfors] You lag them with silicate. The geologists who were up in Semipalatinsk thought that this was totally inadequate.

[Mikhaylov] There are other geologists who say that on the contrary nuclear explosions reduce earth tensions, so that the region becomes stabler.

No, there is another factor which worries me even more. Down in the boreholes under the earth we have stored up masses of radioactivity. What are we to do with it?

[Hagerfors] And what is happening to the groundwater?

[Mikhaylov] That is the next factor that worries me. It is the water which spreads the radiation. The water goes through its cycle and falls as rain, again and again. [Mikhaylov ends]

"It is my burdensome legacy and that of other researchers to try to keep all this under control," Viktor Mikhaylov sighed, consoling himself with the thought that the Americans have the same problems in Nevada. Also, they have detonated around 40 nuclear charges for civilian purposes, according to Mikhaylov.

[Hagerfors] And now you are thinking of detonating new nuclear charges to destroy your nuclear and chemical arms. Is there no other way?

[Mikhaylov] We are also looking at other methods. But using the power of the atom is cheap and destruction takes place instantaneously.

Although it goes without saying that cracks are always being formed in the earth's surface and then there is a danger that the radiation will spread.

[Hagerfors] You intend to destroy the power of the atom by using the power of the atom. Is that not an idiotically evil circle?

[Mikhaylov] No, no. When we use the power of the atom for an explosion, rocks melt and secure spaces are created for arms and waste. So the idea is right. The capsule will be protected for all eternity.

Company Undertakes 'Dangerous Waste' Destruction

*PM2402153492 Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER
in Swedish 14 Feb 92 p A5*

[Report by Lars-Ingmar Karlsson: "Blow Up Nuclear Waste"]

[Text] A newly formed Russian company undertakes to destroy dangerous waste from both Europe and the United States with the help of civilian nuclear charges. Even nuclear reactors that have served their time at research laboratories can be rendered harmless. The price is low and the technology environmentally friendly, the company claims.

The company is called Chetek. It was formed a little over a year ago with the support of the then Soviet Ministry of Atomic Power and Industry (MAPI).

The company has no technical experts of its own, but has access to such experts from Arzamas-16. This is a research institute at which the majority of the former Soviet Union's nuclear arms were constructed. The company is also able to make use of the Novaya Zemlya testing station for its experiments and also undertakes to carry out the actual destruction of waste there.

According to the publication, NUCLEONICS WEEK, the company was set up by 10 researchers from Arzamas-16. The idea behind the company is purely commercial; it is a result of the new openness in Russia.

"We need money to develop techniques for the civilian use of nuclear charges. Some of the money comes from Chetek and some from MAPI," Sergey Yermakov, who is the spokesman of the Russian nuclear ministry, told DAGENS NYHETER's Moscow correspondent.

"We do not release any information about our expertise to unauthorized individuals, nor do we make any concessions when it comes to the scientific safety of our work," he said.

Sergey Yermakov was unwilling to say anything more.

However, the company has not acted at all secretly when it attempted to sell its knowledge. It has, for example, visited scientific conferences in both Europe and Canada, sometimes in the company of Viktor Mikhaylov, deputy minister for atomic power and industry, who was interviewed in yesterday's DAGENS NYHETER. In that interview Mikhaylov was very worried about how Russia and other former Soviet republics would deal with the problems left by past nuclear test detonations.

Lars-Erik De Geer of the Defense Research Institute is one of the people who have listened to Chetek representatives. As well as accepting environmentally dangerous waste and obsolete nuclear reactors, the company also promises to take care of chemical weapons and spent nuclear fuel.

"In purely technical terms the company has found a niche for itself, but doing what Chetek is thinking of doing is unacceptable.

"When the company says that they can also take care of spent nuclear fuel, I think that they really are going far too far. You lose all control over what you are doing," he said, pointing to the stringent safety regulations which normally apply to the storing of spent nuclear fuel.

In their marketing the company says that it is possible to mix everything from environmentally dangerous waste to nuclear waste and then blow up everything with a sufficiently large nuclear charge, for example, in a 1000-meter-deep hole in Novaya Zemlya.

At a conference in Canada Aleksandr Chernychev from Arzamas-16 declared that a single 150-kilotonne charge could destroy 20,000 tonnes of chemical weapons.

It is unclear whether Chetek has succeeded in selling its expertise. Observers do not think this is possible given the demands made on nuclear technology in the West. A frequent comment is that the Russians must be very ignorant of the view taken outside the Soviet Union of the danger of nuclear blasts.

But Chetek itself claims that it has future clients in several chemical companies in Scandinavia, Germany, and the United States. According to the company's price list, it will cost between 1,500 and 6,500 kronor per kilo of waste, depending on the composition of the waste.

According to the company's own timetable, the first experiments with the destruction of waste are to begin this summer. However, since last fall a voluntary one-year ban on nuclear explosions is in force in the CIS. This could be extended, but Chetek claims that it will not be covered by an extension.

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Foreign Ministry Official Cited on CW Elimination

*OW1402155392 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1417 GMT 14 Feb 92*

[Report by Mikhail Mayorov, Igor Porshnev, and others from "Diplomatic Panorama"—transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Forty thousand tons of poisonous substances are stockpiled on Russian soil. Together with the weight of the ammunition Russia's chemical arsenal, the world's biggest, makes up some 400 thousand tons [as received]. DP's [Diplomatic Panorama] correspondent learned this from Grigoriy Berdennikov, a leading disarmament expert in Russia's Foreign Ministry.

According to him, the Disarmament Conference in progress in Geneva has already drafted a more than 200-page convention on banning chemical weapons

[CW]. The talks involve spokesmen for 39 countries who take decisions by consensus, and about as many observers from other countries. G. Bordennikov believes that the convention might be signed as early as this year, as the Russian President B. Yeltsin said in his message read to participants in the conference recently.

The convention aims to destroy all chemical weapons and prohibit their development and production, the expert pointed out. Much will depend on whether the efforts to make the document universal and mandatory to all countries without exception (including Iraq) prove to be successful or not. Russia whose territory harbours all chemical arms of the former USSR is working out a program for their destruction.

This involves highly toxic and dangerous chemicals which creates certain difficulties in the process of destruction. In the first place, the process of liquidating poisonous substances should be ecologically safe. Russia, G. Berdennikov said, "is open to cooperation in this area with other countries, such as the U.S., with which it began consultations long ago".

Since the public in the city of Chapayevsk opposed the plans to use a local plant for destroying chemical arms, the main problem to be resolved now is the choice of another site. According to the Russian Foreign Ministry expert, the process of destroying poisonous substances will begin at one site or another only when the consent of the local public and authorities is obtained.

NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES & PEACE ZONES

Tlatelolco Treaty Viewed on Anniversary

924P0074A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
14 Feb 92 p 3

[Article by Doctor of Historical Sciences K. Khachaturov, chairman of the Russian Committee for Cooperation and Solidarity With Countries of the Americas: "Tlatelolco: 25 Years On"]

[Text] The fate of our nuclear potential is causing justified concern in the world. On 14 February, when, in Minsk, the leaders of the CIS intend discussing a number of problems, including urgent questions of military organizational development and security, the 25th anniversary of the signing of the creation of the world's first nuclear-free zone will be solemnly commemorated at the other end of the world. Doctor of Historical Sciences K. Khachaturov, chairman of the Russian Committee for Cooperation and Solidarity With Countries of the Americas, reflects on this.

Exactly a quarter-century ago in a residence of Mexico's Foreign Ministry situated in a locality known as Tlatelolco the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons in Latin America was signed. What had prompted the Latin American countries to be pioneers of the formation of a nuclear-free world?

By this time Latin America held the world record for the number of palace coups and generals' putsches. Military-police regimes reigned in many states. The "great northern neighbor" continued to gaze at the continent as a "fruit and grocery shop," the mythical Anchuria satirically described by O'Henry in the novel "Kings and Cabbages." The liberation movement was suppressed under the flag of counterinsurgency operations.

But opposite positive processes in the Latin American countries asserting the unity of their thoughts and actions in the name of the accomplishment of common vital tasks were simultaneously developing powerfully. A most vital task was avoiding participation in a world thermonuclear war. The real alarms of the Caribbean crisis of five years previously, when the Latin Americans felt its breath on their doorstep so closely, were fresh in the memory.

The treaty, which acquired the name of Tlatelolco after the place of its "registration," required the parties to prohibit on their territory the testing, use, production or acquisition, receipt, storage, installation, and deployment of nuclear weapons or any form of possession of them. The historic role of the document, which declared nuclear-free a giant piece of the earth's territory, lies in the force of example.

At the same time, on the other hand, the Tlatelolco Treaty is far from perfect. Thus absent from its wording are clear provisions concerning the banning of the transit of nuclear weapons by third countries via the territory of the states subscribing to the treaty. This allows the United States, for example, to transport a lethal cargo across the Panama Canal Zone. It is for this reason that Cuba did not sign the treaty and that our country made reservations in connection with ratification of Supplementary Protocol 2 requiring the nuclear powers to observe the status of the nuclear-free zone.

The treaty has been virtually ignored by Brazil, Argentina and Chile, where for many years military dictatorships prone to nuclear ambitions were predominant. Today, under the influence of internal processes and a revision of military doctrines, Argentina and Brazil have proclaimed an intention to use nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes. Both states are putting their nuclear facilities under mutual supervision and the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA). There have been shifts also in the position of Cuba, which has recognized IAEA control and has become an observer in the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL) centered in the Mexican capital.

A quarter of a century ago we, as the self-styled custodians of the truth in the last instance in respect of all nuclear problems in the world, took a condescending view of the Tlatelolco Treaty. Rather! After all, according to our concepts of that time, it was a question of claims to priority on the part of exotic banana republics which had not really gotten their feet wet in the

20th century. But the Tlatelolco Treaty has proven both its effectiveness and the invariability of the principles of the countries which signed it.

Vilnius Seminar Favors Nuclear Free Zone

*OW2402231992 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1820 GMT 24 Feb 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Participants in the international seminar "Security, Stability and Trust in Eastern Europe" going on in Vilnius have stressed the importance of creating a nuclear-free zone in Europe, including Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine. They expressed hope that this zone would expand gradually getting rid of offensive weapons.

Taking into account Sweden's atomic power stations control initiatives, participants in the seminar spoke in favor of setting up an international inspection team with participation of representatives from Belarus, Russia, Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.

Participants in the seminar believe it is necessary to create within the CSCE framework an international body on prevention of conflicts on the territory of member countries.

REPUBLIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS ISSUES

'Centralized Super Storage' Facility Proposed

*924P0066B Moscow MEGAPOLIS EKSPRESS
in Russian No 2, 9 Jan 92 p 22*

[Article by Pavel Kolesnikov: "We Are Turning the Urals Into a Model Nuclear Storage Facility"]

[Text] The Soviet nuclear potential (both military and "peaceful") is now the focus of attention in the domestic and foreign press. Who will have the strategic missiles and tactical warheads located on the territories of the new sovereign states? Many people really fear that an exchange of missile strikes between the fraternal republics will lead to full-scale nuclear civil war that will destroy not only the new-born independent states but the entire planet. Or at least all of the northern hemisphere, thus resolving the North-South confrontation.

The influential democratic senator Sam Nunn (chairman of the Senate Armed Forces Committee) has summed up the situation as follows: "Either we achieve in the very near future the greatest reduction of nuclear weapons in the history of mankind or there will be an unforeseeable proliferation of nuclear weapons, fissionable materials, and nuclear technologies. For even if the former Soviet republics do not engage in nuclear civil war they may start to sell surplus weapons and export nuclear technologies, while hungry engineers from defense plants take advantage of the emigration laws and set off to work in

'southern' countries, where nuclear weapons may soon be as commonplace as Kalashnikov automatics."

This threat has seemed so real to American legislators that both the Senate and the House of Representatives voted in late November to allocate \$400 million to help the USSR (Commonwealth of Independent States) to dismantle warheads. It is quite possible that this will be only a first installment. American taxpayers may soon become the main source for real funding for the Soviet defense industry, which is totally unprepared to assimilate the many billions of capital investments in disarmaments on the same scale and with the same efficiency as in earlier years, when money was allocated by the party and government for the arms race.

The deputy minister of atomic energy and industry, Viktor Mikhaylov, who is responsible for defense matters in the activity of the nuclear department, recently chaired a Soviet-American seminar in Kiev attended by many American nuclear (military) experts from Livermore and other laboratories, which substantiated a plan to use the American millions. It is being proposed that all \$400 million be used to build a centralized super storage facility in the Urals to store pure (weapons-grade) plutonium. (The exact location of the new construction site of the century is still secret so as not to scare the local population beforehand.)

The huge stock of plutonium produced by Soviet nuclear power workers is truly dangerous: This element is radioactive and it could be seized by criminals for the purpose of blackmail, and—the most important thing—it is extremely toxic. Most weapons-grade plutonium is "installed" in warheads and is held by the military. If mass dismantling of warheads really does start in the near future (with the tactical warheads first), then the plutonium will again be in the hands of those who at one time produced it, receiving orders and awards and titles for so doing. The problem of reliable storage (for millions of years while it is still decaying) or controlled use (fast-neutron reactors, power elements on deep space stations, and so forth) must somehow be resolved.

The dense cloud of secrecy that covers all details of the Soviet nuclear program, however, does not make it possible to judge with any degree of certainty which disarmament programs will be the best. Is it necessary to build a new centralized super storage facility at a new site or re-equip facilities already existing for this purpose more cheaply and more simply (including Arzamas-16, for example)? The Ministry of Atomic Energy and Industry has already set up the well-known Atomash in the Don steppe, but the incomplete complex, to which it was necessary to ship a stream of material from nuclear reactors, has been sinking into the ground in the literal sense of the word.

Moreover, the Soviet defense industry has already put forward an alternative project to eliminate both nuclear and chemical weapons by means of underground nuclear explosions. They say that all that is necessary to blow

them up. However, the desire of any normal expert to ensure the future of his own profession is quite understandable and since there are no other experts, society must listen to those who are there, and as a result nuclear disarmament will inevitably require a further buildup in the nuclear industry. For apart from the weapons themselves, which fortunately are not too radioactive, there is still the unresolved problem of radioactive waste from the nuclear industry, nuclear power engineering, and the reactors aboard nuclear-powered submarines. Whereas production of weapons-grade plutonium has now virtually ceased for all practical purposes, it is not possible to close down the nuclear power stations [AES].

Under conditions in which the recovery of energy resources is falling and their delivery to consumers is becoming increasingly unreliable for economic and political reasons, nuclear power engineering remains the only reliable source of energy in many of the "independent" regions. Lithuania cannot abandon the Ignalinskaya AES, and Ukraine will probably be forced to continue operation of the Chernobyl AES, while in Armenia they are seriously thinking about restarting the Armyanskaya AES.

However, the new independent states are incapable of independently using (or even independently eliminating) nuclear facilities inherited as a legacy from the USSR. Of the 15 independent states, only Russia is a real nuclear power. The rest are more like nuclear hostages. Only Ukraine could in principle achieve nuclear status, and even that would be in the quite distant future (if an appropriate program were adopted and monstrous sums of money were spent); nuclear status assumes totally independent production (and testing) of nuclear weapons and means to deliver them. This, however, would be at variance with its pledges under the terms of the recent agreement on joint measures with respect to nuclear weapons.

Those weapons that are now located in the republics can be removed at any moment (evacuation of tactical weapons has already started). Strategic weapons systems, which it is difficult to remove (ICBM's in silos), cannot be used in interrepublic conflicts because they are targeted on the NATO countries (first and foremost the United States). Although it is theoretically possible to change the targeting, it is in principle impossible to reduce their range down to tactical ranges.

No uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear weapons is taking place; it is simply that instead of the USSR as a nuclear superpower, Russia has emerged as a superpower. Civil (interrepublic) nuclear war (a "nuclear Yugoslavia") seems most improbable under these conditions. Moreover, the dependence of nuclear power engineering facilities and the nuclear industry on centralized supplies ties the independent republics even more firmly to Russia (they cannot count on help from the West because the Soviet reactors are unique). And this dependence will not disappear in the foreseeable future. It is necessary to think that an interrepublic atomic department will be set up (essentially it

already exists) that will establish reliable centralized control over all nuclear facilities on the territory of the former USSR, and also over exports of nuclear technologies to third countries. This kind of control agency may turn out to be even more important than a joint command for strategic forces.

For 45 years nuclear weapons maintained the peace in Europe, preventing the cold war from becoming a hot war. The Soviet tank armies did not move to the Rhine, and the West did not intervene in 1956 in Hungary, nor in 1968 in Czechoslovakia. It is quite possible that now, within the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS] nuclear weapons (or, more exactly, the threat of their use) may also help to dampen (if not prevent) quite probable interrepublic armed conflicts. True, in Europe there was a nuclear balance, while in the CIS, Russia dominates in the nuclear field, but this kind of structure may also be stable enough.

Republics' Locations of Nuclear Materials Eyed

924P0066A Moscow MEGAPOLIS EKSPRESS
in Russian No 2, 9 Jan 92 p 22

[Article by Sergey Morgachev: "Plutonium Is a Friend, But Truth Is More Costly"]

[Text] Along with their independence the republics have received as their property many facilities involved in the nuclear production cycle. In addition, they have on their territories both strategic nuclear weapons (Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus) and tactical nuclear weapons, whose locations remain a state secret. The agreement on joint measures on nuclear weapons signed by the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] countries on 21 December by no means resolved all the problems.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union first of all raised with great urgency the question of where and in whose hands tactical land-based nuclear weapons would be. The arsenal of tactical missiles on the territory of the USSR now includes the SCUD-B (at the beginning of 1991 there were 661 launchers and 1,370 warheads), the FROG-7 (370 and 1,450), and the SS-21 (300 and 310). The most modern weapon is the SS-21, put into service in 1978. Before the start of the catastrophic disintegration of the USSR, tactical missile weapons were deployed at least in the Belorussian, Transcarpathian, Kiev, Odessa, and Turkestan Military Districts, and, of course, in Russia. Western military sources also registered sites where nuclear-capable tactical air forces were based. We are talking about the MiG-27 fighter-bomber (725 aircraft), the Su-17 (600), and the Su-24 (875). Each of them can carry one or two nuclear bombs; the arsenal of those bombs totaled about 2,500 at the beginning of 1991. In addition to Russia, these types of aircraft were deployed in the Belorussian, Transcarpathian, Kiev, Odessa, Transcaucasus, and Turkestan Military Districts.

With respect to nuclear artillery shells, mines, and air defense missiles, and also naval weapons, information on their location never percolated beyond the military

establishment. But it was possible to assume with a very high degree of probability that they were deployed in most military districts. This was essentially confirmed in December 1990 by Marshal Akhromeyev, who stated the following: "Tactical nuclear weapons are deployed in virtually all the Union republics." The top military leadership had for a long time preferred to admit nothing officially, nor deny anything, assuring everyone (as, for example, Marshal Shaposhnikov has) that "the nuclear button is in reliable hands" and that no one "at the local level" can lay claim to this. Even until very recently we were aware only of the statement issued late in 1990 by the commander of the Transcaucasus Military District that there were no nuclear or chemical weapons on the territory of the district. The agreement on joint measures with respect to nuclear weapons finally stated officially that tactical nuclear weapons were located in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, and it was made a mandatory obligation for them to ensure their withdrawal into Russia by 1 July 1992 for dismantling. But the fate of tactical nuclear weapons on the territories of other Commonwealth countries remains unclear.

Another layer of the problem of nuclear safety arising as the result of the breakup of the state is connected with the component parts of the nuclear military cycle and the nuclear fuel cycle ending up in the hands of the now independent republics, and this is a cause for legitimate concern in the international community.

The uranium mines and the plants that produce uranium concentrate are located in Russia (the Urals, and Krasnokamensk in Chita Oblast), in Ukraine (Kirovograd Oblast, Zheltyye Vody), Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan (Yangi-Abad), Kyrgyzstan (Tonskiy Bay at Issyk-Kul, Kadzhi-Say, Min-Kush, and Tyuyamuyun), Tajikistan (Taboshar), and Estonia.

All the uranium-enrichment capacities for power purposes are located in the Russian Federation (production of highly enriched uranium for military needs was halted in 1989). Production of plutonium for military purposes is also concentrated in Russia—Chelyabinsk, Krasnoyarsk, and Tomsk—as is the production of the munitions themselves (the most well-known facility is Arzamas-16 in Nizhegorod Oblast). According to Western figures, at the beginning of 1989 weapons-grade plutonium was being produced by 14 reactors, of which at least five (this is now according to Soviet figures) have been closed down.

As is known, however, plutonium is formed as the result of the reaction in power and research reactors...Soviet nuclear power stations [AES] using channel-type graphite moderated reactors and pressurized water reactors are less "productive" from the standpoint of the plutonium produced than, for example, reactors employing heavy water as the moderator. All reactors designed to generate electric power, however, produce plutonium contaminated with the isotope Pu-204, while usually, for the manufacture of nuclear weapons almost pure Pu-239 is used. But in principle even this is no obstacle to the use of exhausted fuel for military purposes; true, capacities are then needed

to separate the plutonium from it. In addition to Russia, AES are located in Lithuania (the Ignalinskaya AES), and Ukraine (the Rovenskaya, Yuzhno-Ukrainskaya, Zaporozhskaya, and Khmel'nitskaya AES). A statement of intent has been issued to re-open the Armyskaya AES. At Shevchenko on the Mangyshlak peninsula (Kazakhstan) the USSR's first industrial fast-neutron breeder reactor is located; it operates both as an AES and as a water distillation plant, and as a producer of plutonium for subsequent use in power breeder reactors. In the future this reactor itself should be switched to use plutonium fuel...

As far as research reactors outside Russia are concerned, they are functioning in Tashkent, Kiev, Tbilisi, Riga, Minsk, and Alma-Ata and they belong to institutes of the republic academies of sciences. The facilities in Tashkent, Tbilisi, Riga, and Minsk use 90 percent enriched uranium, that is, they are immediately suitable for the manufacture of nuclear weapons. From the standpoint of facilities for producing plutonium the capacities of these reactors are significant, and the reactors at Tashkent, Kiev, and Alma-Ata, which are in the 10-20 megawatt range, are quite powerful research facilities. One of the most "sensitive" materials from the standpoint of production of nuclear material is so-called heavy water (D2O). It is reported that the Agrokhimservis company, which is engaged in the export of this product, is now the only functioning plant producing it; it is located at Dneprodzerzhinsk (Ukraine). However, it is generally thought in the world that our capacities for producing heavy water are much more significant. For example, in an article published recently in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, the director of the Center for Russian and Soviet Studies in Monterey (United States), Potter, writes that major capacities for the production of heavy water and the smelting of beryllium and zirconium (which are also essential for the production of nuclear weapons) are located in republics where Muslim populations predominate. As far as zirconium is concerned, according to other Western information it is also recovered in Ukraine.

The republics of the former USSR have received a quite dangerous nuclear legacy. The 21 December agreement between the member countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States obligated Ukraine and Belarus to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as nonnuclear states. But the nuclear status of Kazakhstan and other Commonwealth of Independent States member states, except for the Slav republics, must be shaped according to all international rules. Their signing of the nonproliferation treaty and agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency would, however, be impossible at the present time.

'Unsanctioned Use' of Nuclear Storehouses Eyed
PM1902083592 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 11 Feb 92 p 2

[Article by Colonel O. Falichev "Military Observer's Notes": "Does Nuclear Terrorism Threaten Us?"]

[Text] The specific nature of my many years' work as an author in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's Rocket and Air Defense Forces Department has required me to travel

out to various missile units and to the Semipalatinsk and Novaya Zemlya test ranges, to delve into the problems of nuclear tests, and to talk with nuclear scientists. I have frequently seen for myself that diseases like radiophobia, which periodically roll over mankind like a rising tide, sometimes also arise because of an elementary lack of information or ignorance of the essence of the matter. The world has now been swamped by a wave of apprehension as to whether our nuclear weapons will spread over the earth. How valid is this?

The breakup of the USSR has upset the geopolitical balance of power that had evolved over decades. Whereas it was considered that two superpowers existed, now there is one left. How it will behave with regard to other countries—evidently time alone will tell. At present the world is anxious about something else: Are the nuclear weapons, scattered about four former republics of the USSR, in reliable hands? Has the possibility of their being purloined been ruled out? Finally, has the possibility of their unsanctioned use or of nuclear blackmail been ruled out?

There is no denying that these are serious questions which you cannot simply brush aside. This is not the first time they have arisen either. Let us recall: At first everyone was anxiously trying to guess which of us had his hand on the "nuclear button." Then the question of the fate of the missile launchers in Ukraine was placed on the agenda. Now there is the question of the possible sale of tactical nuclear weapons to Asian countries and even...to opposing forces in the Transcaucasus region. Italy's L'UNITA, for example, has reported that contraband deliveries of nuclear weapons and radioactive materials are being made to the Near East from our former Union republics. Long before that REUTERS had come up with a real sensation: Two African students had tried to send to the USSR equipment for the creation of nuclear devices, including weapons. It in fact turned out that all this was total conjecture.

It is all right when such "information" roams about the pages of many newspapers. But quite a few statements on this subject have been heard quite recently also from the lips of various politicians. French Defense Minister P. Joxe, for example, has voiced concern at the psychological maturity of our commanding officers responsible for tactical nuclear weapons. Y. Ne'eman, Israeli minister of energy, infrastructure, science, and technology, has also not failed to express his opinion and declared that the loyalty of the officer corps of the former Soviet Army, which belongs to no one, is not beyond doubt. Therefore there are suspicions that nuclear arms might start to disappear from storehouses. As though echoing him, even E. Shevardnadze has doubted the reliability of the guard on our arsenals and said that under conditions of chaos nuclear weapons could end up in the hands of paramilitary formations. It is not surprising that, following such massive "nuclear strikes," a debate has gotten under way in the United States and is still continuing as to whether the CIS [Commonwealth of

Independent States] is capable of guaranteeing the security of its nuclear arsenal. This was discussed, in particular, also at the extraordinary session of the UN Security Council at the end of January. What can the answer be?

Of course, we thank the foreign gentlemen—those ministers—for their touching concern for the psychological health and loyalty of our officers. Now that the Army is being split up among national apartments, it really is not so easy to preserve tranquillity and mental equilibrium. But I have repeatedly seen for myself and I know now that, whatever political storms might fly over the country, missile men fulfill their duty worthily. This is the first guarantee that nuclear storehouses will not become thoroughfares.

But the fact remains that civil war is continuing in certain former republics of the USSR. Is it possible to guarantee nuclear security under such conditions? Has chance been ruled out? For the press has already emphasized repeatedly that we possess neither more nor less than 25,000 nuclear warheads and 10,000 carriers capable of delivering them to their targets. Are we capable of keeping each of these "toys" in our field of vision? Addressing news conferences and writing in the press, spokesmen for the CIS Armed Forces Main Commissariat, have repeatedly declared that there are no grounds for alarm and that chance occurrences have been ruled out. But man's makeup is such that he does not take everything at face value and tests many things with his teeth, as the saying goes, particularly since Chernobyl. Why must we heed the military and not trust Shevardnadze, let us say?

In this connection let us try to recall: What, in general, do we know about incidents involving nuclear weapons and their unsanctioned use? In November 1979 a computer in the NORAD command center (United States) signaled a nuclear missile attack by the USSR. Then strategic bombers received an order to inflict a counterstrike...But the computer's mistake was rectified in time. Pershing missiles have blown up in West Germany; B-52's have dropped nuclear bombs over Greenland and off the coasts of Spain. There was once a news flash relating to an unsuccessful attempt by a terrorist to seize a nuclear-powered submarine in America...During the period from 1950 through 1989, according to data of the CIS Armed Forces General Staff, there were 178 incidents involving nuclear weapons in the United States (43 accidents were accompanied by an explosion or ignition of an explosive charge forming part of a nuclear munition). There were approximately 170 in Britain. However, not one of these instances resulted in catastrophic consequences. They showed mercy, as it were.

Alas, similar "unpleasantnesses" have not bypassed us. In 1986 a missile with a nuclear warhead exploded in the silo of a nuclear-powered submarine in the region of the Bermuda Triangle. It was thrown out into the sea, but the warhead did not work. (I will say why a little later). There was a case when a similar submarine sank in the Pacific.

Everyone remembers the tragedy involving the submarine Komsomolets. This sad list could probably be continued, but the chief thing is that the accidents in our country, like the U.S. and British ones, did not result in nuclear catastrophes. As regards attempts to seize nuclear munitions, CIA Director William Webster reported last year that separatists in the Transcaucasus had attempted to seize a nuclear weapons dump but had been rebuffed. But the information turned out not to tally with reality. "There have not and could not have been such instances," Aviation Lieutenant General S. Zelentsov, deputy chief of a main directorate of the CIS Armed Forces Main Commissariat, categorically declared. "If only because there have long been no such weapons in 'hot spots': We have pulled them out."

Everything necessary was done in the past to ensure that nuclear weapons do not fall into the hands of terrorists and are not liable to be seized by fundamentalists or separatists in regions which in recent years have become the scene of mass disturbances and riots. In the Strategic Rocket Forces the guard on places where nuclear munitions are stored and on strategic missile positions has been reinforced, as reported by Army General Yu. Maksimov, commander of these forces. Similar measures have also been taken by the Rocket Forces and Artillery Staff of the Ground Forces. As regards "hot spots" and regions with an unstable political situation, tactical nuclear weapons have been moved from them to more "reliable" places. True, according to a report in THE EUROPEAN, this large-scale operation did not go unnoticed and was detected by Western intelligence departments. This, incidentally, confirms once again the highly professional work of our servicemen, their psychological fortitude, and, if you like, their loyalty.

What about the nuclear warheads—is it possible to steal them, let us say? Judge for yourselves. The warheads are kept at special storage bases, which are well guarded and carefully equipped against penetration by unauthorized persons. In particular, they are equipped with massive concrete shields and armored doors weighing many tonnes. The reliability of their storage is also ensured with the help of specially allocated modern means of electronic protection. So it is not easy to get into a storehouse and still less easy to remove a nuclear charge without a corresponding sanction. "Such a task, even if it occurs to someone's inflamed brain, is doomed to fail," Lt. Colonel N. Brylev, spokesman for military counter-intelligence in one of the nuclear arsenals, told me.

But let us imagine the impossible: A nuclear munition has still ended up in the hands of a terrorist. Even in this case there will not be a nuclear explosion, as there are several degrees of protection against one (code-blocking devices). This was why there was no explosion of the missile with a warhead on our submarine in the Atlantic or when the nuclear bombs fell from the U.S. B-52's. However, chaos and political instability do not, alas, boost our optimism. For even ordinary damage to the covering of a nuclear munition or its deformation as the result of a blow can cause radioactive contamination

with plutonium discharged into the atmosphere. This is not to mention the fact that acts of terror are possible in respect not only of nuclear weapons and their storage bases but also of nuclear electric power stations [AES's], of which there are more than enough in our country, and AES personnel. The experience and knowledge of nuclear scientists can also be utilized for the same improper purposes with the help of violence. Although this is a topic for a separate discussion, I believe that the problem of the "brain drain" and of protection for AES's remains topical not only for the CIS.

What does the situation primarily dictate in this connection? It must evidently be a question of reducing the nuclear arsenal to sensible limits and of its further utilization. As far as is known, the latter is an extremely complex, costly, and lengthy matter. Therefore, however much this offends national feelings, we obviously should not refuse the \$400 million in aid being allocated for these purposes by the U.S. Congress. It will come in useful to set up workshops, for example, which will produce scrap metal, precious metals, chemical explosives, and other components. Or bases for the storage of weapons-grade plutonium. For, as has been reported, in the long term it is proposed to eliminate approximately 15,000 nuclear warheads. At the same time this number could increase if B. Yeltsin's new proposals for reducing strategic offensive arms are adopted. I would just like to emphasize a detail of considerable importance, which politicians, to all appearances, do not always take into account. The amount that the Americans have offered us is a tiny proportion of what will be required for the large-scale reduction of nuclear arsenals. The main funds will ultimately have to be sought from our own taxpayers. Is a "disarmament race" which will add a new twist to our impoverishment of any benefit?

Furthermore, the process of getting rid of terrible weapons must definitely be a bilateral process and, when it comes right down to it, affect all nuclear powers. At one of the recent Soviet-U.S. consultations on nuclear disarmament it was reported that it is planned to begin work on eliminating and utilizing nuclear warheads in the United States in the first half of 1992. I would like to hope that this was not, figuratively speaking, a U.S. propaganda stunt. That in the present international situation the United States will finally exclude from its military doctrine the point about the possibility of making a first nuclear strike. Otherwise the monetary "gifts" of Congress could turn into gifts borne by Greeks.

If we are to speak of the international legislative base associated with this process, then we obviously must take account of Academician V. Goldanskiy's proposals on "transferring to Russia all the rights and obligations of the USSR under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty" and on consolidating its role in other very important international treaties that are mainstays of a guarantee against the threat of nuclear war. In them Russia, as was also the case with the USSR, must have the right to veto any amendments.

The "Agreement on Joint Measures in Respect of Nuclear Weapons," signed by B. Yeltsin, L. Kravchuk, N. Nazarbayev, and S. Shushkevich, states that our sovereign states pledge "not to transfer nuclear weapons or other explosive nuclear devices and technologies to anyone whatever." The strict fulfillment of this agreement will also guarantee the nuclear security of the CIS countries and the world community. But the chief guarantee, I believe, still lies elsewhere. It lies in you and me. In the desire of everyone together and of each one individually to comprehend and understand the realities of the new life and the prospects being opened up for us by peaceful coexistence and the abandonment of the creation of the image of the enemy. We have hardly realized this fully, but we are, I would like to believe, on the threshold of very great changes. What is needed to make them irreversible is goodwill and the desire to find joint paths to the truth not through blood and violence but through peace and concord.

Belarus Displeased Over Nuclear Arms Removal

LD1302050492 Moscow *POSTFACTUM* in English
2045 GMT 12 Feb 92

["Belarus Unhappy With the Way Nuclear Arms Are Removed"; from the "Military News" section—*POSTFACTUM* headline]

[Text] Minsk—According to a people's deputy of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic is not against removal of nuclear arms from its territory, but is not content that this is done without its knowledge.

As Colonel Valeriy Pavlov, people's deputy of the Republic of Belarus, told PF [*POSTFACTUM*], Belarus would adhere to the declared principle of being a non-nuclear state, but would not hurry up removal of nuclear arms from its territory, as its opinion had ceased to be taken into consideration. In particular, he noted, that removal of tactical nuclear arms from its territory was carried out without its knowledge and without any agreement with the Republic of Belarus.

We are not going to threaten anybody, Pavlov said, but we are responsible for the nuclear arms which were situated on our territory, whereas its removal is carried out in such a way that we don't even know what, where and in what quantities was carried away. Moreover, under the guise of removal of nuclear arms from the territory of Belarus, building materials and other property is being taken away to Russia. According to the order of the government, militia posts were strengthened in the roads of Belarus.

Kazakhstan To Set Weapons Elimination Terms

Kazakh Concerns Viewed

OW1202184092 Moscow *INTERFAX* in English
1724 GMT 12 Feb 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] At the meeting of the leaders of CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] nations in Minsk February 14 Kazakhstan will most likely put its own interests first—those of national and state security—in the discussions on the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons. This was indicated in comments by those close to President Nazarbayev.

According to the sources, the liquidation of nuclear weapons is one of Nursultan Nazarbayev's main objectives. However, the government of Kazakhstan repeatedly stated that the process of the reduction of strategic forces must come under a single military doctrine for the CIS, which does not yet exist but will be the topic of discussion at the Minsk meeting.

By some accounts there are 1150 strategical and 150 tactical nuclear warheads on Kazakhstan's territory. The dismantling of launch sites and transport of weapons to Russia is an extravagant undertaking for the Republic (the budget deficit is 8 billion rubles). "We didn't become a nuclear state by our own initiative", said Nazarbayev during the January 25 visit of French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas.

Kazakhstan is caught between the nuclear tongs of Russia from the west and China from the east. There is also the threat from the Russian leadership on ethnic disagreements (only 40% of Kazakhstan is native).

As for China, the head of the sector of military construction in Kazakhstan, Viktor Shklyar, says there are 10 disputed regions from both sides. One proposed solution is to establish a radius of one thousand kilometers from the borders which will be nuclear free.

Experts in Alma-Ata believe that Kazakhstan will be forced to join the nuclear club in the near future; members of the club are responsible for each others security. This, the experts assert, does not contradict the Alam-Ata agreement of December 21, 1991 on "the cooperation in nuclear relations".

President Sets Conditions

*LD1602204292 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya
Ostankino Television First Program Network
in Russian 1215 GMT 16 Feb 92*

[Interview with Kazakh President Nursultan Abishevich Nazarbayev by "Live Dialogue" program host Andrey Skryabin, MOSCOW NEWS columnist Lyudmila Telen, and correspondents Gadilbek Shalkhmetov and Aleksandr Samoylenko, who read questions telephoned into the program by viewers; Skryabin and Telen are in the Moscow studio, while Nazarbayev, Shalkhmetov, and Samoylenko are in the Alma-Ata studio on the "Live Dialogue" program—live]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [Skryabin] Another question about the army, if you will permit it. Russian experts think that Kazakhstan may soon claim the right to own nuclear weapons on its territory. We would like to know the president's view on this issue.

[Nazarbayev] Thank you for the question. Western journalists ask me the same thing. I must voice Kazakhstan's position quite clearly so that our population knows our position. First, the Alma-Ata declaration signed by the CIS and the Minsk agreement of 30 December: In Alma-Ata, the four republics possessing nuclear weapons signed this document. In Minsk, they signed a document on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Russia and Kazakhstan and Ukraine and Belarus—on whose territory nuclear weapons are sited—concluded a treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and all their components. We rewrote the article that says that none of us will by any means transfer to other countries either technology or nuclear weapons. Second, all four states on whose territory nuclear weapons were at one time sited—through no fault of their own, shall we say—reassured world public opinion by signing a document in Alma-Ata saying that they entrust this button to the Russian president, the commander in chief and chief of general staff. At the same time, any decision on the use—God forbid...[changes thought] If this ever needs to be taken, it will be taken only jointly by the four of us. A special communications link has been set up for that. At the last meeting, in Minsk, we said that this is not enough: For example, what will happen if there is no time, two or three press the button, and other missiles are targetted upon these missiles. We end up in a fix and are unable to express our attitude. Therefore, we agreed to set up a special commission to work out this mechanism. Kazakhstan is singling out this issue, or the issue is being raised, because Ukraine and Belarus said they would sign the treaties as nonnuclear states. Kazakhstan does not feature in this context, although we handed over all the control [upravleniye] and everything. Why? Because the treaty signed in 1968 states that nonnuclear states are those which have not tested, not exploded, nor before 1967 possessed nuclear weapons. Through no fault of our own, Kazakhstan carried out a nuclear explosion in 1949, and there were nuclear missiles before that, too. That is the first thing. If we are nonnuclear, then we must change the treaty we signed in Minsk, because

nonnuclear states must have no influence, either directly or indirectly, over the use of nuclear weapons. Our position is quite clear: We all signed that we aspire to becoming nonnuclear states. We join in all negotiating processes on reducing strategic armed forces. We are removing from Kazakhstan all tactical nuclear weapons which come under the treaty; we are withdrawing them to the territory of Russia, because nowhere else are there factories to disassemble them. Kazakhstan is participating in all other processes. If these weapons are destroyed by the United States, the former Soviet Union, and our neighbor—the PRC—then we are prepared to destroy them. That is our whole, quite clear position. [passage omitted]

Weapons Transfer to Russia Going 'Smoothly'

*LD1402100192 Moscow TASS in English 0856 GMT
14 Feb 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sergey Kuznetsov]

[Text] New York February 14 TASS—Commander in chief of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] Armed Forces, Air Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov plans to press for "Extremely tough control over strategic forces and a milder form of centralization and control for conventional armed forces" at the Minsk meeting of CIS heads of state, scheduled for February 14. He said this in an interview with the American aerospace magazine "AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY" in New York during President Yeltsin's visit to the United States. The interview was published here today.

Shaposhnikov said there were no problems with the implementation of the agreement reached by CIS heads of state last December in Minsk on the perpetuation of centralized control over the former Union's nuclear forces. He also reiterated earlier made assurances that tough control over tactical nuclear weapons would be continued.

"All these armaments will be concentrated on the territory of Russia by the summer of 1992," he stated. "As to the transfer of these weapons, the process is going on smoothly in accordance with the fixed schedules and without any complications.

"Some states believe only nuclear strategic forces are really strategic," he said. "Therefore, we are now conducting extensive explanatory work to make everything clear to our colleagues in various states."

The marshal warned that attempts by CIS states to divide the former Union's Air Force and to set up national air forces on their basis would inevitably produce a shortage of fuel and spare parts. "The reason is that planes are assembled and spare parts to them are produced on the territory of Russia, and we have not created any special mechanism for selling these parts to the republics, if they choose to have their own air forces," the marshal stated. "This is why I favour centralized control over the armed forces, otherwise "The

defence ministers of these republics will be confronted with difficulties which, in turn, will bring hardships to the Air Force personnel."

Shaposhnikov noted that purchases of new military hardware for the Army were being cut and the saved money would be used to improve the living conditions of servicemen. "We are also reducing the serial production of hardware, since we were formally prone to press for quantity," he stated. "Now we must press for quality," Shaposhnikov noted.

The marshal said that the armed forces' spendings on research and designing were also being cut, but not so abruptly as expenditures on new hardware. "We must not lag behind in the development of new armaments even though the danger of war has diminished substantially. But it has not been done away with completely," Shaposhnikov stressed.

He said the armed forces did not renounce their plans to build aircraft carriers and that they planned to continue work on new modifications of Su-27 and MiG-29 deck aircraft. At the same time, he stated that the programme for developing early radar spotting and warning A-50 planes was being revised. He said this aircraft proved inferior to the American analogue as regards tactical and technical performance.

Ukrainian President on System To Control Nuclear Arms Use

*LD1402223392 Moscow TASS in English
2152 GMT 14 Feb 92*

[By BELTA correspondent—TASS]

[Text] Minsk February 15 TASS—The Commonwealth strategic forces, primarily nuclear ones, are subordinated to the Council of State heads of the Commonwealth and commander-in-chief of these forces Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk told a news conference on results of the Minsk summit.

By 1994 the issue of subordination of the strategic forces will not be on the Ukrainian agenda at all, since all the nuclear weapons will be removed from its territory by that time.

Touching on the mechanism of taking decision on the use or non-use of nuclear weapons, the president said special telephones have been placed in the Commonwealth member-countries' capitals. The telephones are connected with the "black box" for recording the content of negotiations between the presidents on this issue and monitoring of the stand of each side.

Text of CIS Strategic Forces Agreement

*LD1502091892 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 0828 GMT 15 Feb 92*

["Agreement Among the Member States of the Commonwealth of Independent States on the Status of the Strategic Forces"—TASS headline]

[Text] The Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, the Republic of Uzbekistan, and Ukraine, hereinafter referred to as the "Commonwealth member states," guided by the agreement on the strategic forces among the member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States,

taking into account the role of the Commonwealth's strategic forces in ensuring the security of the Commonwealth member states,

confirming their commitment to the principles and norms of international law,

have agreed on the following:

Article One

For the purposes of the present agreement, the following terms mean:

1. "Strategic Forces"—military formations and installations which are under united command, the list of which is determined by each state in agreement with the Command of the strategic forces and is confirmed by the Council of Heads of State.
2. "Military Formations and Installations"—military units, establishments, military training establishments, enterprises, organizations, military representations, air bases, test sites, command points, and other installations of the strategic forces.
3. "Host State"—a state which is a member of the Commonwealth on whose territory strategic forces are deployed.
4. Place of Deployment (Basing)—the territory allocated for use by the strategic forces.
5. Immovable Property of the Strategic Forces—the military settlements, airfields, naval bases, ports, access rail tracks, structures at combat positions, training areas, firing ranges, fixed site command and control facilities, communications equipment, residential buildings, and other structures in use by the strategic forces and guaranteeing their ability to function, which are located on the areas of land granted to them for temporary use.
6. Movable Property of the Strategic Forces—all forms of weaponry, ammunition, and military equipment, including the necessary means of transport and other material and technical resources in use by the strategic forces.

7. Persons Belonging to the Strategic Forces—servicemen and civilians performing service or working in formations of the strategic forces.
8. Members of the Families of Persons Belonging to the Strategic Forces—spouses, children and other dependent relatives.

Article Two

General Provisions

1. Any state which is a member of the Commonwealth may be a party to the present agreement regardless of whether military formations and installations of the strategic forces are deployed on its territory.
2. The purpose of the strategic forces is to ensure the security of all states which are party to the agreement and they are maintained at the expense of fixed payments from these states. (The property of the strategic forces is the joint property of all the states which are party to the agreement - Armenia dissenting.)
3. Each of the Commonwealth member states gives its consent to the permanent or temporary deployment and functioning of military formations and installations of the strategic forces in their places of deployment (basing), in which they were deployed and were functioning at the moment of the signing of the present agreement. Alterations to the places of deployment are implemented by agreement between the parties to the present agreement.
4. The deployment of military units and facilities of the strategic forces on the territory of a Commonwealth member state in no way affects the sovereignty of that state. The strategic forces do not interfere in the internal affairs of the host state. Military units and facilities of the strategic forces on the territory of a Commonwealth member state and persons belonging to them are obliged to respect and observe the laws of that state.
5. The Commonwealth member states do not commit actions obstructing the strategic forces in the fulfillment of their functions, unless they contradict the legislation of a sovereign state.

Article 3

Acquisition of Manpower by the Strategic Forces

The strategic forces acquire their manpower on the basis of the principles defined in a separate agreement.

Article 4

Command of Strategic Forces

1. The strategic forces function as an independent strategic grouping.
2. Command of the Commonwealth strategic forces is exercised by the commander of strategic forces, subordinated to the Council of Heads of State and the commander in chief of the joint armed forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

3. The Strategic Forces Command

- draws up plans for the combat application of the groupings, formations, and units of strategic forces;
 - organizes combat duty (operational service) [boyevoye dezhurstvo (boyevaya sluzhba)], plans and carries out operational and combat training, and carries out other measures to maintain the strategic forces in the requisite state of combat readiness;
 - exercises direct operational control of groupings, formations, and units of strategic forces; organizes and carries out measures to maintain the safety of nuclear weapons in areas where they are based and on transit routes and the safety of the civilian population and measures to protect the environment;
 - carries out the functions prescribed to it in the general system of measures to prevent unauthorized actions involving nuclear weapons;
 - places orders with scientific and industrial organizations of the member states of the Commonwealth on a contractual basis for the development and supply to the strategic forces of armaments and combat hardware in line with approved armaments programs, and finances the works that are carried out within the limits of the budget allocations earmarked for these purposes;
 - and carries out measures to observe international treaties on nuclear weapons and other forms of weapons of mass destruction.
4. A decision on the need to use nuclear weapons is taken under the procedure laid down in Article 4 of the Agreement on Strategic Forces between the member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States of 30 December 1991.

Article Five

Legal Position of Persons Who Are Members of the Strategic Forces and the Members of Their Families

The legal position of persons who are members of the strategic forces and the members of their families is regulated by the agreement between the member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States on Social and Legal Guarantees for servicemen, persons discharged from military service, and members of their families.

Article Six

Relations between the Strategic Forces and the State Bodies, Enterprises and Organizations of the Commonwealth Member States

1. Military command bodies of the Commonwealth's strategic forces carry out their activity in cooperation with the state bodies, enterprises, and organizations of the Commonwealth member states.
2. The Commonwealth's strategic forces conclude contracts with enterprises and organizations of the Commonwealth member states to carry out work to create, modernize, and destroy weapons and military equipment and work on other matters of providing back-up

for the activity of the strategic forces. The Commonwealth member states assist in concluding such contracts.

3. Movements by units of the strategic forces, exercises, maneuvers, and other activities organized for the operational and combat training of the strategic forces outside the confines of their places of permanent deployment (basing) are conducted in accordance with plans agreed with the body authorized by the government of the Commonwealth member state on whose territory it is intended to conduct those activities, or with the consent in each case of that government or of the body authorized by it.
The Commonwealth member states grant the military units and facilities of the strategic forces the necessary transportation facilities and land, air, and sea space for their movement, in accordance with the above plans.
4. The construction of new roads, bridges, buildings, and permanent radio and radio-electronic structures with defined frequencies and capacity in the places of deployment of the strategic forces and the construction of other immovable facilities of the strategic forces is carried out with the consent of the responsible bodies of the Commonwealth member state on whose territory it is proposed to construct the new facilities.
5. When areas of land in use by the strategic forces are left, they revert to the host state. The subject of immovable facilities built there with the funds of the strategic forces is settled in accordance with the legislation of the host state or with a relevant agreement.

Article Seven

Financing the Strategic Forces and Providing Them With Material and Technical Back-Up

1. The Commonwealth member states participate proportionately in financing the strategic forces and in fulfilling international obligations to reduce and destroy them. The volumes of expenditures on the above aims and the financing procedure are determined by a separate agreement.
2. The procedure for providing material and technical back-up for the strategic forces and payments in the currency of the host state is determined by the Council of Heads of Government of the members of the Commonwealth.

Article Eight

Property of the Strategic Forces

1. The host states reserve to the strategic forces the immovable property which they had at the time of signing the present agreement; they provide them with electricity, communal, and other services. The procedure and conditions under which the strategic forces use the areas of land allocated to them and also

for providing the strategic forces with all types of services are determined in accordance with the legislation of the host state.

2. The movable property of the strategic forces is at their disposal and for their use. The procedure for dealing with it is determined by the Council of Heads of Government of the Commonwealth.
The Commonwealth member states undertake not to hinder the transfer of movable property of the strategic forces outside the state by agreement with the host party.
3. The road transportation vehicles of the military formations of the strategic forces have registration numbers and distinguishing signs. Unified registration numbers and signs are established by the Main Command of the Commonwealth's unified armed forces.

Article Nine

Matters of Jurisdiction

In cases of crimes and misdemeanors committed by persons belonging to the strategic forces or by members of their families, the legislation in force on the territory of the Commonwealth member state where the crimes or misdemeanors were committed shall apply.

Article Ten

Procedure for Withdrawal From the Agreement

In exercise of its sovereignty, each member state of the Commonwealth has the right to withdraw from this agreement. A member state of the Commonwealth which intends to withdraw from the agreement informs the depositary state and all other member states in writing of its decision to act in this way. Such notification is to be given at least one year before the proposed withdrawal from the agreement.

Article Eleven

Coming Into Force of the Agreement

1. The present agreement is subject to ratification by each member state of the Commonwealth in accordance with its constitutional procedures. The instruments of ratification are handed over for safekeeping to the Government of the Republic of Belarus, which by this agreement is appointed as the depositary.
2. The present agreement comes into force 10 days after the instruments of ratification have been handed over for safekeeping by all member states of the Commonwealth.
3. The depositary immediately informs all member states of the Commonwealth:
 - A) of the handing over for safekeeping of each instrument of ratification;
 - B) of the coming into force of the present agreement;
 - C) of any notification of the member states of the Commonwealth to withdraw from the present agreement in accordance with Article Ten, and of the date of their withdrawal;

D) of any matter requiring the provisions of the present agreement to be revised or defined more precisely.

The agreement comes into force from the moment that it is signed.

Completed in Minsk on 14 February 1992 in one original copy in Russian. The original is kept in the archive of the Government of the Republic of Belarus, which will send a certified copy to the states which have signed this agreement.

The agreement was signed by representatives of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine.

The Azerbaijan representative added the footnote: "On condition that the strategic units located only on the territory of Azerbaijan are financed, and that those units are withdrawn by the end of 1994."

The representative of Armenia added the note: "With a dissenting opinion."

The Kazakhstan representative noted that "an agreement on the test sites will be concluded with the Republic of Kazakhstan."

The Kyrgyzstan representative specified: "Inclusion of Article Two, Point 2."

The Ukraine representative made the annotation: "With the exception of Article Two, point 2, and Article Ten (for Ukraine, in accordance with the Minsk agreement, the term for withdrawal is the end of 1994)."

Poll Views Possibility of Nuclear Weapons' Use
924P0086A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 15 Feb 92 p 2

[INTERFAX report: "What Might a Cause of War Be?"]

[Text] In a January poll of the All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion 29 percent of the participants in Ukraine believe that a lack of order and discipline in the Army and the accidental use of the weapons could now be a cause of using nuclear weapons. Some 24 percent of Russian respondents and 21 percent of Kazakhs are of the same opinion.

Some 1,597 persons were polled in Russia, 517 in Ukraine, and 240 in Kazakhstan, the "DATA" Agency reports.

"Owing to a lack of proper control of the storage of the weapons and the possibility of their falling into the hands of terrorist groupings" was how 28 percent in Russia, 23 percent in Ukraine, and 22 percent in Kazakhstan defined a possible cause.

Some 9 percent of Russians, 8 percent of Ukrainian respondents, and 7 percent of Kazakhs believe that a nuclear conflict could be a consequence of a decision of

the leadership of this republic or the other to use nuclear weapons in an interrepublic conflict.

One out of every five Kazakh respondents believes that an attack by an external enemy could cause war, while 7 percent of Russians and 5 percent of Ukrainians are of this opinion.

The remainder could not say.

Ukrainian-Russian Controversy Over Strategic Bombers

1st Strategic Division Switches Allegiance

LD1702174392 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1655 GMT 17 Feb 92

[By UKRINFORM correspondent Nikolay Zayka]

[Text] Uzen (Kievskaya Oblast), 17 Feb—The 1st Strategic Air Force Division in the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] strategic forces, which is deployed here, today renounced its subordination to the center and has gone over to Ukrainian jurisdiction. On the orders of the strategic air force commander, Colonel General Igor Kalugin, the division commander, Major General Mikhail Bashkirov was removed from his post with subsequent dismissal from the Armed Forces. This decision was abrogated by the order of the Ukrainian minister of defense on instruction from President Leonid Kravchuk. Gen. Kalugin's arrival in Uzen is expected tomorrow.

Ukrainian Official Comments

LD1802221492 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya
Ostankino Television First Program Network
in Russian 1800 GMT 18 Feb 92

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] Today all the world's news agencies are trying to get as much information as possible about the crews of the 21 long-range strategic aviation bombers which, according to TASS, have declared that they have gone over to Ukrainian jurisdiction. REUTER writes that the 21 aircraft are fitted with equipment for cruise missile strikes and also for dropping nuclear bombs.

In order to clarify the true state of affairs, we got through on the telephone to Georgiy Vladimirovich Zhivitsa, chief of the Ukrainian General Staff. He said that in spite of the fact that the formation in Uzen had really sworn allegiance to Ukraine, there was no resubordination.

Anatoliy Alekseyevich Proskurin, chief of staff of long-range aviation, in reply to our telephoned question, confirmed that the division stationed in Uzen—or to be more precise the personnel of a tanker aircraft regiment and some personnel at divisional headquarters—had taken the oath of allegiance to the people of Ukraine. Regarding the existing fears about control over the

nuclear button, Proskurin said: The nuclear button is in reliable hands. We took these measures beforehand.

An agreement was also reached through which all the personnel of the division would come under Ukrainian jurisdiction but would carry out their functions and functional duties in subordination to its direct superiors in the army and the command of long-range aviation.

Military To Investigate

OW1802174892 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1643 GMT 18 Feb 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Col.-Gen. Igor Kalugin, commander of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] long-range air force, arrives in Uzen (Kiev region) on Tuesday [18 February] to look into the situation with the oath of allegiance in the local long-range air force division of the Commonwealth's strategic forces. Reports from Kiev say that on Monday [17 February] the division moved out of Moscow's control and under Ukraine's jurisdiction, since the absolute majority of the personnel pledged allegiance to Ukraine. The Moscow long-range air force HQ says nearly 50% of the division's servicemen, including a regiment of flying tanks [as received] and part of the combat regiment, took the oath of allegiance.

The division commander is believed to be concerned about the personnel's future and trying to win the sympathy of the local authorities. According to reports from Kiev, Gen. Kalugin replaced the division commander but the Ukrainian Defense Minister restored the latter to his post. The Ukrainian Defense Ministry's press center says the Vinnitsa garrison and cadets of the Kiev Naval Academy have, too, pledged allegiance to the Ukrainian people. By agreement with the Main Naval Headquarters of the former USSR most academy graduates will be sent to serve in the fleets of various Commonwealth member countries. As of July 1, 1995 the Kiev Naval Academy will cease existing; its premises will be offered to the Kiev-Mogilyanskaya academy. The only naval school in the CIS armed forces is expected to be situated in Sevastopol.

Kravchuk Appeals to Yeltsin on 'Hijacking'

LD1802235192 Moscow Mayak Radio Network
in Russian 2230 GMT 18 Feb 92

[Text] Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk has issued a sharp statement in connection with the unsanctioned flight of six bombers to a military airfield on the territory of Russia. A telegram to the Russian president says that the hijacking of the combat aircraft may give rise to a whole chain of negative phenomena. Kravchuk asked the president of Russia to give a political and legal appraisal of these unlawful acts and to adopt measures to return the transgressors and the equipment.

Thanks Regiment for Stance

LD1802154792 Moscow TASS International
Service in Russian 1305 GMT 18 Feb 92

[By unidentified UKRINFORM-ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Kiev, February 18 (TASS)—Ukraine President Leonid Kravchuk has thanked the regiment for its position of principle over the unlawful actions of those who flew six combat aircraft from the Starokonstantinovo military airfield to Russia without permission.

Today's edition of NARODNAYA ARMIYA [The People's Army], a Ukrainian Defense Ministry newspaper, carries an appeal by the personnel of the Starokonstantinovo garrison to the president and defense minister of Ukraine, in which they express their indignation over that extraordinary event. They ask the president not to disband the unit but to confer upon it the title of "1st Bomber Aviation Regiment" and award a banner bearing the state emblem of Ukraine.

Kravchuk Cable to Yeltsin on Bombers

PM1902214192 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 20 Feb 92 p 2

[Correspondent O. Musafirova report: "'Rooks' Awaiting a Cage?"]

[Text] Kiev—President Kravchuk has sent President Yeltsin a telegram: "Esteemed Boris Nikolayevich! We report that at 1540 hours on 13 February, six Su-24M bombers were hijacked [ugnano] to Russian territory from Starokonstantinov Airfield. This act was premeditated by Lieutenant Colonel V.P. Chernyy, deputy commander of a combined unit, and Lieutenant Colonel A.I. Krishtop, chief of staff at a bomber air regiment. Armed Forces personnel learned with indignation of this crime, which contravenes existing international agreements and Ukrainian legislation. The hijacking of the warplanes and the misappropriation of the combat banner could generate a whole chain of negative phenomena—from massive transfers [peregon] of equipment to the prohibition of its use even in cases of extreme need, which could have a negative impact on the international assessment of the processes taking place within the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States]. I would ask you, Boris Nikolayevich, to make a political and legal assessment of these illegal actions and to take measures to return the offenders, equipment, and combat banner. Respectfully, L. Kravchuk"

The military prosecutor's office, together with military counterintelligence organs and the Ukrainian National Security Service for Khmelnytskyi Oblast, has instituted criminal proceedings in relation to the aircraft hijacking. An investigation is under way. And another flight of "rooks" [Russian nickname for Su-24], in particular over Poltava, marked the fact that the strategic aviation units

stationed in the city has stopped hesitating and has sworn a mass oath of loyalty to Ukraine.

Poll on Concentrating Nuclear Arms in Russia

924P0090B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 19 Feb 92 p 2

[INTERFAX report: "Will Nuclear Weapons Make Russia a Great Power?"]

[Text] How do you view the proposal for the concentration of all nuclear weapons of the former USSR in Russia? The All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion put this question to participants in a January poll. Some 1,597 persons were polled in Russia, 517 in Ukraine, and 240 in Kazakhstan, the "DATA" Agency reports.

Russian respondents showed the greatest enthusiasm for this proposal: 43 percent believe that this corresponds most to the interests of security.

Half as many respondents were of this opinion in Kazakhstan—21 percent—and 19 percent in Ukraine.

Some 39 percent of those polled in Ukraine, 30 percent in Kazakhstan, and 4 percent in Russia are opposed to the concentration of all nuclear weapons on the territory of Russia. In their opinion, this would afford Russia advantages over the other states of the Commonwealth.

About 15 percent of the participants in the poll in Russia, 8 percent in Ukraine, and 6 percent in Kazakhstan declared that such actions would do great harm to Russian security.

GERMANY

Cabinet Discusses Bundeswehr Reorganization**Stoltenberg Document Debated**

*AU1902151692 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network
in German 1200 GMT 19 Feb 92*

[Report by Peter Heinemann]

[Text] The Cabinet, convening today behind closed doors in the bug-proof conference room at the Defense Ministry, discussed the reorganization of the Bundeswehr's personnel structure as an instrument of security and foreign policy. The debate focused on the so-called Stoltenberg document, drafted by Inspector General Klaus Naumann, that deals with the Bundeswehr's future personnel structure. The document was approved and adopted by Cabinet members today. The study, as known at the Defense Ministry, became necessary because, during the meeting between Chancellor Kohl and then Soviet President Gorbachev in the Caucasus, a Bundeswehr reduction in the united Germany to 370,000 men by the end of 1994 was agreed upon as one of the preconditions for German unification. In today's debate on concepts for the general course and further development of Bundeswehr reorganization and on key features of the 1993 Bundeswehr plan, government officials hinted that a good compromise was achieved between the plans of Defense Minister Stoltenberg and the government's budget policy aimed at balancing the budget.

A major element is improving the equity in conscription by raising the number of draftees performing basic military service from 151,000 to 155,000, reducing privates who sign up for a specific period of time by 4,000; and lowering the number of places in military training centers by 1,000. At the same time, the so-called command density in the units will be increased to improve training quality, the supporters of this study claim. Thus, idleness will soon belong to the past. The Bundeswehr wants to offer improved career opportunities to professional soldiers and soldiers who sign up for a certain period of time and to considerably improve its attractiveness, including a correction of the personnel structure to thin out the bloated top ranks.

For the social-democratic opposition, its defense policy spokesman, Walter Kolbow, said in connection with the Bundeswehr leadership's plans, which go beyond the year 2000, that the so-called Stoltenberg study contains specific signs for the preparation of the Bundeswehr for missions outside the NATO area. As a matter of fact, the document, not unanimously approved by the government coalition, particularly the Free Democratic Party of Germany, states that the Bundeswehr must be able to promote and ensure political, economic, military, and ecological stability worldwide. In the run-up to today's Cabinet session, Defense Minister Stoltenberg said that this document is only a study. But the statements by the

defense expert of the Social Democratic Party of Germany on these points make it clear that a controversy is bound to erupt. Kolbow heavily attacked Stoltenberg and the government, claiming that with this document, the Defense Ministry has finally taken off its mask, because its concepts and plans are aimed at worldwide Bundeswehr missions that do not correspond to the Basic Law. As has become known, the Cabinet members stated today that such missions would only be possible after a corresponding amendment to the Basic Law, and only in individual cases upon UN request and within the framework of the UN Charter, without developing an automatism. A decision would be required in every individual case.

Restructuring Plan Approved

*LD1902155592 Hamburg DPA in German 1427 GMT
19 Feb 92*

[Excerpts] Bonn (DPA)—The Cabinet today approved Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg's plans for the restructuring of the Bundeswehr by the end of the century. The rapid reaction force that is to be set up will also be available for military missions within the framework of the United Nations outside the NATO alliance area, following a clarifying addition to the Basic Law, Stoltenberg said during government Bundestag proceedings.

Establishing this force will not anticipate an amendment to the Basic Law, Stoltenberg said. Up to 25 percent of the Army, 40 percent of the Navy, and 30 percent of the Air Force will be included in the forces that will make up the units that initially have to be available promptly for deployment in crisis situations inside the alliance territory.

Speaking to the news conference, Government Spokesman Dieter Vogel explained that it has become clear in the Cabinet that the Federal Government and the (ruling) coalition parties intend to seek either a supplement to or clarification of the Basic Law. The government, he said, believes that in terms of constitutional politics, it is necessary to amend the Basic Law. Whatever happens, a conflict in the Constitutional Court should be avoided, he added.

Stoltenberg announced that in the future fewer reservists than previously are to be called up. The Bundeswehr will concentrate on calling up those who have recently completed their military service, he said. A decision will soon be made on a new plan for reservists that will fit in with the new personnel structure, he added. Now, there are over 600,000 reservists who can still be called up for defense exercises. [passage omitted]

Those doing basic military service are to be trained in such a way that they are available as fully combat-ready reservists in the event of mobilization. With a view to the improved security situation in Europe, the question of whether the defensive size of the Bundeswehr—already reduced from 1.3 million to 900,000 soldiers and

potentially reduced even further—will be examined. In the future, the Bundeswehr will have many more elite units. The units still have too few regular troops. In a crisis, they should “grow to full size” by adding reservists. [passage omitted]

According to Stoltenberg, the plans envision that the Bundeswehr units’ command and reconnaissance capacity should be improved. The number of divisions in the Army will be reduced from 12 to eight. Twenty of the hitherto 48 brigades will be totally disbanded. Only seven brigades will be kept constantly combat-ready. Among other things, the Air Force will decommission the Alpha Jet fighter-bomber. The number of floating units of the Navy will be reduced from 180 to 90. Some 46,000 civilian jobs with the Bundeswehr will be cut.

DPA has learned that the Cabinet noted that there is still a need to discuss the paper “Military Policy and Military Strategic Bases and Basic Direction of the Restructuring of the Bundeswehr.” Stoltenberg concurred with this view, it was said. The paper, available to the Cabinet, defines German security interests and alliance commitments. The possibilities for operations within the framework of the United Nations are also mapped out there.

Figures on Planned Personnel Cuts

*LD1902140892 Hamburg DPA in German 1058 GMT
19 Feb 92*

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—The Cabinet today approved plans by Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg for the restructuring of the Bundeswehr by the end of the century. Participants in the meeting said that the Cabinet “heard and agreed to” the organizational, deployment, and structural plans of the head of the Bundeswehr. Stoltenberg and high-ranking military personnel told the government of the situation and development of the Bundeswehr that is to be reduced from 495,000 to 370,000 men by 1995.

Almost 44 billion German marks will be saved by 2005 by canceling, avoiding use of, and reducing weapon systems. A new reservist policy will be announced in the spring under which the number of reservists called up for exercises will be reduced considerably. The Bundeswehr has already been reduced from 1.3 million to 900,000 men, and further reductions are very likely. It is evolving from one more geared to maintaining a presence to one focusing on training and mobilization. Rapid reaction units are to be set up for crisis situations.

Genscher Urges Chemical Weapons Convention at CD

*LD2002115492 Berlin ADN in German 1050 GMT
20 Feb 92*

[Text] Geneva (ADN)—According to Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the Geneva Conference on Disarmament [CD] must conclude a convention on the worldwide prohibition of chemical weapons this year. Genscher told the conference on Thursday [20 February]

that this is the body’s central task. The ban on using chemical weapons, defied again and again, has proved inadequate, he said. “Only a clear ban on any dealings with chemical weapons—that is to say including their manufacture, acquisition, and possession—can free us finally from this scourge of humanity,” Genscher said.

A chemical weapons convention, however, can bring this about only if the large majority of states sign it and if there is confidence in the effective verification of the agreed prohibitions. “Only the verifiable nature of the commitments entered into creates confidence, and only confidence creates security,” Genscher said. Negotiations on the verification system have made much progress already, and everything points to the possibility of consensus, he said. Inspections in the chemical industry also are indispensable, he added, in order to act as a deterrent against the misuse of the civilian chemical industry for weapons production.

Genscher welcomed the declaration by Russian President Boris Yeltsin to the effect that Russia has assumed responsibility for the destruction of all former Soviet chemical weapons stocks. Eliminating these weapons on schedule is of particular significance, he said, but Moscow must receive support in solving the problems connected with the storage, containment, and destruction of these weapons, he added. Genscher gave the assurance that Germany is ready to do this.

He also spoke in favor of the immediate abolition of all tactical nuclear weapons, saying they had become an “anachronism.” In Genscher’s opinion, the UN Security Council should impose extraordinarily severe sanctions to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation. States that try to acquire the means to produce nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction, in violation of international law, must be isolated, he said.

Departing CIS Troops Plan To Scrap Weapons

*AU2702133392 Hamburg DIE WELT in German
26 Feb 92 p 5*

[Ruediger Moniac report: “Where To Put the Scrapped Arms?”]

[Text] Colonel General Matyev Burlakov is having problems. The commander of the former Soviet troops in Germany who, under the agreement concluded between Moscow and Bonn on the deployment and withdrawal of these troops, has to organize the orderly return of his military units to the CIS wants to scrap a major part of the weapons in Germany. This is, however, not planned in the treaty, which says that the troops have to be withdrawn with all movable property.

The Soviet Armed Forces have to be withdrawn totally by the end of 1994. That is why Burlakov has now informed the Federal Government of his intention to decommission in Germany tanks, armored personnel carriers, and other large equipment to avoid having to ship it to Russia.

Bonn is alarmed for various reasons. According to information obtained by DIE WELT, the Foreign Ministry will inform the Russian Embassy shortly that the treaty on the withdrawal prohibits Burlakov from scrapping weapons, unless the Russians are prepared to renegotiate the respective agreement. But even that would be problematic, because scrapping weapons must be in accordance with German environmental laws, which are relatively strict. No German environmentalist believes, therefore, that it would be possible to scrap the steel colossi in the Russian tank repair shops on German soil in Wuensdorf, Kirchmoeser, or Werder in a way that takes environmental regulations into account. In addition, Bonn has also objections to the precipitate scrapping, because the weapons scrapped would not be included in the destruction quota agreed upon in the CFE Treaty before it is ratified. In his letter of 18 February to the head of the German Liaison Command, Major General Hartmut Foertsch, Burlakov says that about 3,000 large weapons should not be shipped back home but should be scrapped in Germany.

Moreover, the Russians want to profit from the scrapping in Germany. During his recent visit to Bonn, Pavel Grachev, Russian defense minister, said that he was also prepared to decommission, against payment, the large weapons of the former NVA [National People's Army] in Wuensdorf and elsewhere. Bonn politely took note of this offer but did not act. The Federal Government is apparently planning to commission German special firms with the scrapping, once the CFE Treaty becomes effective, presumably by this summer.

The withdrawal of Burlakov's units is continuing on schedule. Four out of eight motorized infantry divisions were pulled out last year, and two more will leave Germany this year. One out of eight tank divisions was deployed to the CIS in 1991, and three more will follow this year. Federal Government experts are certain that most units withdrawn will be disbanded in their home country.

UNITED KINGDOM

Government To Help Russia Reduce Nuclear Arsenal

LD2702163392 London PRESS ASSOCIATION
in English 1548 GMT 27 Feb 92

[Report by Charles Miller, PRESS ASSOCIATION
defence correspondent]

[Text] Defence Secretary Tom King today unveiled a multi-million pound package to help Russia complete its ambitious plans to cut its huge nuclear arsenal by two thirds. He said Britain would provide:—250 special containers for the secure transport of nuclear weapons;—20 armoured vehicles designed specifically for transporting the containers with the warheads;—

Consultancy assistance in nuclear safety, the storage of fissile material for use in civil nuclear reactors.

Environment Secretary John Wakeham will visit Russia next week to discuss further how the assistance can be best used. The British moves follow talks with President Boris Yeltsin and Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of the new Commonwealth's armed forces, on their recent visit to London.

A British technical team led by Dr Geoffrey Pocock, Mr King's principal technical advisor on nuclear matters, went to Moscow shortly afterward to meet their Russian counterparts. Mr King said: "The Russians asked for assistance and advice on a number of nuclear matters and the government has agreed to meet their requests in full."

He said the vehicles, costing up to 1 million pounds sterling each, and the special containers would be built in Britain and provided to the Russians free of charge. A small number of British personnel would be based in Russia to help with the programme. Some 10 million pounds sterling has been earmarked from reserves to pay for the first year's costs.

Mr King said: "This will be the start of our contribution as one of the most critical and valuable contributions we can make protecting the world from what could be very major nuclear hazards indeed and very destabilising risks as well of proliferation."

Dr Pocock said the Russians had "considerable" problems storing fissile material and were seeking help from the United States as well as Britain. He said the problems had been exacerbated by the very ambitious time-scale the Russians had set themselves for dismantling their nuclear weapons. But he emphasised Britain had no plans to become involved in the actual dismantling of the weapons themselves.

All tactical nuclear weapons are to be withdrawn from the republics to Russia by July and all the strategic weapons by 1994. However there will remain a major transport task within Russia itself for the next ten years.

It is a field in which Britain has well-established expertise and the Russians, uneasy about some of their transport systems, are keen to learn. Asked about the need for armoured vehicles, Mr King said: "You must have protection against some lunatic who might express his opposition to nuclear weapons in some irresponsible way. You must give them reasonable protection." Mr King concluded: "The task is an enormous one and the time-scale which they have set for its completion means that outside help will be necessary."

Experts from British Nuclear Fuels, who form part of the technical team to visit Russia, will be offering special advice on ways of using fissile material in civil nuclear reactors.

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